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11 Introduction
This work deals with the double dividend hypothesis and the macroeconomic impacts
of ecological tax reforms – a topic that has become very prominent during the last ten
years. The double dividend hypothesis claims that environmental taxes not only
reduce pollution (first dividend), but raise tax revenues that can be used to cut other
distortionary taxes in order to enhance the allocative efficiency of the (non-
environmental) tax system (second dividend). In the European countries, which
suffer – more or less – from long-lasting unemployment, the second dividend is
mainly interpreted as a reduction in the tax burden on labour and as having positive
employment effects. In this context, the hypothesis of the ‘employment double
dividend’ (EDD) was established. While the theory of the EDD has been widely
developed during recent years, there is still a lack of empirical research that
quantitatively evaluates the employment effects of ecological tax reforms and
analyses potential trade-offs between the first and second dividend.
This empirical study intends to close this gap partially by using different methods of
applied economics. The essential focus of this thesis is the evaluation of the
macroeconomic (mainly employment) effects of a shift from labour to energy taxes in
a computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework. The underlying model is GEM-
E3, a multi-country, multi-sector CGE model developed by the ZEW, Mannheim,
together with other European research institutes by order of the European
Commission (DG XII).
Basically, CGE models are outstanding in quantitatively evaluating tax policies since
they consider (i.a.) the interrelations between energy and labour market distortions.
CGE model results, however, are only as good as the theoretical assumptions and the
empirical data base on which they rest. Hence, the main task of this work is to
theoretically respecify some of the functional forms, to substantiate important
parameters used in GEM-E3 by applying econometric methods, and to test whether
these modifications affect the EDD outcome.
The GEM-E3 model can be applied either in the EU-14 model version, covering 14
EU countries that all are linked via bilateral trade flows, or in the single-country
version, e.g. for Germany. Two ecological tax reform scenarios are applied in this
work. Both consider a shift from social security contributions to the tax on CO2
emissions for producers and consumers. One scenario assumes an EU-wide co-
ordinated tax policy and is applied to the GEM-E3 EU-14 version. The other scenario
2simulates a unilateral ecological tax reform in Germany and is thus applied to the
single-country version for Germany.
The remainder of this work is divided into five chapters:
In Chapter 2 I review the theoretical literature on energy taxes and ecological tax
reforms. I turn first to an assessment of energy taxes with respect to ecological
effectiveness, cost effectiveness, and innovation incentives; the question of whether
such an instrument can raise revenues is another evaluation criterion. I then survey
the theoretical literature on ecological tax reforms and identify the conditions under
which an EDD can emerge in models with perfectly competitive labour markets and
in models that consider involuntary unemployment. Generally, one will find that
positive employment effects can occur only on the condition that the ecological tax
reform induces tax shifting effects from labour to other sources of private income
that are sufficiently high to offset the negative tax burden effect on labour.
Chapters 3 to 5 concentrate on the impact that substitution elasticities, foreign trade
elasticities, and labour supply elasticities have on the EDD outcome.
In Chapter 3 I focus on the possibilities of tax shifting processes from labour to other
factor income and test the sensitivity of the GEM-E3 single-country version for
Germany with respect to substitution patterns in production. Today there are only a
few empirical studies available that deal with detailed substitution patterns in the
German economy, refer to both producing and service sectors, and account for
disaggregated energy inputs. Therefore, I estimate price and substitution elasticities
between capital, labour, material, electricity, and fossil fuels for four sector
aggregates: energy supply, energy- and nonenergy-intensive manufacturing, and
service sectors. The data basis consists of pooled time series and cross sections for
nearly fifty sectors over the period 1978-90. I provide sectoral estimates for both the
non-nested and the three-level nested translog cost function, where the latter fits into
the nested production structure of the GEM-E3 model. Estimations are completed by
econometric tests on returns to scale of the sectoral production functions and tests for
weak homothetic separability. I introduce the estimates of the nested translog cost
function into the GEM-E3 single country version for Germany and conduct
sensitivity analyses.
The focus of Chapter 4 lies on the impact of terms-of-trade effects on the EDD
outcome in the GEM-E3 EU-14 model. Since terms-of-trade effects depend on the
specification of import and export demand and supply functions of both the EU-14
3and the rest of the world, I first review the general options for a foreign closure. A
world closure is necessary in the GEM-E3 EU-14 model since the behaviour of the
rest of the world is kept exogenous in large parts. After describing the foreign trade
system of the GEM-E3 EU-14 model, I propose three changes in the foreign trade
system: First, I relax the small-country assumption for the EU and assume that trade
activities of the EU affect world prices. Second, I introduce a feedback mechanism
between macroeconomic developments in the EU and the foreign sector. Finally, I
reparameterise the upper-level Armington elasticities in both foreign and EU’s
import demand functions, thus changing the own-price elasticities of sectoral import
demand functions. The sensitivity of the GEM-E3 EU-14 model with respect to the
employment effects of an EU-wide co-ordinated ecological tax reform is tested for all
these specifications.
Chapter 5 deals with the labour market and concentrates on empirical modelling of
the wage setting process in Germany. First, I characterise the institutional structure of
the German labour market and analyse the role of trade unions in the German wage
formation process. The main interest of this chapter is the derivation of a wage
setting equation from a monopoly union model, in which it is assumed that the trade
union has sufficient power to unilaterally set the wage (given labour demand). This
wage setting equation, as well as an exogenous wage model, are introduced into the
single-country version of the GEM-E3 model. I analyse whether employment effects
of a shift from energy to labour taxes are strengthened or diminished (compared to
the neo-classical labour market specification) in the cases of exogenous real wage
rigidities and a monopoly union. Moreover, I consider two policies of unemployment
compensation: a fixed replacement ratio of unemployment benefits to wages and
nominally fixed unemployment benefits.
Finally, in Chapter 6 I summarise the main results, draw a conclusion, and identify
areas where future research is needed.
42 Energy taxation and the employment double
dividend
2.1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the 90’s, energy taxes, either based on the energy and/or the
carbon content of energy products, have been unilaterally introduced in a number of
Western European countries in order to reduce energy consumption and CO2
emissions (cf. Ekins and Speck 1999, Scholz 1999, Smulders and Vollebergh 2000).
Compared to other commonly-used climate policy instruments, such as energy
efficiency standards or voluntary agreements, energy taxes are (in general)
advantageous for various reasons; in particular they minimise overall abatement costs
and provide long-term incentives to introduce energy-saving technologies.
Currently, tradable permits (emissions trading) are another much-discussed climate
policy instrument, which is frequently considered to compete with taxes.1 While the
allocative outcome under both instruments is the same in a static, neo-classical
framework, permits and taxes are far from being perfect substitutes in reality where
transaction costs and other market imperfections exist, but show specific advantages
for use in different sectors or at different levels of application.2 Thus, even if
Germany and other European countries may someday participate in a global
emissions trading system, energy taxes will remain important instruments in national
or EU-wide climate policies. After all, the supplementarity principle established in
the Kyoto Protocol requires that flexible mechanisms such as emissions trading may
only be used to supplement domestic actions, which, in turn, must be promoted by
domestic policies such as energy taxes.3
                                                
1 See Fisher et al. (1996) for a comprehensive overview of policy instruments for greenhouse gas
mitigation.
2 The role of transaction costs for the assessment of environmental policies has gained importance
during recent years. Considering transaction costs, Brockmann et al. (1999) discuss the
appropriateness of different climate policy instruments for different sectors. If there are
transaction costs, Stavins (1995) finds that the initial allocation of tradable permits may affect
the final equilibrium, i.e. transaction costs may reduce the information advantage of tradable
permits over emission taxes (cf. Section 2.2.2.2). Thus, Stavins rightly emphasises the
importance of the effects of transaction costs and the necessity of case-by-case examinations. See
Krutilla (1999) for a broad overview of the transaction costs literature.
3 The Kyoto Protocol within the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change of
December 1997 (UNFCCC 1997) represents the main basis for present global climate policy. It
5In a second-best world with tax distortions, a further difference between taxes and
(grandfathered) permits concerns fiscal aspects.4 During the last few years, European
politicians have seen an important advantage of energy taxes in that these may
generate a double dividend.5 Among economists, however, the double dividend
hypothesis is controversially disputed and is the object of a series of recently
published papers.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 briefly introduces
the functioning of national and international tax systems and the main characteristics
of energy taxes. Section 2.3 takes up in more detail the revenue-recycling issue in the
context of energy taxation, reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on
ecological tax reforms and clarifies the main mechanisms that may trigger an
employment double dividend. The results of this chapter and the implications for
CGE modelling are summarised in Section 2.4.
2.2 Comparative advantages of energy taxes in climate
policy
Section 2.2.1 discusses the general appropriateness of taxes for use in national and
international climate policy. In Section 2.2.2 I assess energy taxes with respect to
their environmental effectiveness, cost effectiveness, and ability to provide
innovative incentives and compare them to tradable permits. In a second-best world
with distortionary factor and commodity taxes, where the availability of instruments
is limited, a fourth criterion for instrumental choice refers to revenue-recycling
issues.
                                                                                                                                         
fixes legally binding quantified greenhouse gas emission limitations and reduction objectives for
Annex I Parties. An aggregate reduction of six greenhouse gases by 5.2% from 1990 levels in the
budget period 2008 to 2012 is prescribed for all industrialised countries.
4 This difference disappears when permits are initially distributed to emitters by an auction. I
assume that permits are initially allocated free-of-charge. Indeed, as confirmed by the U.S.
experience with the Acid Rain Program, tradable permits which are not initially distributed by
grandfathering but are auctioned off do not seem to be politically feasible today (cf. Koschel et
al. 1998).
5 Koschel and Weinreich (1995) present a survey of the popular arguments in favour of an
ecological tax reform.
62.2.1 Current practice and practicability of national and
internationally co-ordinated tax systems
The literature distinguishes between three types of tax systems operating at different
levels: domestic taxes, international taxes, and internationally harmonised domestic
taxes (cf. Hoel 1992). When considering institutional problems regarding
international transfer payments, the following discussion indicates that energy taxes
are mostly appropriate for use at the individual domestic country level.
2.2.1.1 Domestic tax systems
Within domestic tax systems national governments specify the tax rate and collect the
tax revenue. Domestic energy taxes, partly based on the carbon content of fossil
fuels, have been unilaterally introduced during the last ten years in a number of EU
countries, such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands (cf.
Ekins and Speck 1999, Scholz 1999). Austria also introduced an energy tax on
electricity and natural gas in 1996; in Germany an energy tax on mineral oil, gas, and
electricity was imposed in April 1999. In most of these countries, the revenues of the
energy tax are somehow recycled back to private households and firms, keeping
overall tax payments constant. In order to limit impending competitive losses of
domestic industries in international trade and to protect the economy against the
outflow of physical capital into foreign countries and carbon leakage,6 governments
frequently created tax exemptions for the country’s industry or reimbursement
schemes for energy-intensive industries7 (cf. Ekins and Speck 1999).
Theoretically, countermeasures against carbon leakage in the form of sectorally
differentiated environmental tax rates may be the second-best solution if the use of
trade instruments, such as import and export tariffs, is ruled out by international trade
agreements, e.g. the GATT (cf. Hoel 1996, 1999).8 In reality, however, the practical
                                                
6 Carbon leakage appears when, in reaction to a carbon abatement policy taken unilaterally by one
or a group of countries, the emissions in other non co-operating countries (other things being
equal) rise.
7 In practice, refunding schemes typically limit the maximum amount of the energy tax payments
in relation to firm specific figures, such as production costs or savings from reduced rates of
social security contributions. They aim less at increasing the firms’ investment effort (cf.
Gersbach and Requate 2000 for an analysis of the optimal design of refunding schemes) than at
protecting the economy against undesired distributional effects.
8 Applying the GTAP-EG model, Paltsev (2000) shows that welfare always decreases when
sectors are absolutely exempted from carbon taxation. Based on the emission reduction targets
laid down in the Kyoto protocol, he calculates the sectoral contributions of individual Annex B
7implementation of the appropriately differentiated tax rate system is difficult and
runs the risk of being abused. The European Commission (1997a) recently issued an
urgent warning that sectoral tax exemptions may constitute state aid as defined by
Art. 92(1) of the EC Treaty. It thus strongly recommends that any tax relief or
compensation should only be temporary and should not provide the exempted sector
with a net benefit. Consequently, the Commission did not accept the first German
proposal in 1998 for an ecological tax reform (Deutscher Bundestag 1998) in which
several energy-intensive sectors were completely exempted from the tax while they
profited fully from the reduction of the employers’ share in social security
contributions.9
2.2.1.2 International tax system
Within an international tax system the participating countries agree on a uniform tax
rate and an intergovernmental reimbursement rule for tax revenues. The
reimbursement rule determines the international cost sharing in much the same way
as the initial allocation for carbon quotas within an international emissions trading
system.
Similar to an international emissions trading system, every signatory country is free
to choose, under an international tax, policy instruments so as to meet the allowed
amount of emissions (covered by permits or tax payments) in the country. As Hoel
(1992) argues, in the absence of any market distortions, a domestic (carbon) tax with
a tax rate equal to the international tax rate would be the optimum solution for a
country. Alternatively, the national government can implement a national market for
carbon permits and distribute the amount of carbon entitlements in a way that leads
to a national permit price equalling the international tax rate.
The practical implementation of an international tax regime is difficult as it requires
the establishment of an international authority which administers the collection and
international reallocation of tax revenues. Under an international permit system, the
sovereignty of governments is less affected. Here the initial (free-of-charge)
allocation of permits to countries primarily determines the burden sharing, and ex-
                                                                                                                                         
countries to carbon emissions leakages into the non-Annex B countries and finds that any
sectoral exemption increases welfare costs.
9 A sectoral differentiation in the tax rate could also be justified by administrative costs. In
practice, however, energy-intensive industries, which can be taxed with the lowest transaction
costs per unit emission, are typically exempted (cf. Smulders and Vollebergh 2000:30).
8post side payments, if at all, are only needed in order to correct undesired
distributional outcomes due to unforeseen general equilibrium and terms-of-trade
effects. Montgomery (1972) was the first to point out that the initial permit allocation
has no consequences for the allocative efficiency of abatement costs because it
represents a lump sum endowment. The possibility to resolve international burden-
sharing issues by the initial permit allocation is in fact a comparative advantage that
an international tradable permit system has over an international tax system.
2.2.1.3 Multilateral agreement to harmonise domestic taxes
Multilateral agreements to harmonise domestic taxes are a second approach to create
internationally co-ordinated tax systems. Within such an agreement, national tax rates
are determined for a group of countries, i.e. countries commit themselves to apply a
uniform, negotiated tax. As the tax revenues are collected and reimbursed by the
national governments, no international reimbursement rules need to be specified in
the agreement.10 Hence equity issues that become significant if countries differ
substantially from another with respect to abatement costs or real income can only be
addressed by a separate agreement on transfer payments.
2.2.2 Evaluation of energy taxes
The previous section explained that tradable permits are superior to environmental
taxes in international climate policy as they regulate the burden sharing between
countries through the initial permit allocation, thus avoiding complicated financial
transfers between sovereign countries. At the national level, however, this
comparative advantage of tradable permits disappears, and taxes seem to be at least
as suitable as tradable permits. A more detailed comparison of both instruments is
required, which I present in the following sections.11
                                                
10 Two examples of (never implemented) multilateral agreements to harmonise national taxes on
energy products are the European Commission’s proposal for an EU-wide carbon/energy tax
system (European Commission 1992) and the proposal for a common EU-wide excise tax duty
system on energy (European Commission 1997b, see Jansen and Klaassen 2000 for further
details).
11 In Rennings et al. (1996:78-105) and Capros et al. (1999:27-60), I provide a comparison of
environmental taxes not only with tradable permits, but also with other environmental policy
instruments, such as voluntary agreements or technological standards.
92.2.2.1 Environmental effectiveness
In practice, emission taxes are less environmentally effective than tradable emission
permits which can guarantee the attainment of a given quantified emission target (if
properly monitored and enforced).12 If the regulator has insufficient information on
the aggregate abatement cost function, this may lead to uncertainties in setting the
accurate tax rate level (cf. Hoel 1998:81, see also Weitzman 1974). Adjustments of
the tax rate at a later point of time in a trial-and-error process delay the attainment of
the environmental goal if the tax rate is set too low. On the other hand, if the firm’s
adjustment to the tax rate needs time and if the regulator reacts too quickly, the
emission tax may go too far and lead to unnecessarily high costs of attaining the
desired emission reduction target (Siebert 1998:118).13 The regulator’s information
deficits carry weight particularly if environmental policy aims at realising an
precisely predetermined emission reduction target in order to avert dangers. They are,
however, of minor importance in real-world climate policies in which tax rates
frequently increase only slowly over time and are set at reasonable levels (for which
overshooting is unlikely).
A further characteristic of taxes is that the tax rate, theoretically, must be adjusted to
changes in economic conditions, such as cost-saving technical progress, in order to
maintain a given (optimally set) emission level. Under a permit system technological
progress results in a drop of the permit price, whereas technical progress is directly
translated into further emission reductions under an emission tax (cf. Section
2.2.2.3).
2.2.2.2 Cost effectiveness
By sending a uniform price signal to all emitters, emission taxes theoretically
equalise source specific marginal abatement costs and lead – in an ideal world
without transaction costs – to a cost-effective attainment of a given emission
reduction goal. In theory, emissions trading also represents a cost-effective option to
implement emission reduction goals, provided that transaction costs are negligible,
                                                
12 For a comprehensive survey on tradable permits see Koschel et al. (1998).
13 This is confirmed by empirical experience gathered in the U.S. Acid Rain Program for sulphur-
dioxide (SO2) permits. There is a significant discrepancy between the ex-ante estimation of
aggregate marginal abatement costs (around 1000 $/t SO2) – which would have served as the
basis for setting the tax rate in an equivalent tax system – and the actual permit price (around
100 $/tSO2). This reflects, on the one hand, the impact of unforeseen technical progress, and, on
the other hand, the impossibility of obtaining true information on private marginal abatement
costs of firms (cf. Koschel et al. 1998).
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markets are perfectly competitive,14 and emissions are chosen to minimise abatement
costs (cf. Montgomery 1972). At the level of the individual emitter, both instruments
offer more scope for behavioural choice than technical standards, as the emitter can
choose between reducing emissions – by output reduction, input substitution, or the
implementation of advanced additive or integrated environmental technologies – or
paying the tax (or buying permits, or abstaining from selling permits respectively).
When emissions are taxed directly, the emitter has the broadest scope for action and
private (individual and aggregate) abatement costs reach the lowest level. If there are
transaction costs, however, it might be more cost-effective sometimes to control
emissions indirectly by taxing the excise of inputs.15 In this context, Smulders and
Vollebergh (2000) examine the potential trade-off between administrative costs and
the incentives of environmental protection and propose general conditions under
which an excise tax will result in less total costs when internalising environmental
externalities. These include a close linkage of emissions with inputs, the existence of
only a few and expensive additive technologies so as to abate emissions directly, and
relatively high administrative costs of emission taxes. As the authors demonstrate,
these conditions are satisfied in the case of carbon taxation. Accordingly, the taxation
of the excise of energy products instead of emissions is the current strategy that most
countries use which introduced a carbon tax.
2.2.2.3 Incentives for innovations
Apart from its ecological and cost effectiveness, an instrument's ability to provide
incentives for innovations has become a popular criterion in environmental policy
assessment. This growing interest is, not least, related to the popular, but heavily
                                                
14
 The problem of strategic manipulation and oligopolistic interaction in tradable permit markets
has been addressed in several studies, as in Hahn (1984), Misiolek and Elder (1989), Tietenberg
(1990), Mørch von der Fehr (1993) and others. Indeed, when competition is not perfect, for
instance, if a single firm has some market power, it may use this to manipulate the permit market
to its own advantage. Thus it is important to guarantee in particular cases that a sufficient number
of firms is involved. This is often the case in carbon abatement policy, where a restriction of the
market region for ecological reasons is not necessary (cf. Koschel et al. 1998).
15 In the case of carbon taxation, second-best taxation of inputs requires that fossil fuels (coal, oil,
and gas) are taxed according to their specific carbon content and not according to their energy
content. In desired substitution processes the latter discriminates between carbon-intensive and
less carbon-intensive fossil fuels and leads to additional distortions. Note, however, that the
optimum design of a carbon tax changes if other goals are considered, such as the protection of
scarce energy resources. Measures regarding CO2 reduction and natural resource protection,
however, should not be combined in practice since their efficient design has to be based on
different criteria.
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disputed Porter hypothesis which states that “properly designed environmental
standards can trigger innovation that may partially or more than fully offset the costs
of complying with them“ (Porter and van der Linde 1995:98). A central question in
the recent literature is whether environmental taxes are more appropriate to give
incentives for the development and/or adoption of new technologies than other
environmental policy instruments. In addition, optimisation models analyse the
dynamic efficiency of these incentives, i.e. the efficiency of resource allocation after
the innovation has taken place.16
At present there is no final consent in the theoretical literature whether taxes, in terms
of dynamic efficiency, are superior to other climate policy instruments or not.17
Different rankings of environmental policy instruments are mainly the outcome of
differences between the underlying modelling frameworks.18
Economic instruments typically dominate direct controls in the majority of the
(earlier) perfectly competitive, partial equilibrium models, which are frequently
based on graphical argumentation (cf. Downing and White 1986, Milliman and
Prince 1989, Jung et al. 1996, Malueg 1989). Disagreement exists as to whether
auctioned permits and free permits provide different innovation incentives and
whether auctioned permits are superior to emission taxes or not. Requate and Unold
(1997, 1999), for instance, discover that permits never induce higher incentives to
adopt new abatement technologies than emission taxes do and that auctioned and
grandfathered tradable permits are equivalent in terms of their innovative incentives.
In addition, the authors demonstrate that a permit policy may be superior to a tax
policy from a social welfare perspective. The reason for this is that if the policy (tax
rate or amount of permits) was set optimally before starting innovation and if partial
adoption of the new technology is socially optimal, taxes may give firms innovation
incentives that are too high while tradable permits induce too few firms to adopt the
new technology. When considering the possibility of ratcheting, i.e. the optimal
policy adjustment after innovation, a permit system is superior to an emission tax, as
the government can reduce the number of permits at a later point in time in order to
                                                
16 Note that ‘dynamic efficiency’ and ‘innovative incentives’ have two different meanings. An
instrument with the highest incentive to innovate does not necessarily provide the highest
dynamic efficiency (cf. Requate and Unold 1997).
17 Unfortunately, empirical evidence is weak as well due to the very limited use of economic
instruments in actual real-world policies, (cf. Jaffe and Stavins 1995).
18 The following discussion is a summary of Koschel (1998).
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reach the social optimum ex post. Under a tax system, however, the social optimum
can be realised only by an ex-post tax rate reduction, which is associated with a
devaluation of installed physical capital.
Recently, the perfectly competitive innovation models have been widely questioned
because of the restrictive assumptions they rely on.19 Experts criticise most
frequently the fact that such models assume perfect competition and full information
and consequently neglect strategic market behaviour. In addition, they ignore product
market feedbacks but maintain the level of output quantity and output prices. In
response to this criticism, recent literature has been concerned with analysing the
incentives to innovate if some of the assumptions listed above are relaxed.
Giving up the assumption of perfect competition and considering ‘strategic
incentives’ as an essential force for innovation has led to the development of a host
of game-theory, fixed-number duopoly or oligopoly model approaches (cf. Beath et
al. 1995).20 The studies in this area concentrate mainly on the analysis of emission
taxes, environmental standards, and subsidy schemes. They take into account that
R&D activities of an individual firm cannot be analysed out of context but are
considered as being dependent on the R&D activities of its competitors. In addition,
they no longer ignore product market effects, such as an instrument’s impact on the
firm’s output and the effect of an output reduction on R&D expenditure. Under
specific conditions, for example with respect to the degree of product market
competition, this negative output effect (which tends to be relatively high under a
cost-raising tax) may dominate the direct incentive effect on R&D. Therefore, as
technological standards lead to higher industry output, they may – in specific cases –
promote more R&D spending.
Since the endogenous growth theory gained prevalence, several studies have been
published analysing the interconnection between environmental policy instruments,
R&D spending and innovation in general equilibrium endogenous growth models.
Hung et al. (1994), Verdier (1995), and Elbasha and Roe (1996), for instance, all
                                                
19 Common model assumptions are as follows: 1. firm incentives to innovate are measured as the
savings in the firms’ abatement costs, 2. innovation in emission control is modelled as a
downward exogenous shift in the marginal abatement cost curve, 3. abatement costs increase
continuously with emission reductions, 4. polluters maximise profits, and 5. the regulating
agency has perfect information on the marginal cost curves and the marginal damage function
(cf. Kemp 1997).
20 See also Carraro and Soubeyran (1996), Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996), and Ulph (1997).
For a presentation of these studies see Koschel (1998).
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consider monopolistic competition in commodity markets by employing the product
variety approach. Fixed production costs are represented by industrial R&D costs,
and free-entry of firms is assumed. Taking into account not only environmental
externalities, but also static distortions in the product market and dynamic distortions
related to R&D activities,21 a central question in these studies is how policy
intervention should be designed in order to achieve the optimum growth rate of
innovation. Unfortunately, none of the available studies compares different types of
instruments with each other. Elbasha and Roe (1996) come to the conclusion that
there is a range of second-best policy options (including emission taxes or R&D
subsidies) to bring both competitive and optimum growth rates of innovation into
line with each other. The model of Verdier (1995) indicates that an emission tax
leads to a higher growth rate than a technical standard. The extent to which emission
taxes may or may not dominate technological standards from a dynamic welfare
perspective depends, however, on the strictness of the emission target. All in all, the
endogenous growth theory gives new insights into the ranking of environmental
policy instruments. The results, however, do not seem to completely oppose existing
(partial equilibrium) analyses but rather complement them.
2.2.2.4 Revenue-raising issues
As already mentioned, in a second-best optimal world, a further criterion for
instrumental choice is an instrument’s ability to raise public revenues. Tax revenues
can be used (alternatively or side-by-side) to:
– support distributive and social equity goals, e.g. alleviating undesired negative
economic or social side-effects. This refers to tax revenue refund systems for
energy-intensive firms or households.
– increase the incentive effect of the environmental tax or create additional
environmental incentives. This includes public financing of environmentally
                                                
21 The latter may include three further distortion effects (cf. Verdier 1995:192): 1. the consumer
surplus effect, which arises when innovators do not take into full account the increase in the
consumer surplus associated with the innovation, 2. the profit destruction effect, which reflects
that innovators decide only on the basis of their own private profits without considering the
profit destruction of other firms, and 3. the research spillover effect, which results from the fact
that innovators are not able to appropriate returns to R&D completely; it is frequently assumed
that innovators can only appropriate the returns to product-specific knowledge, whereas general
knowledge spills over and increases the public knowledge stock, which, in turn, facilitates
subsequent innovation (cf. Grossman and Helpman 1991:44).
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friendly infrastructure and public services as well as the support of R&D and
investments in energy saving measures.22
– finance the cut in the marginal rates of other existing distortionary taxes in order
to reduce the excess burden associated with these taxes. Considering the high
unemployment figures in most European countries, the most-discussed option in
this context is the cut in labour tax rates in order to reduce the excess burden in
the labour market.
The third option of revenue recycling has led to a growing interest in energy taxes
over recent years. In this context, the double dividend argument was brought into
discussion: The first dividend is related to lower pollution levels, whereas the second
dividend generally reflects an increase in the efficiency of the non-environmental tax
system which may be realised if the revenue of the environmental tax is returned
through cuts in distortionary pre-existing taxes such as labour taxes. Particularly if
the government is unable to run alternative policies to reduce the excess burdens
associated with certain taxes (e.g. for political-economy reasons), the ability to raise
revenues might be a strong argument in favour of environmental taxes (cf. Bovenberg
1995:119).
2.3 The employment double dividend: a literature survey
In this section, I summarise the main findings in the literature on revenue-neutral
ecological tax reforms. The literature on the double dividend can be divided broadly
into two branches (cf. Bosello et al. 1999).23 The first branch interprets the second
dividend in terms of welfare and distinguishes between a weak and a strong double
dividend.24 The second branch defines non-environmental benefits in terms of
macroeconomic indicators, such as GDP or employment. Following the European
                                                
22 Strand (1999) is a recent example for a double dividend paper in which revenues from the
pollution tax are used to subsidise capital investments of firms.
23 Further surveys of recent double dividend literature and results are Majocchi (1996), Ligthart
(1998), Pezzey and Park (1998), Bovenberg (1999), and Perry (1999).
24 The weak double dividend requires that the recycling of tax revenues through cuts in
distortionary taxes lead to less welfare costs (i.e. a lower excess burden), compared to the case
where revenues are returned in a lump sum way. The strong double dividend hypothesis claims
that the revenue-neutral introduction of environmental taxes, which partially or completely
replace other distortionary taxes, involves zero or negative non-environmental gross costs (cf.
Goulder 1995). Most literature concentrates on the strong form. Actually, the evidence of a
strong double dividend would imply that an ecological tax reform is equal to a no regret strategy,
thus increasing political acceptance considerably.
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research line and motivated by the increase in long-term unemployment in Europe,25
the main focus of this survey is on the employment effects of ecological tax reforms.
This interpretation of the double dividend is known in literature as the employment
double dividend (EDD) (cf. Carraro et al. 1996).
The theoretical literature indicates that an EDD can emerge only if the ecological tax
reform successfully shifts parts of the tax burden from wage earners to non-workers.
In this context, three ways of tax shifting are discussed, namely tax shifting to non-
labour production factors (e.g. owners of capital), to recipients of transfer income
(e.g. pensioners or the unemployed), and to the foreign sector (e.g. foreign owners of
fossil fuels or foreign users of intermediates).
Section 2.3.1 specifies some common assumptions on which most analytical EDD
studies are based. Section 2.3.2 summarises the basic transmission channels through
which employment is affected in models with perfectly competitive labour and
commodity markets, where only environmental and tax distortions exist. Section
2.3.3 then reviews the more recent literature, in which the neo-classical framework is
extended by non-tax market imperfections due to price and wage setting behaviour of
agents. I focus on models with production externalities, in which a polluting tax on
intermediate inputs, such as energy, is levied on producers and where revenues are
recycled through a cut in the labour tax.
2.3.1 Typical model assumptions
Nearly all models analysing the EDD outcome rely on a general equilibrium
framework in order to account for energy and labour market interactions. Most
models employ comparative static analysis and examine only marginal changes in the
tax structure. Frequently, different initial equilibria with either zero or positive
energy taxes are considered, whereby initially positive energy tax rates are supposed
to approximate the impacts of large environmental taxes.26 The labour market is
                                                
25 According to Friedmann (1998), the EU-15 unemployment rate has risen from 1.9% in 1964 to
almost 11% by mid-1996. Unemployment rates, however, differ considerably between countries.
In mid-1996, the EU-countries with the highest unemployment rates were Spain (23%), Finland
(18%), and Ireland (15%). France and Italy prevail with rates around 12%. Germany is, along
with Belgium, Austria, Sweden, Greece, and the UK, in the middle with 9-10%. Unemployment
is lowest in Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal (around 7%), and Luxembourg (less than 3%).
26 If the initial energy tax is zero, an ecological tax reform, consisting of a marginal energy tax,
produces no additional excess burden. The magnitude of the additional tax burden depends
largely on the initial level of the energy tax rate, which determines the marginal costs of reducing
energy consumption.
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distorted by a positive tax on labour27 which is imposed – in the absence of lump sum
taxes in a second-best world – in order to finance public spending. The labour tax
drives a wedge between real producer and real consumer wages and distorts labour
supply decisions. In the presence of distortions arising from labour taxation a rise in
employment improves welfare (ceteris paribus).28
Ensuring (ex post) revenue neutrality, the overall governmental tax revenue is kept
constant by fixed public spending. In the majority of studies the tax rate on labour is
determined endogenously and balances the public budget.29 In addition, it is assumed
that the economy is on the left hand side of the Laffer curves for both the labour and
energy tax, thus ensuring that a marginal increase of the energy tax rate leads to a fall
in the labour tax rate.
Frequently, production is modelled on Cobb-Douglas or nested constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) functions with (maximally) two clean primary production factors
(typically labour and capital) and the polluting input (e.g. energy), while intermediate
nonenergy material inputs are neglected. Labour is internationally immobile in nearly
all models.
The majority of studies neglects environmental feedbacks on labour supply and
labour productivity. Environmental benefits are interpreted as a public good that is
weakly separable in the utility function; environmental quality in particular is
supposed to be a substitute for leisure. Only a few recent studies show that
environmental feedbacks on labour demand (e.g. Bovenberg 1997) and labour supply
(e.g. Kahn and Farmer 1999, Schwartz and Repetto 2000) may – in the long run –
offset negative effects on the real after-tax wage rate, so that the prospects for a
double dividend increase. However, allowing for a complementary relationship
                                                
27 The tax on labour may consist of either a labour income or a payroll tax. Studies which are closer
to reality consider both taxes and introduce non-wage labour costs, such as social security
contributions of employers and employees.
28 Intuitively this can be explained by the fact that the benefit of an additional unit of labour
consists of higher output (according to the marginal product of labour) and of additional labour
tax revenues. When deciding on leisure and consumption, however, the private household
neglects the social benefit of employment in terms of higher tax revenues and takes into account
only the private benefit in terms of higher production.
29 De Mooij and Bovenberg (1998) and Bovenberg and Goulder (1997) are exceptions. They also
analyse a cut in capital taxes. In a model with consumption externalities, Scholz (1998) points
out that a second dividend is closely attached to the choice of the commodity tax which is
reduced in reaction to higher taxes on the polluting consumption good. In this work, I will focus
on the substitution of energy for labour taxes.
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between leisure and environmental quality may exacerbate the negative impact on
labour supply (cf. Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994, de Mooij 2000:219).
Apart from these common features, analytical EDD models differ from each other
with respect to the type of environmental externality (consumption or production
externalities), the size of pre-existing tax distortions, the production and consumption
structure and substitution patterns, foreign trade specifications, and supply elasticities
of non-labour production factors. The double dividend outcome also depends on
whether or not households receive non-wage income, such as transfers, and whether
markets are perfectly competitive or characterised by wage and price setting
behaviour of agents.
In the following sections, I use the degree of labour market competition to arrange
the EDD studies into two groups. The first encompasses the studies which assume a
neo-classical labour market, the second presents the studies which consider non-tax
labour market imperfections. I discuss the remaining other determinants for an EDD
in the individual context.
2.3.2 Employment effects of an ecological tax reform in a perfectly
competitive framework
The earlier literature on ecological tax reforms neglects involuntary unemployment
and relies on perfectly competitive labour markets with fully flexible and market-
clearing real wages.
2.3.2.1 Introductory graphical analysis
Figure 1 illustrates the impacts of an ecological tax reform on the labour market
equilibrium in a partial neo-classical framework with a fully flexible real wage.
Consider a small open economy with a profit maximising representative firm that
produces a final output good. Labour demand, represented by the LD curve, depends
negatively on real labour costs, i.e. the real producer wage wP. Furthermore, consider
a utility maximising representative household that finances private consumption with
after-tax labour income. Labour supply is calculated as the difference between some
exogenous endowment of time resources (total time TT) and the endogenous demand
of leisure. The latter results from maximising the household’s utility function,
including leisure and consumption goods. Labour supply depends positively on the
real consumer (net or after-tax) wage w. Assume that the government levies an ad-
valorem tax on labour income tL (or, equivalently, a payroll tax). Without
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consumption taxes, the producer’s price index is equal to the consumer’s price index
and it is w=wP(1-tL). In the absence of payroll taxes, such as employers’ contributions
to social security, wP is equal to the real gross wage which is defined as the real net
wage plus income taxes plus employees’ social security contributions (cf.
footnote 56). In literature, the difference between the real producer wage wP and the
real net wage w, which can be attributed to all commodity and factor taxes (including
social security contributions) that are borne by labour, is called the tax wedge (cf.
Tyrväinen 1995:13, Steiner 1998:317). According to Nickell and Layard (1999), the
total average tax wedge in the period 1989-1994 is approximately 53% in Germany.30
Employment
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Figure 1: Employment effects of an ecological tax reform,
neo-classical labour market
Let us turn to Figure 1. In the initial labour market equilibrium, employment L0 is
supplied by the representative household at the real net wage 0w  and demanded by
the firm at the real producer wage 0Pw . The initial tax wedge ( 0Pw - 0w ) causes an
excess burden on the labour market, which is represented by the Harberger triangle
bca.31
                                                
30 Among the EU-15 member countries, Sweden (70.7%), Finland (65.9%), France (63.8%), Italy
(62.9%), the Netherlands (56.5%), Spain (54.2%), and Austria (53.7%) have a higher average
tax wedge than Germany for the same period (Nickell and Layard 1999:3038).
31 The excess burden of a tax system is defined as the amount of welfare that is lost in excess of
what the government collects (cf. Auerbach 1985:67). Note that the change of environmental
quality (representing the first dividend) is not included in this welfare measure. The excess
burden, represented by the triangle bca, results from the difference between the aggregate labour
tax induced loss of surplus suffered by the employee and the firm (w0bcawP0) and the labour
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Now we will assume that the government introduces an ecological tax reform.
Consider first the labour market effect of a cut in the tax wedge. If energy tax
revenues are reimbursed by a cut in the labour income tax tL, the tax wedge is
reduced to ( 1Pw - 1w ) and the Harberger triangle is reduced to ecd. The excess burden
on the labour market shrinks by the area beda. In response to the higher real net wage
labour supply rises from L0 to L1. The results change if the allocative effects of the
energy tax increase are taken into account. On the producer side a higher tax rate on
energy inputs in production leads to higher energy costs and to lower energy demand.
The rise in the energy tax rate causes not only a reduction in pollution, but
simultaneously increases the excess burden in the energy market. The latter is
calculated as the balance between the loss in the firm’s surplus in response to
reduced energy demand and the amount of energy tax revenues.
The following sections will show that the incidence of the tax burden on private
income is the crucial factor determining the employment effects of an ecological tax
reform. In the simple two-factor model, on which Figure 1 is based (see Section
2.3.2.2), the excess burden of the energy tax is fully borne by real net wage income.
Higher energy taxes lead to an increase in energy costs, which, in turn, reduces the
firm’s energy demand and labour productivity. The loss in labour productivity causes
a downward shift of the LD curve, possibly to LD1. As a result, the positive
employment impact of revenue recycling is reduced and overcompensated (at least in
the simple two-input model) by the negative allocative effect of the additional excess
burden which is associated with the energy tax increase. Both the real net wage and
employment decrease, provided that the uncompensated wage elasticity of labour
supply is positive: The final equilibrium employment level (not depicted in Figure 1)
lies somewhere to the left of L0. Indeed, in the neo-classical labour market model the
sign of the uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply plays a crucial role for
the sign of employment effects. According to the econometric literature, in Figure 1,
and in most EDD studies, this elasticity is assumed to be (slightly) positive with
respect to the real consumer wage.32 Consequently, a second dividend in terms of
employment can only emerge on the condition that the real net wage increases in
response to the ecological tax reform.
                                                                                                                                         
income tax revenues (w0bawP0). Gottfried and Wiegard (1995) and Reding and Müller (1999:
Chapter 4) explain the concept of the excess burden in greater detail.
32 The uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply is positive if the substitution elasticity
between leisure and private consumption is above unity (cf. de Mooij 2000:34). See Blundell
and MaCurdy (1999) for a review of empirical estimates of the uncompensated wage elasticity.
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In the next section I will pick up the simple two-input model framework. Following
de Mooij and Bovenberg (1998) and de Mooij (2000) I analyse in greater detail why
the EDD hypothesis is rejected. I will then explain, however, that tax shifting effects
from labour to other private incomes may occur under specific model assumptions,
enlarging the scope for an EDD.
2.3.2.2 Tax shifting across production factors
De Mooij and Bovenberg (1998) and de Mooij (2000) show that a shift from labour
to energy taxes reduces employment in a model of a small open economy with only
two production factors and production externalities. The authors assume that a
representative profit maximising firm produces a single tradable output good with
only labour and energy as inputs, using a neo-classical, constant-returns-to-scale
production function. The output market is perfectly competitive. While energy and
output prices are given by the world market, wages are determined endogenously on
the domestic market because labour is immobile. The only income of the
representative utility maximising household is after-tax wage income. The pre-
existing tax system includes a positive tax on energy input and labour income.
Two channels can be identified through which an ecological tax reform affects
employment. Firstly, the energy tax increases energy and production costs. This cost
increase cannot be passed on to consumers as commodity prices are fixed. Higher
energy taxes induce firms to reduce energy input in order to avoid tax payments.
Labour productivity, labour demand, and the real net wage decrease. The drop in
energy demand contributes to environmental protection, but it also lowers the base of
energy taxation and the amount of energy tax revenues. The erosion of the energy tax
base stands for the additional tax excess burden, which is associated with higher
energy prices and abatement costs and is fully borne by the private sector. Secondly,
the recycling of energy tax revenues through a cut in the labour income tax alleviates
the negative impact on the real after-tax wage. Due to the tax base erosion effect,
however, the labour income tax rate cannot be reduced sufficiently to compensate
entirely for the decline in the real before-tax wage: the real net wage decreases. Thus
both labour supply and equilibrium employment decline and the EDD hypothesis
cannot but fail in the two-input benchmark model with a competitive labour market
and an upward bending labour supply curve. Obviously, a shift from labour to energy
taxes reduces the efficiency of the non-environmental tax system since energy taxes,
which are ultimate taxes on labour income, not only increase the labour market
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distortions, but additionally distort input choice decisions. This sets off a trade-off
between the first and the second dividend.
The authors extend their benchmark model by a second clean production factor,
(physical) capital,33 and distinguish between two extreme cases of capital supply:
internationally mobile capital or infinitely elastic supply of capital (Case 1) and
internationally immobile capital or fixed domestic supply of capital (Case 2).
In the case of internationally perfectly mobile capital (Case 1), the nominal after-tax
rate of return on capital is determined by the world market according to the law of
one price, i.e. capital supply is infinitely elastic.34 Since capital owners move their
capital (partially) abroad in response to the capital tax in the absence of
internationally harmonised capital taxation,35 the ultimate burden of capital taxation
in terms of real income is borne by immobile labour. Actually, as will be shown
below, a capital tax only causes a decline of capital demand and leaves the after-tax
return on capital unaffected. Assume that both a positive source-based tax on capital
income and a positive energy tax are imposed in the initial equilibrium. From a
revenue-raising point of view the initial tax system is inefficient not only with respect
to energy taxation, but also with respect to capital taxation. Direct taxation of labour
income is, in any case, superior to indirect taxation by means of a capital tax that
additionally distorts investment decisions. The ecological tax reform affects non-
environmental welfare and labour market distortions (employment) through two
channels:
– Similar to the two-input model, the increase in the energy tax is associated with a
tax burden effect that reflects the costs of a cleaner environment. The tax burden
effect grows bigger the larger the initial energy tax rate is and the stronger the
energy/labour ratio declines in response to the higher price for energy and the
lower price for labour.
                                                
33 Sometimes the second clean production factor is referred to as land or entrepreneurial talent (cf.
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg 1998a:138). Compared with capital, however, both factors are
characterised by relatively small production shares and therefore presumably have a relatively
lower potential to absorb the tax burden.
34 A three-input model with internationally mobile capital is also employed in Bovenberg and de
Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and Goulder (1997), and Ruocco and Wiegard (1997).
35 It is assumed that capital owners remain in the domestic country and consume the capital yields
at home.
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– Since the elasticity of energy supply is infinite and that of labour is finite, a
decline in the energy/labour ratio is associated with a negative output effect. De
Mooij (2000:73-77) argues that the capital/labour ratio typically falls in response
to an increased ratio of energy to labour prices since the negative output effect
offsets the positive substitution effect.36 The drop in capital demand reflects a tax
shifting effect of the tax burden towards capital, which is, however, in terms of
real income, ultimately borne by immobile labour. The capital tax base shrinks
(tax base erosion effect) and labour productivity further declines. Given revenue
neutrality, the government’s scope for cutting the labour income tax rate is further
restricted, and the real net wage and the incentive to supply labour are further
reduced.
To conclude, in the presence of mobile capital, mobile energy, and immobile labour
the incidence of all taxes falls on real labour income in a neo-classical labour market.
Employment thus typically decreases when labour taxes are shifted to energy taxes.
In the case of perfectly inelastically supplied (or at least imperfectly elastically
supplied) capital (Case 2) the prospects for an EDD are enhanced since tax shifting
effects towards after-tax profits (i.e. the income of the fixed factor) become possible
(at least under specific conditions, see below).37 It is assumed that profit income
accrues to the household, i.e. the household now receives labour and profit income.
If, in the case of fixed capital, the initial distribution of taxes over labour and capital
is sub-optimal from a revenue-raising perspective (i.e. labour is ‘overtaxed’, while
capital is ‘undertaxed’), an ecological tax reform may alleviate initial inefficiencies
by shifting the tax burden from labour to profit income (tax shifting effect). This
means that an EDD emerges if the following conditions are met which will guarantee
that the tax shifting effect to profits is sufficiently large to offset the negative tax
burden effect on labour (cf. de Mooij and Bovenberg 1998:24, de Mooij 2000:102):38
                                                
36 De Mooij (2000:76) shows that capital demand increases in response to an ecological tax reform
only if the substitution possibilities between capital and energy are high enough to compensate
for the negative production effect. This is the case if labour input is separable in production, if
the production share of labour is high, and if energy and capital are better substitutes than labour
and energy.
37 A fixed factor was also introduced in Bovenberg (1997) and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg
(1998a).
38 These conditions refer to the case of fixed capital.
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– The initial profit tax rate is small (and below unity39) and the share of capital in
production is large. This ensures that after-tax profits can bear a substantial part
in the overall tax burden.
– The elasticity of labour demand is relatively high (compared to the elasticity of
energy demand). This implies that labour demand increases strongly in response
to a cut in the labour tax,40 whereas the drop in energy demand and thus the tax
base erosion effect is relatively small.
– The supply of labour is sufficiently elastic (it should be neither completely
inelastic nor completely elastic) with respect to wages. In this case the tax shifting
effect towards capital income is large.
– The initial labour tax is large, while the initial energy tax should be small. This
ensures that an increase in employment is associated with high welfare increase,
whereas a drop in energy demand leads to relatively small welfare losses.
Summarising the theoretical results, I find that in the case of a fixed (or at least
imperfectly elastically supplied) clean non-labour production factor (capital) and
initial inefficiencies of the non-environmental tax system41 tax shifting effects from
labour to capital become possible. This may offset the negative tax burden effect on
labour. It was shown that the real net wage and employment may rise only if capital
supply is not infinitely elastic.42 Hence the assumptions on the supply elasticity of
capital and the degree of international capital mobility are decisive. If it proves to be
true that capital moves abroad in the long run due to distortions in domestic factor or
product markets, positive employment effects of an ecological tax reform may
threaten to disappear in the long run (cf. Bovenberg 1995:123). Recent empirical
                                                
39 In the case of an initial profit tax rate of unity, tax shifting from labour to profits is impossible.
Assuming the (first-best) 100% profit tax, however, is out of touch with reality. In the GEM-E3
model the (calibrated) tax on capital income lies between zero and one in Germany.
40 De Mooij (2000:101) shows that labour demand typically rises in response to reduced wage
costs. It may fall only in an exceptional case: the production function is characterised by
separability of labour and a relatively high degree of substitutability between energy and capital.
41 From a revenue-raising perspective, it would be most efficient to raise all tax revenues by the
(first-best) profit tax. If the profit tax rate, however, is predetermined at a given level and if there
are insufficient profit tax revenues to finance public spending, the government is forced to
impose further (distortionary) taxes. De Mooij (2000:92-98) finds that the optimal ratio of labour
to energy taxes depends on the elasticities of labour and energy supply and demand. According
to the Ramsey principle for taxation, the input with the relatively lower demand and supply
elasticity should be taxed with a relatively higher rate.
42 Note that in a richer model framework allowing for other ways of tax shifting an EDD may be
gained, even if capital is internationally mobile.
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work on international capital mobility is ambivalent. This might indicate that capital
is neither fully immobile nor perfectly mobile. Obstfeld (1993), who surveys the
literature on measuring international capital mobility, ascertains that the mobility of
capital between economies has increased markedly in industrial countries in the last
two decades but that capital mobility is still lower between countries than within the
borders. Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) also conclude that capital is not perfectly
mobile and attribute capital immobility to asymmetric information of investors across
countries.
The findings of this section imply for CGE modelling that, apart from the benchmark
data set used for the calibration of the initial tax system, the assumed degree of
capital mobility and the choice of factor demand elasticities is crucial when analysing
the impacts of an ecological tax reform. As factor demand elasticities mainly depend
on the degree of substitutability between production factors, the objective of Chapter
3 is to substantiate sectoral substitution patterns in the GEM-E3 model empirically
and to test the model’s sensitivity with respect to variations in substitution
elasticities. Within these and other simulations based on the GEM-E3 model, I
assume that invested (physical) capital stocks are internationally and sectorally
immobile, while investment decisions depend on nationally and sectorally
differentiated interests on capital.43
2.3.2.3 Tax shifting to non-wage incomes
If households finance private consumption not only with labour income, but also with
non-wage (lump sum) incomes, such as social transfers, pensions, or unemployment
benefits, the chance for an EDD increases since this creates an additional way of tax
shifting, namely tax shifting from labour income towards non-wage income. As is
shown by Bovenberg (1997) and de Mooij (2000), tax shifting between both types of
income is possible if the non-wage income regime meets specific conditions. In any
case, the tax burden of an ecological tax reform is shared by recipients of social
transfers in terms of real income losses if transfers are not subject to labour taxation
and not indexed to consumption prices. In this case the recipients of social transfers
                                                
43 Springer (2000) stresses that the incorporation of internationally mobile capital in multi-country,
multi-sectoral CGE models may have important implications for the allocative and distributive
outcome. She shows that the theoretical equivalence between goods trade and factor movements
no longer holds in the presence of country specific production technologies, trade impediments,
and factor and product market distortions. She also explains that it is crucial to account for
foreign capital ownership and international transfers of capital income.
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partly bear the incidence of the higher energy tax but are not compensated by a lower
labour income tax.
In more realistic models where some households mainly rely on labour income and
others (e.g. the unemployed) finance consumption with transfer income, tax shifting
between wage and non-wage income raises equity issues and may be associated with
a trade-off between a fair income distribution and higher employment. The current
discussion in Germany about the adjustment of pensions and the complaint of
pensioners about the energy tax clearly reflects this trade-off.44
The impact of an ecological tax reform on the ratio of non-wage incomes (such as
unemployment benefits) to after-tax wages plays a special role in the context of wage
setting models. This aspect will be picked up in Section 2.3.3 in more detail (see also
Chapter 5).
2.3.2.4 Tax shifting to foreign countries
Whereas tax shifting effects to non-labour production factors and to non-wage
income are common in the theoretical double dividend literature, tax shifting
mechanisms to foreign countries have been widely neglected.45
Tax shifting effects to the foreign sector become feasible when terms-of-trade effects
can be observed. In reality, this is only plausible if the ecological tax reform is
introduced in a large country (e.g. the USA) or a large group of countries (e.g. the
EU-15) which account for a substantial part of the world trade.
Unlike the theoretical EDD literature, which mainly relies on the small-country
assumption, terms-of-trade effects are important determinants of the double dividend
outcome in CGE models. As will be shown in the following chapters, both the single-
country version and the linked version of the GEM-E3 model allow for tax shifting
effects towards the foreign sector since the rest of the world’s import demand is
assumed to be imperfectly price elastic. I will investigate the impacts of terms-of-
trade effects on employment and economic welfare in Chapter 4.
                                                
44 Strictly speaking, a double dividend is always associated with a change in income distribution.
This change, however, may be particularly disapproved by the public when it is implemented at
the expense of domestic recipients of income transfers.
45 Koskela et al. (1998) is an exception. De Mooij (2000: Chapter 5) analyses the importance of
terms-of-trade effects for the double dividend in a three-country model in which tax shifting to
foreign suppliers of polluting inputs and to foreign users of intermediate inputs is permitted.
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2.3.3 Employment effects of an ecological tax reform in the case of
labour market imperfections
In a recent series of double dividend papers the EDD was analysed in a modelling
framework, where distortions not only arise from environmental externalities and
taxes, but also from imperfectly competitive labour and commodity markets. Most
theoretical and empirical papers indicate that labour market imperfections may
increase the size of employment effects and enhance the scope for an EDD.46
The remainder of this section proceeds as follows. I briefly introduce the concept of
the wage setting curve in Section 2.3.3.1. Section 2.3.3.2 summarises the results of
the literature that simply traces involuntary unemployment back to exogenous real
wage rigidities. Section 2.3.3.3 concentrates on studies, in which wage formation is
endogenous and founded on the microeconomic theory of trade unions.47
2.3.3.1 Introductory graphical analysis
In reality labour market imperfections arise from the presence of several labour
market institutions, such as legal employment protection rules, taxes on labour, trade
unions and minimum wages, the social security system and unemployment benefit
regime, or barriers to regional and sectoral mobility. Economic theory offers a variety
of concepts to explain labour market imperfections and the institutional structure of
wage setting. Three leading approaches of wage setting behaviour are available from
the microeconomic theory of equilibrium unemployment (cf. Layard et al. 1991):
trade union/wage-bargaining models, efficiency wage models, and job
search/matching models.
                                                
46 In Section 5.3.2, I will empirically bear out this result. See also Bosello et al. (1999) for a
discussion of simulation results obtained from empirical large-scale models with labour market
imperfections.
47 A further approach to modelling temporary unemployment – which is not considered here – is
the Phillips curve wage equation which connects the real wage changes with the unemployment
rate; the real wage rises if unemployment is below its natural rate and falls if unemployment rises
above it. The Phillips curve concept, however, is less appropriate for modelling endogenous
wage formation for the following two reasons: firstly, its micro-foundation is weak (i.e. it does
not explain the determinants of the natural rate of unemployment), secondly, it assumes that
unemployment is stationary and fluctuates around a mean value. However, according to
empirical evidence from industrialised countries, there are not only temporary effects on
equilibrium unemployment, but also persistent shifts in the unemployment rate in the long-run.
The Phillips curve is thus suitable for capturing short-term disequilibrium processes but not for
explaining long-lasting unemployment (cf. Tyrväinen 1995, Bean 1994). Examples of an
application of the Phillips curve in CGE models can be found in Welsch (1996) and Kemfert and
Welsch (2000).
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All models explain why the actual consumer wage is marked up over the so-called
reservation wage of employees (see below), but they differ in the variables that affect
this mark-up. At present, there are only a few EDD studies available that employ the
efficiency wage approach (e.g. Schneider 1997) or a mismatch model (e.g.
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg 1998b, Strand 1999).48 Most papers addressing
European labour market characteristics assume that wage formation is determined by
decentralised wage bargaining between the unions and the employers. Considering
the evidence on labour market institutions in Germany (cf. Section 5.2), I also follow
this approach by assuming that wage setting behaviour originates from the presence
of trade unions.49 I will therefore introduce in Figure 2 an aggregate wage setting
(WS) curve that describes the relation between the negotiated real consumer wage
and collective labour supply. The WS curve replaces the individual labour supply
(LS) curve: Equilibrium employment and wage levels are now determined by the
intersection of the WS curve and the labour demand (LD) curve. In the case of labour
market equilibrium, the difference between individual labour supply and labour
demand at the equilibrium real wage rate determines the level of involuntary
unemployment.
De Mooij (2000) theoretically shows that in the case of wage bargaining the wage on
the WS curve is determined not only by the unemployment rate, but also by further
factors such as the labour tax rate50 and a labour productivity index (see also Layard
et al. 1991:181-189). If the ecological tax reform does affect these factors, this may
                                                
48 Like the trade union models, the efficiency wage models explain why workers who are willing to
supply their labour force at a wage rate below the actual market wage do not find a job. But
while involuntary unemployment is explained by the labour supply side in the trade union
models, i.e. by the power of insiders, the firms, i.e. the labour demand side, set wages above the
market-clearing level in the efficiency wage models. Even if firms maximise profits, they are
assumed to have an incentive to voluntarily pay wages above the market-clearing wage rate in
order to stimulate labour efficiency and to curb shirking (to motivate workers), reduce
fluctuation (to retain workers), or select job candidates (to recruit workers). The mismatch
models assume that individual workers and employers bargain over the rents that are associated
with hiring costs, leading to a mark-up over the competitive wage (cf. Layard et al. 1991).
49 See Nickell and Layard (1999) for the empirical evidence on the influence of labour market
institutions on wage formation and unemployment in OECD countries. As was already
mentioned, trade unions are not the only labour market institution that influences wage formation
in Europe, nevertheless they are of great empirical significance, especially in Germany (cf. also
Dell’ Aringa and Lucifora 2000). In Chapter 5 I will derive a wage setting equation from a
monopoly union model.
50 In more complex models, other factors, such as the tax structure, influence the negotiated wage
level. Lockwood and Manning (1993) and Pissarides (1998) analyse the impact of non-
proportional tax systems on wage pressure generated by trade unions.
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lead to persistent shifts of the WS schedule in (w–L) space. For a given employment
level, an upward shift of the WS curve implies higher wage pressure exerted by the
trade unions, and a downward shift leads to wage moderation.
In order to create a better understanding of the impacts of a shift from labour to
energy taxes on the wage setting behaviour of trade unions, I briefly explain how the
slope and the locus of the WS curve are determined in a wage-bargaining model
framework (see Section 5.2.3 for more details and a formal analysis).
According to de Mooij (2000: Chapter 7) the EDD depends mainly on the question
whether the ecological tax reform affects the ratio of the reservation wage, w , to the
real net wage, w. If the tax reform reduces w /w, the bargaining position of the trade
union gets worse as potentially unemployed union members face a lower
unemployment benefit. Reduced wage pressure widens the scope for an EDD. A
policy induced increase in w /w reflects that the union’s wage claims become
stronger, thus reducing the opportunity for an EDD.
The reservation wage w  (often also termed fallback or outside option of employees)
represents the union’s utility during unemployment. In decentralised wage-bargaining
models, w  is typically specified simply as the weighted sum of real income during
employment, w, and real income during unemployment, b
(2-1) w =(1-u)w+ub
where the economy-wide unemployment rate, u, is assumed to approximate the
probability of being unemployed, and (1-u) stands for the probability of finding a job
outside the trade union’s coverage.51 From (2-1) we obtain a positive relationship
between w /w and b/w (for given u).
Several factors exert an influence on the union’s bargaining position which is mainly
reflected by changes in w /w. First of all, I consider the impact of the unemployment
rate on the negotiated real net wage, i.e. the slope of the WS curve. The slope
measures the degree of real wage rigidities in the labour market, i.e. the degree of the
sensitivity of real net wage changes to an alteration of the unemployment rate. A flat
WS curve indicates strong real wage rigidities, a steep WS curve reveals a low degree
                                                
51 Note that income during unemployment, b, may refer not only to unemployment benefits, but
also to untaxed income from the informal sector. A more complex specification of the trade
union’s utility during unemployment (and employment) is, for example, adopted by Pissarides
(1998), who additionally introduces a coefficient reflecting risk aversion of the trade union.
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of real wage rigidities. Considering the definition of the reservation wage (2-1), the
positive slope of the WS curve in (w-L) space is explained by the fact that a lower
unemployment rate, u, ceteris paribus pushes up the ratio w /w (since b/w<1). An
increase in w /w (or equivalently a rise of b/w), however, strengthens the trade
union’s bargaining position and increases wage pressure.
Furthermore the position of the WS curve in (w-L) space may be affected under
certain conditions by changes in the labour tax rate (or the rate of social security
contributions, respectively) and/or labour productivity.
The relative bargaining position of the trade union in wage negotiations deteriorates
(leading to wage moderation) if a lower labour tax rate reduces the ratio of the
reservation wage to the consumer wage. This may occur if nominal unemployment
benefits are fixed. In such as case a lower tL ceteris paribus boosts the net wage,
whereas unemployment benefits remain constant (thus b/w and, given u, w /w
decrease). According to the tax incidence literature, this phenomenon is described as
real wage resistance. Real wage resistance exists if the real wage partially or fully
resists the change in the labour tax rate. This means that the incidence of a labour tax
cut does not affect only employees in terms of higher real consumer wages but also
employers in terms of lower real labour costs.52 In a wage-bargaining model
framework, real wage resistance generally requires that parts of the income during
unemployment, b, be untaxed. Since real wage resistance (ceteris paribus) widens the
scope for an EDD, its empirical evidence is an important issue (see Section 5.2.2 for
a survey on the econometric literature).53
The analogous argumentation holds for the impact of labour productivity on the locus
of the WS curve. If lower labour productivity increases w /w, e.g. because
unemployment benefits are nominally fixed, wage pressure of trade unions is
reinforced and the WS curve shifts upwards. Note that for a fixed replacement ratio
                                                
52 Tyrväinen (1995:7) states in his definition of real wage resistance that “If wages do not fully
absorb changes in wedge factors (including various tax rates), real wage resistance exists.”
53 Bingley and Lanot (1999) identify three related factors that determine the responsiveness of the
real producer wage to labour taxes: firstly, the nature of the tax wedge, secondly, the institutional
structure of wage setting and the degree of product market competition, and thirdly, the
perceived links between labour taxes and transfers such as unemployment benefits. Pissarides
(1998) demonstrates that the impacts of a labour tax policy crucially depend on the specific
model underlying the wage setting function, the structure of taxation, and the unemployment
benefit system.
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(i.e. for a fixed ratio of unemployment benefits to the net wage) neither a change in tL
nor a change in labour productivity affects the locus of the WS curve.
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Figure 2: Employment effects of an ecological tax reform,
non-competitive labour market and involuntary unemployment
Figure 2 illustrates the possible impacts of an ecological tax reform on employment
in a partial equilibrium framework in which involuntary unemployment results from
wage bargaining. Just as in Figure 1, the LD curve represents either the traditional
labour demand function (if output markets are competitive) or a price setting curve
(if output markets are imperfect and prices are set as a mark-up on marginal costs). I
already mentioned that in contrast to Figure 1 the labour supply side is now described
by a WS curve which is to the left of the (virtual) LS curve.54 In Figure 2 the initial
equilibrium employment level, L0, is determined by labour demand at the real
producer wage, wP0; the initial tax wedge is (wp0-w0).
                                                
54 The LS curve relates the real net wage to the amount of labour that individual households would
supply theoretically if all labour market institutions were absent. The equilibrium unemployment
rate u (also designated as natural rate of unemployment or rate of structural unemployment) is
defined as u=1-L/Ls. It represents the resulting unemployment level if prices and wages are
correctly foreseen (cf. Johnson and Layard 1986:921). The empirically observable rate of
unemployment does not necessarily correspond to the rate of structural equilibrium
unemployment due to cyclical shocks in product markets, such as technology or import price
shocks (cf. Franz 1996). If actual employment deviates temporarily from equilibrium
unemployment this may have a direct effect on the equilibrium rate of unemployment. This
phenomenon of persistence of unemployment (hysteresis) has gained much attention in the
literature. Bean (1994), for example, discusses various sources of persistence that refer to the
supply side (i.e. the wage setting process), such as insider membership or outsider
characteristics, or to the demand side (i.e. the price setting schedule), such as firing costs or
capital shortage.
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Firstly, I consider a cut in the labour income tax tL, i.e. a reduction in the tax wedge. I
assume that real wage resistance exists. This implies that the WS curve shifts
somewhere downwards, for example to WS’, in response to the cut in tL. For given
real wage rigidities (i.e. for a given slope of the wage curve) this downward shift
reinforces the positive employment impact of revenue recycling since the incidence
of the tax cut falls partially on employers in terms of a lower producer wage. On the
assumption that the tax wedge shrinks to ( 1Pw - 1w ), employment rises to L1 in
Figure 2.
On the other hand, an increase in the energy tax leads to higher energy prices, lower
energy demand, and lower labour productivity. The LD curve moves to the left (for
example to LD’). If lower labour productivity boosts ww / ,55 the union’s bargaining
position in wage negotiation improves, wage pressure rises, and the WS curve shifts
upwards (for example to WS’’).
Both moves tend to reduce equilibrium employment compared to L1, however, in the
partial equilibrium framework underlying Figure 2, and without a quantitative
parameterisation of the wage setting and labour demand equations, the ultimate net
labour market effect of an ecological tax reform cannot be discovered. I only
attempted to illustrate that, if there is wage-bargaining behaviour, the EDD outcome
depends on a number of elasticities in the wage setting equation. The degree of real
wage resistance (which in turn depends on the indexation rule for unemployment
benefits) and the size of real wage rigidities are particularly important.
2.3.3.2 Fixed real wages
The first few papers analysing the EDD in a framework of equilibrium
unemployment simply assume that the real wage – typically the real net wage – is
fixed at a level above the exogenous reservation wage. With exogenous real wage
rigidities, labour supply is de facto infinitely elastic at the fixed real wage, i.e. the
WS curve in Figure 2 transforms into a horizontal line. The incidence of a change in
the tax wedge is fully borne by the employers, and there is a maximum degree of real
wage resistance.
                                                
55 As already mentioned, both the elasticity of the wage with respect to the labour income tax and
labour productivity depend on the indexation of unemployment benefits (cf. de Mooij 2000:191).
If unemployment benefits are nominally fixed, lower labour productivity increases wage
pressure, whereas a lower labour tax reduces wage pressure.
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Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998a), Bovenberg (1998), and de Mooij
(2000:196-200) introduce involuntary unemployment that is explained by an
exceedingly high fixed real net wage into a small open-economy model with three
production factors: labour, energy, and fixed capital (cf. Section 2.3.2.2). The authors
suggest that in the presence of fixed net wages the necessary conditions for positive
employment effects are very similar to those derived from the fixed factor model
with a competitive labour market. A sufficiently small initial pollution tax (ensuring
a small tax burden effect), a small initial rate of profit taxation, and a large
production share of the fixed factor (both ensuring that after-tax profits can bear a
large part of the tax burden) are the prerequisites for a substantial fall in real wage
costs and thus for positive employment effects. A further condition is a higher degree
of substitutability between labour and energy than between the fixed factor and
energy (ensuring that the substitution effect offsets the output effect and that the
fixed factor can share the burden of the energy tax to a great extent).
In Koskela et al. (2001) equilibrium unemployment is also traced back to an
excessive fixed net wage. A representative firm produces an export good with two
production factors – domestic labour and imported energy – in an open economy. In
contrast to most other EDD studies, the terms of trade defined by the price of the
export good in terms of an import good are assumed to be endogenous and declining
in output. The authors come to the conclusion that a moderate ecological tax reform
can alleviate the unemployment problem through strong substitution processes
between energy and labour in production. Moreover, substitution towards labour
increases welfare since energy is priced at its national opportunity cost (which is
equal to the fixed world market price) while the wage rate is above its opportunity
cost. In addition, the authors find that unit production costs of exports continue to
decrease as long as the (ad-valorem) energy tax rate is below the (ad-valorem) labour
tax rate, i.e. the economy’s competitiveness increases.
The sensitivity of EDD results with respect to different ways of wage fixing is
examined in Kirchgässner et al. (1998) by applying a CGE model for the Swiss
economy and in Koschel et al. (1999) by using the single-country version of the
GEM-E3 model for Germany. In both studies, the energy/carbon tax revenues are
redistributed to the private sector through an equal cut in the employers’ and
employees’ social security contribution rate. Both studies support the EDD
hypothesis, provided that workers accept a decrease in the real gross wage compared
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to the benchmark.56 If, however, employees take advantage of the tax reform and
improve their real income position, real labour costs cannot decrease sufficiently,
leading to a higher share of unemployment compared to the benchmark (cf. Section
5.3.1).
2.3.3.3 Wage bargaining
The assumption of exogenous real wage rigidities is unsatisfactory because it is
lacking in a microeconomic foundation of the wage formation process. Recently,
some EDD papers were published that allow for endogenous wage formation. As I
mentioned in Section 2.3.3.1, in the majority of EDD studies that refer to European
labour markets equilibrium wages are regarded as the outcome of collective
bargaining between trade unions and employers. Typically, the right-to-manage
approach is chosen, which implies that bargaining only has to do with wages,
whereas employment is determined unilaterally by profit maximising employers ex
post.57 The standard approach is to derive wages and employment from the
maximisation of a Nash objective function subject to labour demand (cf. McDonald
and Solow 1981).
In Section 2.3.3.1 I argue that the introduction of a positively sloped wage curve that
attributes real wage rigidities to institutional mechanisms of wage setting opens up a
further transmission channel through which employment may be influenced when an
ecological tax reform is implemented. This transmission channel is closely related to
the tax reform’s impact on the ratio between income during unemployment and
income during employment. If the ecological tax reform is successful in shifting parts
of the tax burden from workers to the unemployed, this ratio decreases, the union’s
bargaining position deteriorates, and wage claims are moderated.
                                                
56 Note that the real gross wage and the real producer wage differ from each other if employers’
social security contributions are considered. In Germany the real gross wage is usually defined as
the real net (after-tax) wage plus labour income taxes and employees’ social security
contributions. The real gross wage plus the employers’ social security contributions then yield
the real producer wage, i.e. real labour costs (cf. Steiner 1998).
57 Alternatively, it can be assumed that the union does not bargain with employers but has the
power to unilaterally set the wage level. A monopoly union model is applied in Section 5.2.3 as
well as in Jensen et al. (1994) and Nielsen et al. (1995). Bayindir-Upmann and Raith (1999)
examine the trade-off between first and second dividend in the context of four alternative
bargaining models: efficiency bargaining, monopoly union, right-to-manage, and insider-
dominated union model (see below in this section).
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In a bargaining equilibrium the net wage is a constant mark-up on the reservation
wage of employees. The mark-up represents some rents that are negotiated on.
Actually, in models where profits are zero regardless of the negotiated wage level
wage bargaining will not take place because there is no incentive for firms to enter
into negotiations. In theory there are various sources of rents. Rents may come from
market power on commodity markets, leading to product market rents (e.g. in
Holmlund and Kolm 1997, Koskela et al. 1998, Marsiliani and Renström 2000).
Alternatively, rents may arise from a (quasi) fixed production factor, such as capital
(e.g. in Bayindir-Upmann and Raith 1999, Koskela and Schöb 1999, de Mooij 2000)
or from search and hiring costs (e.g. in Bovenberg and van der Ploeg 1998b, Strand
1999). Rents can also originate from firm specific human capital or entry barriers
(e.g. in Carraro et al. 1996, Bosello and Carraro 1998). As de Mooij (2000:203)
indicates, the source of rents is an important issue since it determines whether or not
the mark-up and thus the EDD outcome depend on the production structure.
In the following, I review the results of some recent EDD studies which account for
wage bargaining.
Carraro et al. (1996) were among the first authors who introduced imperfectly
competitive labour and output markets into a large-scale macro-econometric general
equilibrium model, the WARM model.58 Firms are price setters and set a constant
price mark-up. Net wages in the primary sector (including all industrial and service
sectors apart from agriculture) are the outcome of a sequential bargaining process. In
a first step, wages are determined by bargaining between a trade union and a
representative firm of the ‘leading’ manufacturing and service sectors; in a second
step, wages in all other sectors of the primary sector are derived on the basis of sector
specific wage differentials. It is assumed that the union maximises the product of
employment and the individual earnings of workers in the unionised sector. Wage
formation is described by a share equation in which the ratio between the gross wage
and profits per head depends positively on the relative bargaining power and
negatively on the unemployment rate, the employment elasticity with respect to
wages, and the weight that the union attributes to employment in its utility function.
                                                
58 The inclusion of technical change and a disaggregated capital stock are two further specific
features of the WARM (World Assessment of Resource Management) model (cf. Carraro et al.
1996).
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Econometric estimation of the share equation indicates that real wage resistance
exists only in the short run, while a cut in payroll taxes only has negligible positive
employment impacts in the long run if trade unions enforce higher net wages.59 In the
WARM model, a revenue-neutral ecological tax reform introducing a uniform EU-
wide carbon/energy tax and lowering payroll taxes boosts employment and reduces
gross wages in the short run. In the long run, however, employment virtually
approaches the baseline figures. A further interesting outcome of Carraro et al.
(1996) is that an ecological tax reform increases employment; income effects,
however, will lead simultaneously to higher pollution.60
In a subsequent paper on the WARM model, Bosello and Carraro (1998) segmented
the labour market of the primary sector into unskilled and skilled workers. Wages in
both segments are separately negotiated according to the sequential process outlined
above. Econometric estimations yield that the trade union of skilled workers has
more bargaining power and higher preferences for wages than the trade union of
unskilled workers. The simulations carried out with the WARM model reveal that the
short-term increase in employment is higher when tax revenues are used to cut social
security contributions of both unskilled and skilled workers than those of unskilled
workers alone. The reason for this is that a unilateral reduction of the gross wage
triggers substitution processes between unskilled and skilled labour which cause
labour demand of skilled workers to decline. As was outlined in Carraro et al. (1996),
positive employment effects arise only in the short run since unions succeed in
transferring lower labour costs into higher net wages in the long run.
Holmlund and Kolm (1997) investigate the employment effects of an ecological tax
reform using a general equilibrium model of a small open economy with a tradable
and a non-tradable sector. In each sector a fixed number of monopolistically
competitive firms operates with sector specific production technologies including
two production factors: immobile labour and imported (mobile) energy. For given
price levels nominal net wages are the outcome of decentralised bargaining of the
right-to-manage type. The real net wage is then specified as a constant mark-up on
the outside opportunity, which is measured in terms of the weighted average of
                                                
59 See Brunello (1996) for more details on the estimation results.
60 At first glance, this result is surprising. Weinbrenner (1999: Chapter 5) and Bayindir-Upmann
and Raith (1999), however, prove that in theoretical models with only consumption externalities
an ecological tax reform may reduce environmental quality despite substitution effects if
efficiency gains lead to higher income and thus to higher consumption of dirty goods.
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incomes from unemployment and employment in the tradable and the non-tradable
sector.61 Since Holmlund and Kolm assume that the trade union in the tradable sector
has a relatively higher bargaining power, the negotiated wage in the tradable sector is
higher than in the protected sector.
The authors conclude from theoretical and numerical analyses that a moderate
increase in the tax on imported energy can boost equilibrium employment, provided
that the negotiated wage is higher in the tradable sector than in the protected sector.
This is due to the fact that the energy tax lowers labour demand in the tradable sector
and the real value of outside opportunities. Wages in both sectors are depressed and
employment is reallocated from the tradable to the non-tradable sector. Numerical
sensitivity tests with respect to the unemployment benefit regime reveal that results
hardly differ, irrespective of whether unemployment benefits are indexed to the
consumer wage (fixed replacement ratio) or to the consumption price index (fixed
real unemployment benefits). Obviously, in the model of Holmlund and Kolm the
main driving force of employment effects is the wage differential between the
tradable and the protected sector. A tradable sector wage premium, however, requires
that there be substantial rents in bargaining, either resulting from strong market
power of firms or from quasi-fixed capital in the tradable sector. Both assumptions
are questionable in the framework of a small open economy in which firms in the
tradable sector are more likely to be price takers and capital is internationally mobile
(cf. Section 2.3.2.2). For this reason, the authors themselves conclude that there is
little chance of obtaining an EDD.
Koskela and Schöb (1999) expand the EDD debate by emphasising the importance of
the institutional arrangements concerning the income tax and the unemployment
benefit system. They construct a model of a small open economy consisting
exclusively of consumption externalities and right-to-manage wage bargaining. Firms
produce a single output good with labour as the only variable input. Households are
divided into workers, either employed or unemployed, and shareholders who own
profit income which accrues to a fixed factor in production. Trade unions maximise
workers’ real income which consists of real net wage income and real net
unemployment benefits. The negotiated outcome is the nominal net wage.
                                                
61 The real reservation wage w  is defined as follows: SSCC wnwnubw ++= , (u+nC+nS=1),
where u denotes the unemployment rate, b are real unemployment benefits, nC and nS are ratios
of labour demand to the labour force in the tradable and the non-tradable sector, and wC and wS
are sector specific real net wages (cf. Holmlund and Kolm 1997:14).
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The authors analyse the effects of a revenue-neutral shift of the tax on (labour and
profit) income to the tax on dirty consumption goods under four assumptions
concerning the taxation and indexation of unemployment benefits and the type of tax
exemption. They deduce that employment rises if the benefit-replacement ratio – i.e.
the ratio between real net unemployment benefits and the real net wage – decreases.
This is the case if unemployment benefits are nominally fixed and taxed at a lower
rate than labour income. Employment effects are ambiguous if unemployment
benefits are price-indexed and taxed at a lower rate than labour income. Employment
definitely falls when benefits are price-indexed and taxed at the same rate as labour
income.
Applying four different wage-bargaining models, Bayindir-Upmann and Raith (1999)
conclude that a revenue-neutral tax reform on the consumption side is successful in
raising employment and shifting the tax burden from workers to profit owners. In
their model, competitive firms produce both a dirty and a clean good with a Cobb-
Douglas production function. Labour is the only variable production factor.
Households are divided into unemployed workers (those who receive only transfer
income), employed workers (those who receive both wage and transfer income), and
managers (those who receive profit income arising from fixed factors in production).
Wages are determined alternatively by efficiency bargaining, right-to-manage,
monopoly union and insider-dominated union models.
The authors show that the first dividend can get lost if – in terms of pollution – the
substitution effect between clean and dirty commodities does not suffice to
overcompensate the income effect associated with higher employment. Positive
employment effects lead to increased pollution under the following conditions: The
economy is on the left hand side of the Laffer curve for the labour income tax, and
the labour income tax rate exceeds a critical value which, in turn, depends on the
households’ expenditure share for dirty goods, the production coefficient, and the
wage share. The authors suggest that, provided that the bargaining outcome is on the
labour demand curve,62 an expenditure share of 0.5 leads to an increase in pollution
for any labour income tax at the left hand side of the Laffer curve. This is an
interesting theoretical finding; however, I would like to make a comment on it from a
more empirical perspective. Consider, for instance, a tax on household energy
consumption and right-to-manage bargaining. In this rather realistic case, the initial
                                                
62 This applies to the right-to-manage, monopoly union and insider-union models.
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labour income tax rate for which a revenue-neutral ecological tax reform leads to
both higher pollution and higher employment must stay in the narrow range of 0.26
to 0.3 (I calculated the lower bound of 0.26 on the basis of an household expenditure
share for energy of 10%63). Actually, this shows that the condition for a simultaneous
increase of energy-related emissions and employment is very specific and might not
be met in reality.
While the last two models ignore production externalities and factor taxation,
Koskela et al. (1998) analyse the employment effects of a marginal ecological tax
reform affecting the producer side in the presence of wage bargaining. Their model
considers a monopolistic firm which only uses labour and imported energy to
produce output with a CES production technology. The net wage is negotiated
between a trade union and the firm according to the right-to-manage model.
Unemployment workers receive a fixed unemployment benefit.
The authors suggest that the condition for an employment dividend is the limited rise
of the negotiated net wage. Employment definitely increases if the substitution
elasticity between labour and energy exceeds unity, thus leading to a decrease in the
negotiated net wage. As soon as the substitution elasticity between labour and energy
drops below unity, the net wage increases. Employment may still rise if there are
moderate wage increases, however, it will decline if the wages reach a certain level.
A further result is that chances for positive employment effects increase
simultaneously with the labour tax rate and decrease with the bargaining power of
trade unions.
Marsiliani and Renström (2000) develop a general equilibrium model of a closed
economy with both consumption and production externalities. In close analogy to
Layard et al. (1991) they assume monopolistic competition on product markets and
decentralised right-to-manage wage bargaining. The main focus of the authors is to
test for the sensitivity of EDD outcomes with respect to the degree of both labour and
product market distortions. A large number of price setting local monopoly firms
produce a different consumption good with the same Cobb-Douglas production
technology using a given capital stock, labour, and energy. Households are divided
into three groups: after-tax wage-income earners (employed workers), recipients of
                                                
63 According to the Federal Statistical Office Germany (1999, Table 21.2), the expenditure shares
of households for energy (electricity, gasoline etc.) were even less than 10% in 1998 – i.e. only
between 4 and 7%.
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unemployment benefits (unemployed workers), and profit-income earners
(shareholders). The outcome of bargaining between firms and local unions is the net
wage which is a constant mark-up on unemployment benefits. The mark-up rises
with increasing bargaining power of unions and decreasing competition in good
markets.
Marsiliani and Renström find that a revenue-neutral ecological tax reform, consisting
of a newly introduced energy tax and a cut in the (Laffer efficient) labour income
tax,64 generates positive employment effects. This is due to tax shifting effects
towards non-labour income such as unemployment benefits and profits; actually, all
households bear the additional tax burden associated with the energy tax, but only
employed workers are compensated with lower payments of the income tax.
Secondly, the authors find that employment rises as the union power and price mark-
ups increase. This result is explained by the fact that the share of household income
from profits and unemployment benefits in total wage income is higher with less
competition on the labour and product markets, and this leads to a higher ratio of
expenditure for energy consumption to wage income. This implies that the ratio of
the energy tax base to the labour tax base is also higher with market imperfections
than in the competitive scenario. With lower competition, an increase in the energy
tax rate is thus associated with a relatively higher amount of revenues. This allows
for a relatively larger reduction of the labour tax rate and labour market distortions.65
After all, numerical simulations with the model calibrated to Italian data confirm that
the theoretical results hold even if the initial energy tax is positive.
My survey closes with a brief presentation of the findings of Bovenberg and van der
Ploeg (1998b) who employ a search model in which wages are bargained between
firms with vacant jobs and individual unemployed workers seeking work. Bargaining
is conducted over the rent which originates from (expected) hiring and search costs
for the firm and the worker.66 In addition to imported energy, immobile labour and
internationally mobile capital are employed in production. Apart from unemployment
benefits the authors consider a second source of utility in unemployment: untaxed
                                                
64 Marsiliani and Renström (2000:12) show that a payroll tax is equivalent to a labour income tax,
provided unemployment benefits are untaxed.
65 Remember that in Koskela et al. (1998), in which only production externalities are considered,
employment effects decline with a lower degree of competition in the labour market.
66 See also Strand (1999), who employs a search model with bargaining between the firm and the
worker.
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income from work in the informal sector. While unemployment benefits are indexed
to the consumer wage, income in the informal sector is indexed to the producer wage,
i.e. to labour productivity in the formal sector.
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg examine the sensitivity of EDD results with respect to
different income regimes and indexation rules. They find that an ecological tax
reform leaves unemployment unaffected if unemployment benefits are indexed to
after-tax wages and if other sources of utility in unemployment are absent. In this
case, the unemployed have a share in the costs of a cleaner environment. However, if
the unemployed receive untaxed income from the informal sector in addition to
unemployment benefits, an EDD may result. This is the case if the initial energy tax
rate is small and income from the informal sector is substantial. Since income from
the informal sector is indexed to the producer wage, the unemployed bear an
additional part of the tax burden as labour productivity in the formal sector declines
in response to the energy tax increase. The decay of the outside option of workers
induces a fall in wages and thus a lower unemployment rate.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter outlines the way energy taxes function as tools for climate protection
and reviews the theoretical literature on ecological tax reforms. I sum up the main
results of this chapter and conclude as follows:
1. From an economic perspective, energy taxes (and tradable permits) are the
preferred instruments in climate policy. Theoretically, both instruments minimise
overall abatement costs and provide innovative incentives that are higher than in
the case of technical standards. Recent literature indicates that energy taxes are
superior to tradable permits with respect to innovative incentives, whereas
tradable permits have an advantage over taxes that are applied at the international
policy level. Generally, one can argue that energy taxes are a suitable instrument
for climate protection, in particular for application in national climate policy.
2. Since the early nineties the merits of energy taxes have been mainly discussed
from a non-environmental point of view. In this work I concentrate on the
employment double dividend hypothesis (EDD) which claims that a shift from
labour to environmental taxes simultaneously boosts employment and reduces
pollution. The theoretical literature on ecological tax reforms indicates that the
EDD is accepted only under certain conditions. Employment rises if, from a
public finance point of view, labour is taxed with an excessively high rate
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compared to energy in the initial equilibrium and if a tax shifting effect from
labour to other private income offsets the negative tax burden effect on labour
income.
3. Three ways of tax shifting are considered in the literature: tax shifting between
production factors, tax shifting towards the foreign sector through terms-of-trade
effects, and tax shifting to non-wage income earners. Accordingly, it depends on
several model assumptions – such as the production structure, substitution and
supply elasticities of factors, the foreign trade specification (terms-of-trade
effects), and the specification of labour markets and the unemployment benefit
regime – whether (and how much) employment will increase or not in response to
an ecological tax reform.
4. In my literature survey I focus on EDD studies with labour market imperfections
and involuntary unemployment. One interesting finding is that in wage-
bargaining models the chance for an EDD increases since tax shifting effects
from workers to the unemployed become possible which lead to wage moderation
and thus to lower producer wages. If long-lasting real wage resistance exists, a
labour tax cut causes a long-lasting reduction in labour costs. If, however, real
wage resistance is absent or only a short-term phenomenon, long-lasting positive
employment effects are reduced and less likely.
The quantitative net effect of all factors mentioned above cannot be determined
theoretically. Ultimately, it is impossible to conclude from theoretical models
whether the EDD hypothesis is valid or not in real-world economies. In principle, a
rich and realistic numerically solvable CGE model structure which incorporates non-
clearing labour markets can open all channels (recommended by theory) through
which an ecological tax reform affects employment and can produce a definitive net
employment effect. The high model complexity of a CGE framework, however,
makes it difficult to identify the specific contribution of each key mechanism that
leads to an approval or a rejection of the EDD hypothesis. Thus the theoretical
findings summarised in this chapter prove to be an indispensable guide for a
meaningful interpretation of CGE modelling results.
There is an overall consensus today that there is still a lack of empirical research that
quantitatively evaluates the employment effects of ecological tax reforms and
analyses the possible trade-off between the first and second dividend (cf. also Bosello
et al. 1999). In order to close this gap partially, I use both the single-country and the
linked version of the GEM-E3 EU-14 model in the following parts of this work and
simulate several ecological tax reform scenarios which apply to both the producer
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and the consumer side. I will concentrate on the impact that substitution elasticities,
foreign trade elasticities, and labour supply elasticities have on the EDD outcome. In
order to enhance the validity of model results, I will substantiate some of the non-
calibrated functional parameters incorporated in the GEM-E3 model empirically
(partially by own econometric estimations) and conduct sensitivity analyses.
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3 Employment double dividend and substitution
patterns in production
3.1 Introduction
As was already briefly mentioned in Chapter 2, the substitutional relationship
between energy and nonenergy inputs is one of the key factors for the labour market
effects of an ecological tax reform that raises energy taxes in production and reduces
taxes on labour. The more easily labour can be substituted for energy in comparison
to other production factors, such as capital, the higher the substitution effect is that
works against the negative output effect.
Today, there are only few empirical studies available dealing with detailed
substitution relationships in the German economy. Most of them are restricted to
manufacturing sectors and consider only a single energy aggregate. The main
objective of this chapter is to contribute to an additional empirical clarification of
sectoral substitutional opportunities in the German economy and to improve the
empirical basis of the GEM-E3 model and its power to simulate ecological tax
reform scenarios.
Sectoral substitution elasticities are estimated using a flexible translog functional
form for a non-nested and for a three-level nested production function with capital,
labour, material, electricity, and fossil fuels. Nearly all producing industries and
service sectors in Germany are covered. Compared to the CES, the translog
functional form is advantageous as it does not impose a priori restrictions on the
underlying technology with respect to substitution patterns, separable structures, and
economies of scale.67
This chapter is set out as follows: In Section 3.2 I estimate sectoral substitution
elasticities with respect to a time-series cross-section data sample for Germany.
Section 3.2.1 provides a literature survey, Section 3.2.2 presents the translog cost
model, while Section 3.2.3 describes the econometric procedure and the data.
Empirical results are discussed in Section 3.2.4. The sensitivity of GEM-E3
                                                
67 Examples for translog applications are Berndt and Wood (1975), Griffin and Gregory (1976),
Halverson (1977), Pindyck (1979), Turnovsky and Donnelly (1984), Chung (1987), Kintis and
Panas (1989), Grant (1993), Betts (1997), or Casler (1997). See Section 3.2.1 for a literature
review.
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simulation results to the choice of substitution elasticity values is analysed in
Section 3.3. Finally, Section 3.4 contains the main conclusions.
3.2 Estimation of substitution elasticities in German
producing and service sectors
3.2.1 Literature review
When looking into the econometric literature on substitution elasticities between
energy and nonenergy inputs, one can find a substantial number of empirical studies
which have been published since the energy crisis in the 1970s.68 Most of them rely
on homothetic KLEM69 (or KLE) translog cost functions and use highly aggregated
data, often for the whole U.S. manufacturing sector. Substitutability relationships are
mainly measured by the (constant-output) Allen partial elasticity of substitution
(AES). The most cited study in this field was provided by Berndt and Wood (1975)
who calculated AES on the basis of a translog cost share system with constant returns
to scale and Hicks neutral technical progress, using aggregate U.S. KLEM data for
the period 1947-71. The main results of this study are that energy demand is
responsive to a change of energy prices, that capital and energy are strong
complements, and that labour and energy are slightly substitutable.
Whether capital and energy are complements or substitutes in production or, in other
words, whether or not an increase of energy prices reduces overall economic
investment and economic growth, was the main focus in the 70’s and 80’s.
Table 1 and Table 2 list the results of a series of papers on the substitutability
between capital and energy which have been reviewed by Apostolakis (1990). The
author concludes that there is a dichotomy between studies based on time-series data
and studies using cross-section or pooled time-series cross-section approaches. While
the former tend to support capital-energy complementarity, the latter favour capital-
energy substitutability (cf. also Griffin and Gregory 1976).
                                                
68 See, for example, Hamermesh (1993:88), Kintis and Panas (1989), or Apostolakis (1990) for
surveys.
69 KLEM stands for capital (K), labour (L), energy (E), and material (M) inputs.
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Table 1: KLEM studies assessing energy-capital complementarity
Author(s)* Sector(s) Years Remarks
Berndt/Wood (1975) US manufacturing 1947-71 CRTS translog cost function with Hicks neutral 
technological change; σ KE = -3.20
Hudson/Jorgenson (1974) US manufacturing 1947-71 CRTS translog cost function with no autocorrelation 
correction; σ KE  = -1.39
Fuss (1977)** 5 Canadian regions 1961-71 σ KE  = -0.21; translog pooled cross-section time-
series with two-stage optimisation
Denny et al. (1978) Canadian manufacturing 1949-70 Generalized Leontief cost function; σ KE  < 0           
1952: σ KE  = -10.57, 1959: σ KE = -9.86,                   
1965: σ KE = -11.91, 1970: σ KE = -10.14
Magnus (1979)*** Dutch economy 1950-76 2 models; σ KE  = -2.19, σ KE  = -2.45; Diewert 
generalized Cobb-Douglas cost function
Berndt/Khaled (1979) US manufacturing 1947-71 Test 12 models as derived from a Box-Cox ultra 
flexible form; Hicks neutral technical change
Anderson (1981) US manufacturing 1948-71 Mean σ KE  = -0.70, 1948: σ KE  = -0.65, 1960: σ KE 
= -0.69, 1971: σ KE  = -1.39; CRTS translog cost 
function
Denny et al. (1981) USA-Canada 18 
industries
1949-71 
1961-75
σ KE  < 0 in 14 out of 18 US industries (LR);             
σ KE  > 0 in 12 out of 18 Canadian industries (LR); 
KLEM
Norsworthy/Harper (1981) US manufacturing 1958-77
-0.26 ≤ σ KE  ≤ -7.98 in six specifications; translog 
cost function with CRTS
Morrison/Berndt (1981) US manufacturing 1952-71 SR:σ KE  = 0.000; intermediate-run:σ KE  = -0.021; 
LR: σ KE  = -0.075; complementarity increases in the 
LR
Dargay (1983) 12 Swedish 
manufacturers
1952-76 In six sectors: σ KE  < 0, one sector: σ KE  >0, five 
sectors: σ KE  = 0; translog 
homothetic/nonhomothetic forms
Longva/Olson (1983) 19 Norwegian 
manufacturers
1962-78 In E -intensive sectors: σ KE  < 0 (= -0.13); in 
inclusion of M leads to complementarity 
Pindyck/Rotemberg (1983) US manufacturing 1948-71 Translog function using 3SLS; E-M  are flexible 
factors; K-L  are quasi-fixed factors
σ ij : substitution elasticity; CRTS: constant returns to scale; LR: long run; SR: short run.
* See Apostolakis (1990) for detailed references.
** Pooled cross-section data.
*** KLE  data.
Source: Apostolakis (1990:52).
Apostolakis explains this dichotomy by the fact that annual time series capture only a
limited range of input price variations. Thus, a cost function which is estimated from
annual time series can be interpreted to reflect short-term relationships. Since the
capital stock is fixed in the short run, capital services and energy are likely to be used
in fixed proportions. Consequently, an increase of energy prices induces a decrease of
capital utilisation. In contrast to this, cross-section and pooled time-series cross-
section studies are interpreted to cover long-term relationships. They tend to favour
capital-energy substitutability because capital stocks are flexible in the long run and
can be adjusted to price changes. An increase in energy prices therefore may
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stimulate investments in energy-saving technologies which are characterised by
higher capital user costs and lower energy consumption (given constant output).
Table 2: KLEM studies supporting energy-capital substitutability
Author(s)* Country/sector(s) Method/  years Remarks
Griffin/Gregory (1976) 9 nations 
manufacturers
pooled c-s 
1955-69
1.02 ≤ σ EK  ≤ 1.07; σ EK  = 1.02 (Belgium, 
Netherlands, Norway); 1.03 (West Germany, 
Italy); 1.04 (Denmark, UK); 1.05 (France); 1.07 
(USA)                                                   
Halvorsen/Ford (1979) 8 US 2-digit 
manufacturers
c-s             
1974
-1.03 ≤ σ KE  ≤ 2.02; translog function
Ozatalay et al. (1979) 7 nations 
manufacturers
pooled t-s        
1963-74
σ KE  = 1.22; KLEM cost translog function
Pindyck (1979) 10 nations 
aggregate
pooled c-s t-s 
1959-73
σ KE  = 1.48: Canada, 0.56: France, 0.67: Italy, 
0.74: Japan, 0.59: Netherlands, 0.54: Norway, 
0.63: Sweden, 0.36: UK, 1.77: US, 0.66: West 
Germany
Uri (1980) US Manufacturing c-s              
1947-71
KLEM ; Leontief-type fixed coefficient production 
function is appropriate; there is directional 
causality between quantities and prices
Walton (1981) 5 US regions 
manufacturing
t-s                    
1950-73
5 inputs: K , L , M , fuels, electricity; all σ ij  > 0; 
information is lost by regional aggregation
Williams/Laumas (1981) India manufacturing c-s                   
1968
KLEM  translog function: 96 cross-price 
elasticities: 88 positive; 8 negative (insignificant)
Turnovsky et al. (1982)                       t-s                    
1946-75
KLEM  translog function; mean σ KE  = 2.26; σ KE 
= 2.63 for 1946-47; 1.91 for 1974-75
Denny et al. (1981) US-Canada            
18 manufacturers
t-s               
1949-71           
1961-75
σ KE  > 0 in 12 out of 18 Canadian industries;     
σ KE  < 0 in 14 out of 18 US industries; KLEM 
translog
Apostolakis (1984) Greece aggregate t-s              
1953-77
0.92 ≤ σ KE  ≤ 0.94; two-output three input (KLE ) 
translog cost function; separability tests done
Apostolakis (1987) 5 nations aggregate t-s                    
1953-84
France: 0.86 ≤ σ KE ≤ 0.94; Greece: 0.41 ≤ σ KE  ≤ 
0.66; Italy: 0.83 ≤ σ KE  ≤ 0.95; Portugal: 0.62 ≤ 
σ KE  ≤ 0.71; Spain: 0.74 ≤ σ KE
 
≤ 0.82; translog 
KLE  cost function
Iqbal (1986) Pakistan                  
16 industries
pooled t-s        
5 years
σ KE  > 0 in 9 industries and σ KE  < 0 in 7 
industries; total σ KE  = 1.641; KLE  translog 
function
σ ij : substitution elasticity, c-s: cross section; t-s: time series.
* See Apostolakis (1990) for detailed references.
Source: Apostolakis (1990:53).
This interpretation of cross-section and time-series studies is questioned by
Thompson and Taylor (1995). The authors demonstrate that the dichotomy of both
concepts can be partially dissolved if substitutability is no longer measured in terms
of the AES, but in terms of the Morishima elasticity of substitution (MES). Based on
the latter, positive substitution elasticities are calculated far more frequently between
47
energy and capital. This is due to the fact that the MES per definition tends to favour
substitutability relationships (see Section 3.2.2.2).
The question of substitutability between input pairs other than energy and capital is
less disputed in the literature. Estimates of substitution between labour and energy
and labour and material are summarised in Hamermesh (1993:104). With the
exception of only a few studies, labour and energy are found to be substitutes – even
if the cross-price elasticity of labour demand with respect to energy prices is quite
small and normally below 0.5. According to Hamermesh, labour is also a substitute
for material but includes a small cross-price elasticity as well.
Most of the previously cited studies are based on U.S. data. Studies analysing
substitution pattern in the German economy were published particularly in the 1980s
(e.g. Friede 1980, Nakamura 1984, Unger 1986, Natrop 1986, or Peren 1990). All
these studies use time-series KLEM data (with the exception of the Natrop study
which employs pooled time-series cross-section data) and homothetic translog cost
functions. More recent studies are, for example, Falk and Koebel (1999) and Kemfert
and Welsch (2000).
Falk and Koebel (1999) estimate cross-price and Morishima substitution elasticities
between capital, energy, material, and heterogeneous labour. The factor demand
system is derived from a normalised quadratic cost function. The study is based on
pooled time-series cross-section data for 27 manufacturing sectors of West Germany
over the period 1978-90 and presents estimates for a concavity unrestricted and a
concavity restricted model. The authors find very small absolute values of sectorally
aggregated price elasticities for aggregated labour. A negative cross-price elasticity is
revealed for energy and labour, which suggests a slightly complementary
relationship. While the Falk and Koebel study focuses on examining substitution
patterns between disaggregated labour and other factor aggregates, my work
concentrates on substitutional relationships between disaggregated energy and
nonenergy production inputs. As data for disaggregated energy inputs are available
only for the same short time period (1978-90), I am also constrained to a time-series
cross-section approach, but I still cover a much higher number of sectors (including
service sectors).
Based on three alternative nesting structures, Kemfert and Welsch (2000) estimate
substitution elasticities directly from a two-level nested CES production function
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with aggregated energy, capital, and labour input for the entire German industry and
seven industrial sectors.70 The data base consists of time series over the period 1970-
88. With regard to the nesting structure the authors find that a nested CES production
function with an aggregate of capital and energy is most appropriate for the whole
industry, while the ranking varies at the sectoral level. Concerning the magnitude and
sign of substitution elasticities, they find that energy, capital, and labour are
imperfect substitutes in the production function of the German industry as a whole
and of the individual sectors.
From an econometric point of view, the study of Kemfert and Welsch suffers from
several shortcomings. Positive substitution elasticities, for example, are an inevitable
result because the CES function per definition does not allow for complementarity
relationships between input pairs at the same nesting level. In addition, the authors
exclude material from production, i.e. they assume that a homothetic KLE aggregate
exists which is weakly separable from material inputs. The validity of this constraint
and other separability restrictions, which are implicitly imposed on the econometric
model when a nested CES function is estimated, are, however, not tested.
In order to get around these critical points, I apply a flexible functional form that
allows, firstly, to measure for both complementarity and substitutability pattern
between input pairs, and, secondly, to test for weak homothetic separability
constraints. Compared to previous studies, my work is of higher sectoral coverage; it
includes nonenergy materials and introduces a disaggregated energy input.
3.2.2 Theoretical framework
3.2.2.1 Translog cost function
The translog – first introduced by Christensen et al. (1973) – is the most frequently
applied flexible functional form in econometrics. In spite of certain limitations, the
translog has a number of advantages.71 In particular it allows testing for approximate
separability structures and homotheticity properties of the underlying production
structure. In the following sections a flexible translog cost function is employed in
order to estimate price and substitution elasticities between five variable production
                                                
70 The sectors considered are ‘chemical industry’, ‘stone and earth’, ‘non-ferrous metals’, ‘iron’,
‘vehicle’, ‘paper’, and ‘food’.
71 Disadvantages of the translog are the loss of flexibility when global concavity or global weak
separability restrictions are imposed (see Section 3.2.2.3 and 3.2.2.4).
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factors: capital (K), labour (L), nonenergy material (M), electricity (EL), and fossil
fuels (F). The use of the dual cost function (instead of the production function) with
input prices as regressors has proved to be advisable, particularly if empirical data are
highly disaggregated and input prices can be assumed to be exogenous for the sectors
involved.
The translog cost function can be interpreted as a second-order Taylor series
approximation in logarithms to an arbitrary and unknown, twice differentiable cost
function. Assume that a twice differentiable non-homothetic cost function exists.72
Expanding the log of total production costs ),,(ln txC p  in a second-order Taylor
series about the observation point 1990, where 0ln =p  (p=1 in 1990), yields:73
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where ip  and jp  denote factor prices, x  the level of real output and t a time trend
reflecting technical progress. Total costs of producing output x  are defined by:
FpELpMpLpKpC FELMLK ++++= .
Slutsky symmetry of cross-price derivatives implies:
(3-2) jiij ββ = .
Theory requires that the cost function be homogeneous of degree one in factor prices,
i.e. that, for a fixed level of production, costs increase in the same proportion as
prices. Thus the following restrictions are additionally imposed:
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The translog form is advantageous as it enables statistical testing of the validity of
homotheticity and homogeneity restrictions. It is homothetic for iix ∀= ,0β ,
                                                
72 The non-homothetic form enables relative input demands to vary with the level of output and
places no a priori restrictions on returns to scale.
73 See Diewert and Wales (1987:46) for a definition of the non-homothetic translog cost function
with technical progress.
50
homogeneous for ixxxtix ∀=== ,0βββ , and linearly homogeneous for
ixxxtix ∀=== ,0βββ  and 1=xβ . The translog turns into the Cobb-Douglas form
if substitution elasticities are restricted to unity, i.e. if additionally jiij ,,0 ∀=β .
Assume that firms are price takers and minimise costs. Applying Shephard’s lemma
leads to the factor share system:
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3.2.2.2 Elasticities
Price elasticities
In the empirical part (Section 3.2.4) own- and cross-price elasticities are computed
from cost shares and parameter estimates of the translog cost function according to
(cf. Berndt 1991):
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Substitution elasticities
The computation of Morishima elasticities of substitution (MES) is common in
empirical application since the article of Blackorby and Russell in 1989 and their
criticism of the Allen partial elasticity of substitution (AES). Blackorby and Russell
(1989:883) criticise the AES for being not a quantitative but only a qualitative
measure for substitution, which does not provide any new information that is not
included in the (constant-output) cross-price elasticity. The AES can be easily
expressed as the ratio of the cross-price elasticity of demand for factor i with respect
to the price of factor j to the cost share of input j (εij / sj).74 Assuming non-negative
cost shares, the sign of the AES is equivalent to the sign of the cross-price elasticity.
                                                
74 In terms of the cost function, the AES is defined as: AESij=C(p,x,t)·Cij(p,x,t)/Ci(p,x,t)·Cj(p,x,t).
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The MES is defined as:
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It measures the percentage change in the ratio of input j to input i when the price of
input i changes by 1%, keeping output constant. As Burniaux et al. (1992:66) state,
the MES is the closest analogue of a CES elasticity in a translog framework.
When interpreting the MES empirically, it is necessary to keep in mind that we are
dealing only with a partial elasticity which ignores scale and overall economic effects
induced by the change of input prices. It is generally an appropriate measure of the
curvature of isoquants and thus a useful concept to calculate substitution elasticities
of production functions – which is the main purpose of this chapter.75
In contrast to the AES, the MES is generally asymmetric with respect to which price
varies ( jiij σσ ≠ ), provided that more than two inputs are considered. Input pairs
which are Allen substitutes, i.e. which are characterised by positive cross-price
elasticities, also have to be Morishima substitutes (assuming positive fitted cost
shares and non-positive own-price elasticities), whereas the opposite is not true (cf.
Thompson and Taylor 1995:566). Thus, as will be shown in Section 3.2.4.1.2,
reporting MES instead of AES (as in the majority of available empirical studies on
substitution in the literature) may lead to completely different empirical evidence on
substitution pattern.76
                                                
75 Note that if the goal is not only to measure the curvature of isoquants, but to measure changes in
relative factor shares, the MES is only useful if technologies are homothetic or if output effects
are insignificant. This limitation of the partial MES motivated Davis and Shumway (1996:174)
to develop the so-called factor ratio elasticity of substitution. See also Frondel and Schmidt
(2000) who propose the concept of generalised cross-price elasticities in order to measure gross
substitution effects.
76 Based on price elasticity estimates of eight major studies of capital-energy substitutability,
Thompson and Taylor (1995) demonstrate that substitution elasticities, which are computed
according to the MES, are positive in far more cases than when they are calculated according to
the AES concept. Additionally, the authors find that the dichotomy between time-series and
cross-section studies (see Section 3.2.1) is no longer evident when using the MES instead of the
AES.
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Economies-of-scale elasticities
In accordance with Berndt (1991), economies of scale, λ, are defined as the inverse
of the elasticity of total costs with respect to output, µCx. They are computed on the
basis of observed output quantities and input prices:77
(3-7) 
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µCx>1 (or λ<1 respectively) indicates decreasing and µCx<1 (or λ>1 respectively)
increasing returns to scale. Constant returns to scale are characterised by µCx=λ=1.
3.2.2.3 Monotonicity and concavity
Apart from linear homogeneity in input prices and cross-equation symmetry,
monotonicity of the cost function and concavity in factor prices constitute two
additional regularity conditions required by microeconomic theory. While it can be
easily examined whether the cost function is non-decreasing in input prices by
analysing whether fitted cost shares are non-negative, it is more difficult to check
concavity conditions and, if they are not satisfied, to impose them. In the literature, a
distinction is drawn between the concepts of global concavity and local concavity.
Both concepts, applied to the five-input cost function, are discussed in the following.
Global concavity of the translog cost function
As described, for instance, in Lau (1978), Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1981), and
Diewert and Wales (1987) a necessary and sufficient condition for global concavity
in factor prices is the negative semidefiniteness of the Hessian matrix of second-
order partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to input prices: The matrix
),,(2 txCpp p∇  must be negative semidefinite for the observed values of the
explanatory variables.
According to Diewert and Wales (1987:47), the logarithmic second-order derivatives
of the translog cost function can be expressed by:
                                                
77 An alternative standardisation can be found in Christensen and Greene (1976). The authors
define scale economies as unity minus the elasticity of total cost with respect to output.
Increasing returns to scale take positive values, decreasing returns to scale negative values.
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where 1=ijδ  if ji =  and 0=ijδ  otherwise. These equations can be translated into
the matrix form:
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where FELMLKjiij ,,,,,)( == βB , s  is a quintuple vector of cost share functions, sˆ  is a
55×  matrix with the share vector on the main diagonal, and pˆ  is a 55×  diagonal
matrix, the diagonal elements of which are the elements of price vector p . On the
assumption that costs are strictly positive and prices are non-negative the Hessian
matrix of the cost function, ),,(2 txCpp p∇ , is obviously negative semidefinite if and
only if the matrix TsssB +− ˆ  is negative semidefinite. Thus, if cost shares is  are non-
negative (which implies monotonicity of the cost function) and since 10 ≤≤ is , the
negative semidefiniteness of matrix B  is necessary and sufficient for the negative
semidefiniteness of ),,(2 txCpp p∇  at each observation point, i.e. for global concavity
of the cost function with respect to all input prices generating non-negative cost
shares. Consequently, global concavity can be checked ex post by examining whether
the signs of the principal minors of the Hessian matrix – or equivalently of the matrix
B  – have the correct sign at each observation point.78 If global concavity properties
are violated,79 global concavity restrictions can be empirically imposed on the
translog cost function by means of a Cholesky factorization (see Jorgenson and
Fraumeni 1981). This simply requires that the elements of B  in (3-1) be
parameterised according to
(3-9) TLDLB =
where D  is a diagonal matrix, whose diagonal elements are called Cholesky values
(cf. Lau 1978:429). L  is a unit lower triangular matrix, and TL  is the transposition
of L . As B  is negative semidefinite if and only if all Cholesky values are non-
positive, i.e. iDii ∀≤ ,0 , (cf. Lau 1978:429, Theorem 3.2), the cost function can be
restricted to global concavity by determining that the iiD  are non-positive.
                                                
78 Neither the monotonicity nor the concavity check represent statistical tests, i.e. they do not
examine whether negative fitted cost shares or principal minors with wrong signs are statistically
significant.
79 See Section 3.2.4.1.1 for possible reasons for the non-concavity of the cost function.
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However, as indicated by a number of empirical studies, imposing global concavity
restrictions on the translog function destroys its flexibility properties.80 Diewert and
Wales (1987:48,62), for example, demonstrate that the Jorgenson and Fraumeni
procedure causes distortions with a tendency to bias own-price elasticities upward (in
absolute terms). The problem that the translog typically does not have a correct
global curvature led to an increased application of other flexible functional forms in
recent years, which are based e.g. on the normalised quadratic cost function (see
Diewert and Wales 1987, 1995) or linear logit models (see Jones 1996). These forms
are actually more appropriate to satisfy the regularity conditions globally prescribed
by economic theory.
Local concavity of the translog cost function
Nevertheless, I decided to use the translog because separability constraints can be
imposed and tested for this functional form, and functional parameters can be easily
interpreted. In order to avoid the inflexibility problem implied by global concavity
restrictions, I impose, in line with Lau (1978), less restrictive local concavity
conditions on the approximating translog function. In contrast to global concavity,
local concavity requires only that the functional form is curvature correct at a single
data point, typically the point of approximation.
Lau shows that for local concavity of the cost function it is necessary and sufficient
that the matrix TsssB +− ˆ  is negative semidefinite at the approximation point 1990,
for which 0ln =p . Its Cholesky factorization yields:
(3-10) TT LDLsssB =+− ˆ .
Restricting the Cholesky values iiD  to non-positiveness is necessary and sufficient to
yield a negative semidefinite result for the matrix TsssB +− ˆ  (provided that cost
shares for 1990 data are positive), i.e. that the cost function is locally concave in
input prices for 1990 data.
3.2.2.4 Weak separability
The GEM-E3 producer model is based on a four-level nested CES production
function (see Figure 3 in Section 3.2.3.2). Assuming nested technologies in CGE
                                                
80 Due to this inflexibility, the translog cannot describe global concavity properties of the true cost
function in general, but only for special cases of cost functions, such as the Cobb-Douglas type
(see Natrop (1986:57) for a detailed discussion).
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modelling is advantageous, as this allows for subsequent optimisation, different
elasticities between input pairs, and inter-process substitution, which enables input
factors not only to be substitutes, but also to be complements (cf. Anderson and
Moroney 1993). In order to estimate substitution elasticities which are consistent
with a nested production structure, it is necessary to impose weak separability
restrictions a priori.
A definition of weak separability is given in Berndt and Christensen (1973:404) or
Chambers (1988:44). The production function ),( tafx =  is weakly separable with
respect to a given partition of the set of all inputs into { }maaa ,...,, 21 , i.e.
( )ttaftaftaffx mm ),,(),...,,(),,( 2211=  if the marginal rate of technical substitution
between ai and aj, which are elements of the same separable input vector ra , is
independent of the quantities of all factors outside that aggregate, i.e. if
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While weak separability of the production function is only a necessary condition for
the existence of consistent input aggregates, weak homothetic separability in the
quantities to be aggregated is a necessary and sufficient condition (cf. Denny and
Fuss 1977:408). Weak homothetic separability requires that the macro-production
function f be weakly separable and that the micro-production function f 1, f 2,..., f m be
homothetic. Weak homothetic separability opens up the possibility of a two-stage
optimisation procedure which implies that the mix of inputs within each aggregate is
optimised in a first step, and then the level of each aggregate in a second step (Fuss
1977:91).81
The common empirical procedures for testing for weak separability depend on
whether the translog is interpreted as the true production function or just as an
approximation of an arbitrary production function. Berndt and Christensen (1974)
developed a test procedure under the assumption that the translog exactly represents
the unknown production function. However, this exact test was fiercely criticised by
Blackorby et al. (1978:297) and Denny and Fuss (1977), who point out that the
imposition of weak homothetic separability conditions may cause the micro-
production function or the macro function of aggregates – or both – to lose their
                                                
81 According to duality theory, a homothetically weakly separable production function corresponds
to a cost function which is weakly separable in factor prices (with an identical partial aggregation
of inputs) and separable in output (cf. Chambers 1988:115).
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flexibility, i.e. their capability to provide an arbitrary second-order approximation to
the separable technology. Strictly speaking, the restrictions either force the separable
form of the translog function to be a Cobb-Douglas function of translog aggregates or
to be a translog function of Cobb-Douglas aggregates.82 Thus a statistical rejection of
weak separability, based on this exact test, is not very meaningful.
In order to avoid this inflexibility imposed by the restrictions for weak homothetic
separability on the translog production function in the exact case, Denny and Fuss
(1977) provide a less restrictive empirical test for (local) weak homothetic
separability at the point of approximation. They employ a linear-homogeneous
production function and demonstrate that the conditions for weak separability and
weak homothetic separability are identical.
Let us assume a five-input production function that is weakly homothetically
separable in the partition 1a  and which is expressed by ),),,(( 511 tataffx = , where
{ }43211 ,,, aaaaa =  and 1f  is a homothetic micro-production function. According to
Chambers (1988:115) and the theorem of duality, this production function
corresponds to the cost function ),,),,(( 51 txptphcC = , ),,,( 43211 ppppp = , which
is weakly separable in the ‘ext
ended’ partition { }xpp ,, 51 . The parameter restrictions for weak homothetic
separability of the underlying production function, which have to be imposed on the
translog cost function, are:
55 ijji ββββ = ,   ixjjxi ββββ = , .4,...1, =ji
If the null hypothesis of approximate weak homothetic separability
(3-11) 055 =− ijji ββββ ,   0=− ixjjxi ββββ , 4,...,1, =ji ,
cannot be rejected, the cost function is thus approximately weakly separable in
partition { }xpp ,, 51 .
For the estimation of a nested cost function, consistent price aggregates of the weakly
homothetically separable input factors are required.
                                                
82 Starting out from the separability and inflexibility criticism of the translog, Diewert and Wales
(1995) propose two functional forms, which are based on the normalised quadratic functional
form. The authors estimate profit functions and test them for the existence of a homogeneously
separable aggregator function. One disadvantage of their separability tests is that both the macro-
aggregator function and the micro-aggregator function are assumed to be linearly homogeneous
in their arguments.
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One option to generate them is to choose a step-by-step translog estimation approach
by estimating sub-models of the separable factors. In order to ensure that an
aggregate price index is independent of all other prices and quantities and that the
product of the aggregate price and quantity indices equals an aggregate’s total costs,
the condition of weak homogeneous separability on the production function is
typically imposed. This means that the micro-production function ),( 11 taf  is not
only required to be homothetic, but additionally linear-homogeneous in its arguments
(cf. Diewert and Wales 1995). It is only under this assumption that the aggregate
price index is equal to the unit cost of the separable aggregate.
A second option is to employ appropriate index number techniques to compute
aggregate prices and quantities from disaggregated data. However, as Natrop
(1986:136) critically remarks, the use of index functions may lead to inconsistencies
and distortions of estimates and does not give evidence for the relationships among
input factors of an aggregate. Due to these disadvantages, I will apply the first
method in Section 3.2.3.2.
3.2.3 Estimation procedure and empirical data
3.2.3.1 One-stage estimation
For the purpose of the empirical implementation of the translog cost model I impose
the restrictions of symmetry (3-2) and linear homogeneity (3-3) on the parameters of
the cost function and the five cost share equations. Stochastic terms are added to each
of the equations, which are assumed to be independently and identically multivariate
and normally distributed with mean vector zero and a constant non-singular
covariance matrix for each equation.83 Due to the condition of linear homogeneity in
prices, the cost shares of the five demand equations sum up to unity; thus the
disturbance covariance matrix is singular and non-diagonal. This problem is solved
by dropping the share equation for nonenergy materials; the parameters of the
omitted equation are then estimated indirectly as linear combinations of the
remaining parameter estimates. In order to ensure invariance with respect to the
choice of the dropped share equation, I compute maximum-likelihood estimates of
the parameters. The econometrics software program used is TSP 4.4.
                                                
83 The appended error terms incorporate, for example, deviations of the firms from cost-minimising
behaviour as well as errors of approximation to the unknown cost function (see Berndt 1991,
Greene 1997).
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As previously mentioned, I use pooled time-series cross-section data. A total of 49
sectors, for which data are available in the German national account statistics, are
pooled into four sector aggregates:84
– the energy supply sectors aggregate (7, 8, 11, 15), accounting for 39% of energy
consumption,85
– the energy-intensive manufacturing sectors aggregate (1, 12, 14, 18-24, 32, 33,
37-39), accounting for 17% of energy consumption,86
– the nonenergy-intensive manufacturing sectors aggregate (16, 17, 25-31, 34-36,
40-46), accounting for 11% of energy consumption, and
– the service sectors aggregate (51, 52, 54-57, 60, 61, 64-66), accounting for 33%
of energy consumption.
The five-equation system, consisting of the cost function and four factor demand
equations, is estimated for each of the four sector aggregates, employing the panel
data set described in Section 3.2.3.3.87 It is assumed that the slopes of the derived
demand functions are identical in each sector aggregate, i.e. sectoral dummy
variables are added only to first-order coefficients (βi). This reduces the
meaningfulness of sectorally differentiated substitution elasticities, as values differ
only according to differences in sectoral cost shares. However, the introduction of
sectoral dummy variables in addition to the parameters representing the second
derivatives of the cost function failed because the resulting number of free
parameters proved to be too high.
                                                
84 The way of pooling follows the sectoral breakdown of the GEM-E3 model (cf. Table 17 in
Appendix I).
85 Percentage rates refer to an aggregate’s share of energy consumption in total energy consumption
of all 49 sectors in 1990.
86 The energy-intensive manufacturing sectors aggregate contains five nonenergy-intensive
manufacturing sectors with cost shares of total energy below 5%. These are the sectors
‘fabricated metal’ (24), ‘precision and optical instruments’ (32), ‘iron, steel, and steel products’
(33), ‘paper and paper products’ (38) and ‘printing and publishing’ (39). Besides, the aggregate
contains the sector ‘agriculture’ (1), for which a cost share for aggregate energy of 4.9% is
calculated in 1990.
87 Including the cost function is advantageous for two reasons: first, it enhances the efficiency of
estimation, and second, it facilitates the estimation of scale elasticities.
59
3.2.3.2 Three-stage estimation
While the previous section dealt with substitution patterns in the German economy in
general, the objective of this section is to estimate substitution elasticities that fit into
the nested production structure of the GEM-E3 model.
The GEM-E3 model includes 18 production sectors which are characterised by four-
level nested CES production functions with labour, capital, and 18 intermediate
inputs.88 The intermediates consist of electricity, an input aggregate of three fossil
fuel components (coal, oil, and gas), and an input aggregate of 14 nonenergy material
components. The following figure illustrates the levels of nesting:
x
K
production
LEM
capital labour, energy, material
EL LFM
electricity labour, fuels, material
L MF
labour materialfuels
M M1 14.......F F F1 2 3
coal oil gas nonenergy materials
Figure 3: Nested production structure of the GEM-E3 model
This production structure implies that firms at the bottom level minimise costs by
choosing optimal quantities of fossil fuels (F1, F2, F3) and material (M1,…,M14)
components within the fossil fuel (F) and material (M) composite. In a second step,
firms choose the cost-minimising mix of labour (L), the fossil fuel aggregate (F), and
the material aggregate (M), in a third step the cost-minimising mix of the LFM
bundle and electricity (EL) and, finally at the top level, the optimal mix of the LEM
aggregate and capital (K). This four-level nested CES production function implicitly
assumes weak homothetic separability, i.e. the cost function is weakly separable in
prices and output (cf. Section 3.2.2.4).
                                                
88 See Appendix IV for a description of the GEM-E3 model.
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Assuming weak homothetic separability of the production function opens up the
possibility of multi-stage estimation of production decisions using consistent input
aggregates. The three-stage estimation procedure, described below, represents an
extension of the two-stage estimation procedure applied in Fuss (1977). Due to a lack
of disaggregated data, I was not able to examine substitutability relationships
between coal, oil, and gas and between the individual nonenergy material
components.
First nesting level: K-LEM (third stage of estimation)
I will now turn to the first stage of the nested GEM-E3 production model. Imposing
weak homogeneous separability in the LEM  aggregate leads to the production
function ),),,,,,(( tKtFELMLLEMfx = , where LEM  is a linear-homogeneous
aggregator function. The dual cost function is then weakly separable in the same
partition: ),,),,,,,(( txptppppphC KFELMLLEM= . LEMp  represents an aggregate
price index which is equal to the minimum cost per unit of the separable LEM
aggregate and which is independent of the level of LEM. The non-homothetic
translog cost function with exponential technical progress is expressed by:
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where { }KLEMji ,, ∈ . I impose the conditions of symmetry (3-2) and linear
homogeneity in prices (3-3) and apply Shephard’s lemma to derive the cost share
equations. The factor share system (consisting of only one equation) and the translog
cost function is estimated with respect to the prices for capital use ( Kp ) and the price
index for the separable input aggregate ( LEMp ). LEMp  is generated in the second
estimation stage.
Second nesting level: LFM-EL (second stage of estimation)
Due to the assumption that the cost function of the LEM  sub-aggregate is linear-
homogeneous in LEM , the unit cost function can be approximated by the following
translog unit cost function:89
                                                
89 The assumption of linear homogeneity of the sub-aggregate cost function in LEM is a necessary
assumption in order to ensure that the value of output is equal to the values of inputs. Linear
homogeneity implies in addition to homotheticity and homogeneity that LEM=1. Thus ln(LEM)
appears on the right hand side of the equation of the log of total costs. Subtracting ln(LEM) from
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where }{ ELLFMji ,, ∈ . The share equation of electricity is estimated on the basis of
exogenous electricity prices ( ELp ) and estimates of LFMp , which are generated in
the first stage of estimation.
Third nesting level: L-F-M (first stage of estimation)
The translog unit cost function of the LFM aggregate, which is assumed to be linear-
homogeneous in the level of LFM, is represented by
tppppp i
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where }{ MFLji ,,, ∈ . The translog system of the two cost share equations for labour
and fossil fuels is estimated on the basis of exogenous prices of labour ( Lp ), fossil
fuels ( Fp ), and nonenergy materials ( Mp ).
3.2.3.3 Data
Yearly data on prices and cost shares of capital, labour, nonenergy material,
electricity, and fossil fuels are compiled from German national account statistics and
input-output tables of 1978-90. Due to the short time period, I use pooled time-series
cross-section data. The whole sample contains the agriculture and forestry sector and
nearly all producing and service sectors recorded by the German Federal Statistical
Office.90 Input prices and quantities are constructed according to Falk and Koebel
(1999).
Electricity and fossil fuels
As sectorally disaggregated data for electricity and fossil fuels are not available from
national account statistics, expenditure and quantities (in terajoule) are drawn from
(unpublished) input-output tables, which were provided by the Federal Statistical
                                                                                                                                         
the left hand side leads directly to the unit cost function of the LEM aggregate, i.e. to the translog
price function. Linear homogeneity conditions are also imposed at the third nesting level (see
Section 3.2.2.4).
90 Due to data problems, two sectors – ‘other services’ (67) and ‘house renting’ (62) – were
excluded from the data set. The ‘water supply’ sector (9) was separated as well, because its
inclusion into the group of energy supply sectors led to implausibly high elasticity values,
particularly in cases where fossil fuels were involved.
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Office Germany. In order to ensure consistency of input-output energy data with
national account data, the following adjustments are required for each sector:91
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where ai represents demand of input i; NAtiiap )(  denotes expenditure in period t for
input i, calculated according to the concept of national account statistics, and
IO
tiiap )(  stands for expenditure, calculated according to the input-output concept.
This adjustment formula assumes that differences in output x  between the national
account and the input-output concept do not change over time but can be represented
by the discrepancy in 1978.
The prices of electricity and fossil fuels are derived by dividing expenditure by
quantities, both are defined in terms of the input-output classification. The energy
deflator IOtip ,  is then used to approximate the national account energy deflator 
NA
tip , ,
which is normalised to one in 1990. The quantity indices for electricity and fossil
fuels are obtained by dividing expenditure for electricity and fossil fuels by the
standardised price deflator:
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Nonenergy materials
Nonenergy material inputs include intermediate inputs other than energy.
Expenditure for nonenergy materials are obtained by subtracting energy expenditure
∑
i
NA
tiiap )( , FELi ,= , from material expenditure. Quantities of nonenergy materials
in 1990 prices are calculated in a similar way. The deflator for nonenergy materials is
computed as the ratio between nonenergy material expenditure and quantities in 1990
prices.
                                                
91
 The concepts of input-output tables (IO) and national account statistics (NA) are not fully
compatible. In contrast to input-output tables, which are constructed according to the functional
classification scheme (breakdown of sectors by commodities), national account data are
classified according to the institutional principle (breakdown of sectors according to institutional
units).
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Labour
As data on actual working hours in each of the 49 sectors are not available, the
quantity of labour is approximated by the total number of employees.92 For each
sector and year, the price for labour is calculated by dividing gross wage income of
employed persons by the number of employees. Wages are normalised to unity in
1990. Labour quantities (in prices of 1990) are obtained by dividing gross wage
income by normalised wages.
Capital
I assume that capital is variable93 and calculate sectoral user costs of capital in line
with Jorgenson (1974) as follows:94
1, )1()1( +⋅−−⋅+= tIttIttK pprp δ
where tr  denotes the nominal interest rate, tIp  and 1+tIp  represent the price of gross
investment at t  and 1+t  and tδ  the depreciation rate. Nominal interest rates are
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. tδ  is computed as follows:
ttttt NKINKNK /)( 1 +−= +δ
where tNK  denotes real net capital stock and tI  gross investment in constant prices.
The price index for gross investment, tIp , is derived by dividing gross investment in
actual prices by gross investment in constant prices. The quantity of capital is
computed by dividing capital costs, ttK NKp ⋅, , by the 1990 normalised user-cost
price index of capital.
Figure 4 gives an impression of the development of aggregated prices and quantities
over the period 1978-90. In all sector aggregates the development of fossil fuel prices
clearly reflects the oil crisis, which led to a sharp price increase from 1978 onward.
After a peak in 1985, prices fell again, but then the decline stopped and prices
remained at a higher level.
                                                
92 As Hamermesh (1993:68) emphasises, using employment instead of working hours may result in
biases if hours per worker are correlated with factor prices and output.
93 Alternatively, lagged adjustment mechanisms can be introduced by modelling capital as a quasi-
fixed input in the short run (cf. Kintis and Panas 1989).
94 Sectoral indices are omitted for the sake of simplicity.
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Figure 4: Quantities and prices for sector aggregates (1978-90)
Note: Quantity and price indices for 1978-90 are normalised at unity in 1990.
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In contrast, electricity prices were relatively uninfluenced by the oil crisis (prices
increased relatively steadily by a total of 40% from 1978 to 1990) as electricity
production is mainly based on brown and hard coal, produced in Germany, whereas
the share of oil in total fuel inputs is less than 10%.95
The development of fossil fuel consumption corresponds to the development of fossil
fuel prices. With the exception of the service sectors aggregate, fossil fuel demand
declined in all sector groups. In contrast, the trend seems to indicate an increase of
electricity use in production. Labour demand remained nearly constant in the
nonenergy-intensive manufacturing sectors aggregate and increased in the service
sectors aggregate in spite of a significant rise of the wage rate. However, increased
labour costs are associated with reduced labour demand in the energy supply and
energy-intensive manufacturing sectors.
Cost shares
Cost shares calculated for the entire German economy and for the different sector
groups are listed in Table 3. All in all, the figures indicate that cost shares were
relatively stable during the examined period. Remarkably, cost shares of fossil fuels
are smaller in 1990 than in 1978 in all sector groups, whereas cost shares are slightly
higher for electricity. The substantial increase of the cost share of material in the
energy supply sectors aggregate is the most striking result which is associated with a
significant decrease of the cost share of fossil fuels. This is primarily the
consequence of price effects (due to the development of fossil fuel prices between
1978 and 1990) and of the high cost share of fossil fuels in total inputs in this sector
group (particularly in the ‘mineral oil’ sector).
                                                
95 The cost share of oil in total inputs in electricity production was 7.2% in 1980, 3.3% in 1985,
and 2.8% in 1990 (BMWi 1993, 1998).
66
Table 3: Cost shares of sector aggregates [%]
Year Fossil fuels (F )
Electricity 
(EL )
Labour 
(L )
Capital 
(K )
Material 
(M )
1978 4.42 1.44 21.70 7.41 65.03
All sectors 1984 6.04 1.56 20.25 8.28 63.87
1990 3.11 1.53 21.30 8.96 65.11
Energy supply 1978 43.04 3.07 15.78 16.73 21.38
sectors 1984 44.84 2.51 10.98 13.90 27.77
1990 27.03 3.15 12.73 18.79 38.31
Energy-intensive 1978 4.45 2.27 25.18 12.38 55.71
manufacturing 1984 6.48 2.41 23.03 12.54 55.54
sectors 1990 3.41 2.30 25.15 13.14 55.99
Nonenergy-intensive 1978 1.10 0.82 29.99 5.97 62.13
manufacturing 1984 1.34 0.89 28.75 6.78 62.24
sectors 1990 0.66 0.89 28.34 6.97 63.14
1978 2.08 1.39 15.73 5.76 75.04
Service sectors 1984 2.55 1.55 15.47 7.04 73.39
1990 1.69 1.51 16.60 7.91 72.29
Table 14 in Appendix I reveals that cost shares vary among the sectors – indicating
sectoral differences in factor intensities and production technologies. The share of
aggregated energy expenditure in total expenditure is for the most part of sectors far
less than 10%. Only the energy supply sectors (7, 8, 11, 15), ‘pulp and paper’ (37),
and ‘water transport’ (55) reveal cost shares higher than 10%. The share of electricity
in total costs is, for most of the sectors, less than 3%. It exceeds the 3% limit only in
nine sectors: ‘electricity’ (7), ‘coal mining’ (11), ‘sand, gravel and stone’ (18), ‘glass’
(20), ‘non-ferrous metals’ (22), ‘foundry’ (23), ‘timber processing’ (35), ‘pulp and
paper’ (37), and ‘railways’ (54). The cost share of fossil fuels is above 5% in the
transport sectors (55, 57) and the energy supply sectors (7, 8, 11, 15), as well as in
several energy-intensive manufacturing sectors, such as the ‘pulp and paper’ industry
(37), ‘iron and steel production’ (21), ‘glass’ (20), ‘fine ceramics’ (19), ‘sand, gravel
and stone’ (18), and ‘chemical products’ (14).
There is a tendency that (less capital-intensive) sectors with cost shares of capital
lower than 10% have cost shares for total energy below 5%. Highly capital-intensive
sectors with cost shares exceeding 20% are: ‘agriculture and forestry’ (1),
‘electricity’ (7), ‘railways’ (54), ‘water transport’ (55), ‘postal services’ (56), and
‘education, science, and culture’ (65).
For the majority of sectors cost shares for labour vary between 20 and 30%. Sectors
with cost shares below 20% are: ‘agriculture and forestry’ (1), the energy supply
sectors (with exception of ‘coal’), ‘non-ferrous metals’ (22), ‘pulp, paper and board’
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(37), ‘food’ (43), ‘beverages’ (44) and ‘tobacco’ (45), the trade sectors (51, 52), and
‘water transport’ (55).
3.2.4 Empirical results
3.2.4.1 One-stage estimation
In this section I present estimates of the non-nested and non-homothetic translog cost
function with capital, labour, material, electricity, and fossil fuels.
3.2.4.1.1 Curvature conditions
Price elasticities are computed according to definition (3-5) and are evaluated on the
basis of 1990 data (the most recent year). The following aggregated elasticities are
calculated as the weighted sum of sectoral elasticities, whereas a sector’s share in
total input quantity serves as weight.96 I allow for two ways of aggregation: first,
elasticity values which are insignificant at a 5% level enter aggregation with zero
(value I). Second, all estimates, whether they differ significantly from zero or not, are
used to compute the weighted aggregated elasticity (value II).
Table 4 depicts sectorally aggregated own-price elasticities, calculated from the
concavity unrestricted translog cost function. In the majority of cases, elasticities
show the expected sign; in particular the own-price elasticities of capital, labour, and
material are negative for all sectors without exception. However, significantly
positive own-price elasticities of electricity demand are computed for the service
sectors. Additionally, the own-price elasticity of fossil fuel demand is significantly
positive for all sector groups, with the exception of the energy supply sectors, for
which I obtain negative values.
                                                
96 See Falk and Koebel (1999) for a theoretical founding of this aggregation procedure for own-
and cross-price elasticities over individual industries. This procedure guarantees that sectorally
aggregated own- and cross-price elasticities sum up to zero ( 0=∑
j
ijε ) as required by theory.
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Table 4: Own-price elasticities for sector aggregates, concavity unrestricted and
non-nested translog model (at 1990 data)
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Even if positive own-price elasticities are inconsistent with neo-classical theory, they
are a common finding in empirical applications of KLEM models to German data and
in interfuel substitution studies (cf. Nakamura 1984:201, Jones 1996:815). According
to Friede (1980:87), who also computed positive own-price elasticities for West
German producing sectors in 1954-1967, positive own-price elasticities can be
attributed to: statistical errors (e.g. positive values are statistically not significant),
data errors (in particular in cases where the input, e.g. fossil fuels, is unimportant for
production), and errors in model assumptions (e.g. with respect to the underlying
postulate of cost-minimising behaviour).
In practice, it is quite difficult to identify the source of error. Deviations from cost-
minimising behaviour might be, for example, attributed to energy or environmental
policy regulations, to information and transaction costs, or to physical constraints
which prevent input quantities from adjusting to their optimal levels (cf. Conrad and
Unger 1987). Note that for the energy supply sectors own-price elasticities are
negative (indicating cost-minimising behaviour) although this sector group (in
particular the ‘electricity’ sector) was heavily affected by environmental laws and
other energy policy regulations in the 1980s.
Data errors seem to be the most obvious explanation for significantly positive own-
price elasticities of fossil fuel demand in the service sectors and in the nonenergy-
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intensive manufacturing sectors, as these sectors are characterised by cost shares of
fossil fuels below 5%.
In order to be able to interpret the estimates in an economically sensible way, I
impose local concavity restrictions by replacing the substitution parameters βij in
equations (3-1) and (3-4) by a Cholesky factorization according to equation (3-10).
For the concavity unrestricted translog, the Cholesky values (Dii, i=K,L,M,EL,F) of
all five inputs are negative for the energy supply sectors aggregate. However,
estimating the translog for the energy-intensive manufacturing sectors, nonenergy-
intensive manufacturing sectors, and service sectors aggregates yields non-negative
Cholesky values for fossil fuels and/or electricity. Thus the corresponding Cholesky
values DEL,EL and DFF are restricted to zero when estimating the translog model for
these three sector aggregates.97
Table 5 depicts local concavity restricted estimates. All computed own-price
elasticities are negative and below unity (in absolute terms), with the exception of
capital demand in the service sectors. The monotonicity of the cost function – with
the exception of two minor sectors (‘printing and publishing’ and ‘office and data
processing’), for which slightly negative fitted cost shares of fossil fuels are
computed – is satisfied at 1990 data.
The responsiveness of input demand to a change of own prices is highest for capital
and labour in the service sectors. On the whole, the estimates are in accordance with
the results in the econometric literature. Hamermesh (1993), for example, derives a
range of –0.75 to –0.15 for εLL in the aggregate. He reports own-price elasticities of
capital εKK and material εMM which are (in absolute values) below unity and thus also
consistent with my estimates. The estimates of Hesse and Tarkka (1986) are in
conformity with my results, too. On the basis of pooled individual country time-
series data for two periods, 1960-72 and 1973-80, the authors find that capital evokes
the highest demand response in Germany’s manufacturing industry. The authors
reveal estimates of –0.59 for εKK, –0.2 for εLL, –0.36 for εEL,EL, and –0.09 for εFF for
the second period. However, compared to estimates of own-price elasticities of fossil
fuels and electricity demand produced by Halverson (1977) for aggregate U.S.
manufacturing or by Jones (1996) for industrial energy consumption of the G7
countries, my estimates of εFF and εEL,EL are relatively small in absolute terms. Both
                                                
97 If Dii=0, the corresponding elements of the triangular matrix L which are multiplied by Dii also
have to be set equal to zero (cf. Lau 1978:445).
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authors yield a higher sensitivity of energy demand to energy prices; they computed
elasticities around –1 or even higher negative values.
Table 5: Own-price elasticities for sector aggregates, concavity restricted and non-
nested translog model (at 1990 data)
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A comparison of the own-price elasticity estimates of the concavity unrestricted and
the concavity restricted models indicates that numerical differences are quite small
for εKK, εLL, and εMM.98 However, imposing local concavity restrictions causes
estimates of εEL,EL and εFF to become statistically insignificant. The aggregation of
both significant and insignificant sectoral elasticity estimates yields slightly negative
values for εEL,EL and εFF in the energy-intensive and nonenergy-intensive
manufacturing sectors and the service sectors aggregate. This is in line with Falk and
Koebel (1999), who also find that energy demand of German manufacturing sectors
is relatively insensitive to own-price changes and that there are small differences
between concavity restricted and concavity unrestricted estimates.99
                                                
98 Table 16 in Appendix I sets out cross-price elasticities derived from the unrestricted and the
restricted translog models for the energy-intensive manufacturing sectors, the nonenergy-
intensive manufacturing sectors, and the service sectors aggregate. For most of the input pairs
differences in cross-price elasticities are not substantial either.
99 In Appendix III in Chapter 5, I derive an expression for the own-price elasticity of labour
demand for the nested production function used in the GEM-E3 model and depict sectoral base
year values (note that in Chapter 5 εLL is defined with a minus sign).
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3.2.4.1.2 Substitution patterns
Table 6 depicts aggregated cross-price elasticities and Table 7 aggregated MES; for
the sake of simplicity both are expressed only in terms of value II. The aggregated
MES are directly calculated from sectorally aggregated own- and cross-price
elasticities according to (3-6).100 In this section, both elasticity concepts are quoted to
interpret substitution patterns of the five-input production structure – even if they
may lead to different evidence. For example, capital and electricity are Allen
complements for the energy-intensive manufacturing sectors aggregate with a slightly
negative cross-price elasticity of –0.028 when the electricity price changes and with
an elasticity of –0.154 when the user-cost price of capital varies. In contrast, the MES
of capital and electricity is positive in the case of a capital price change
( 204.0
,
=ELKσ ) as well as in the case of an electricity price adjustment
( 011.0
,
=KELσ ).
Empirical results indicate that inputs are substitutes in terms of both cross-price
elasticity and MES in the majority of cases. Complementary relationships can be
observed in exceptional cases only for input pairs with either electricity or fossil fuels
involved. Nevertheless, capital and labour, capital and material, and material and
labour are always substitutable.101
Substitution patterns with respect to magnitude and sign differ widely among the four
sector aggregates. The degree of substitutability is particularly striking in the service
sectors aggregate. Here, MES above unity indicate strong substitutional relationships
between capital and labour, capital and electricity, capital and fossil fuels, capital and
material, and labour and electricity.
On the basis of cross-price elasticities, electricity and capital are statistically
significant complements for the energy-intensive manufacturing sectors aggregate
( 028.0
,
−=ELKε , 154.0, −=KELε ) and the nonenergy-intensive manufacturing
sectors aggregate ( 028.0
,
−=ELKε , 220.0, −=KELε ). For all four sector aggregates,
                                                
100 Parameter estimates of the concavity restricted models are depicted in Table 15 in Appendix I.
Values and t-statistics of sectoral Morishima elasticities of substitution are listed in Table 18 in
Appendix I.
101 Hesse and Tarkka (1986) also discover some complementarity relationships between energy and
capital or labour in the whole German manufacturing industry. The authors find that – measured
by the AES – capital and electricity are statistically insignificant and that fossil fuels and
electricity are significant complements for the period 1960-72 (σK,EL = –0.36, σF,EL = –11.46).
For the period 1973-80, only labour and fossil fuels are found to be (statistically insignificant)
complements (σLF = –0.14).
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the absolute cross-price elasticity is higher when the capital price changes than when
the electricity price fluctuates. Such complementarity patterns between capital and
energy inputs can be explained by technical restrictions or long adjustment periods of
the capital stock to changed electricity prices (cf. Apostolakis 1990:51). Fossil fuels
and capital, however, are characterised by positive cross-price elasticities in all sector
aggregates.
Statistically insignificant negative cross-price elasticities between labour and
electricity are computed in the energy supply sectors aggregate
( 012.0
,
−=ELLε , 050.0, −=LELε ) and the energy-intensive manufacturing sectors
aggregate ( 005.0
,
−=ELLε , 054.0, −=LELε ). The computed cross-price elasticity for
labour and fossil fuels is negative in all four sector aggregates as well, but significant
values result only for the nonenergy-intensive manufacturing sectors and the service
sectors aggregate. The cross-price elasticity is close to zero when the fossil fuel price
changes; estimates are around –0.5 when the wage rate varies.
In addition, complementary patterns may exist between electricity and material in the
nonenergy-intensive manufacturing sectors aggregate, for which, however, estimated
cross-price elasticities are insignificant ( 003.0
,
−=ELMε , 189.0, −=MELε ). The
service sectors aggregate, in contrast, is characterised by significantly negative cross-
price elasticities ( 622.0,013.0
,,
−=−= MELELM εε ).
Insignificant cross-price elasticity estimates for the energy supply sectors aggregate
may indicate a complementary interrelation between fossil fuels and electricity
( 002.0
,
−=ELFε , 013.0, −=FELε ). Possible technical reasons for this complemen-
tarity are grid losses in the electricity sector: If fossil fuel input decreases due to
increased fossil fuel prices, electricity production and grid losses are reduced as well.
In the statistics, the latter effect is expressed as a reduction of own consumption of
electricity. Higher fuel prices may therefore correspond with lower electricity
demand in the electricity sector.
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Table 6: Cross-price elasticities for sector aggregates, concavity restricted and
non-nested translog model (at 1990 data)
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In contrast to the cross-price elasticity approach, the estimated MES elasticity
supports the hypothesis of capital-energy substitutability. It is, however, difficult to
draw any policy conclusion from this finding since the (constant-output) MES only
reflects (net) substitution effects from price changes, while output (gross) effects are
neglected (cf. Davis and Shumway 1996 and Section 3.2.2.2). Capital-energy
substitutability, measured by the MES, merely implies that, first, an increase of fossil
fuel or electricity prices leads to a reduction of energy consumption and, second, the
negative output effect for capital demand (which typically will result from the energy
price increase) is weakened by a positive substitution effect for capital.
While all MES are positive for the energy supply sectors, several complementary
relationships exist for the other three sector aggregates. The MES – aggregated over
all (insignificant) sectoral estimates of LFσ  in the energy-intensive manufacturing
sectors – is negative when the wage rate changes ( 012.0−=LFσ ). The aggregated
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LFσ  is also negative for the nonenergy-intensive manufacturing sectors
( 228.0−=LFσ ). The aggregated FLσ  is slightly negative for the service sectors
aggregate ( 019.0−=FLσ ). Excluding insignificant values from sectoral aggregation
in the latter two cases still leads to negative MES.
Table 7: Morishima elasticities of substitution for sector aggregates, concavity
restricted and non-nested translog model (at 1990 data)
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Furthermore, electricity and material are complements in the service sectors
aggregate ( 388.0
,
−=ELMσ ) as well as in the nonenergy-intensive manufacturing
sectors aggregate ( 050.0
,
−=ELMσ ). For the latter, however, the sectoral elasticities all
are insignificant.
According to Chapter 2, a central question in the context of tax shifting effects
between production factors is whether labour is a better substitute for the taxed
energy input than other input factors, such as capital or nonenergy materials. Table 8
roughly summarises the empirical evidence gained from the estimations of
substitutability relationships between energy and nonenergy inputs (assuming a
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variation of the price of electricity and fossil fuels, respectively). The ranking is
independent of whether substitutability is measured in terms of cross-price elasticity,
Morishima substitution elasticity, or Allen substitution elasticity.
For the energy supply sectors and the energy-intensive manufacturing sectors
aggregate, both electricity and fossil fuels are more substitutable to material and
(with exception of electricity in the energy-intensive manufacturing sectors) to capital
than to labour. The nonenergy-intensive manufacturing sectors and service sectors
are characterised by a higher degree of substitutability between fossil fuels and
materials or capital, respectively, than between fossil fuels and labour, whereas
labour can be easier substituted for electricity than capital or material.
Table 8: Ranking of substitution elasticities between energy and nonenergy inputs
labour capital material labour capital material
Energy supply sectors 3 2 1 3 2 1
Energy-intensive manufact. sectors 3 1 2 2 3 1
Nonenergy-intensive manufact. sectors 3 2 1 1 3 2
Service sectors 3 1 2 1 2 3
1: highest degree of substitutability, 3: lowest degree of substitutability. 
fossil fuels electricity
Ranking: substitutability between
Thus for the energy supply sectors and the energy-intensive manufacturing sectors,
which are responsible for more than 50% of total energy consumption in 1990, a
relatively low substitution of labour for energy can be expected from higher energy
taxation. For the other sector aggregates at least an electricity price increase would
induce substitution processes which primarily favour labour demand.102
3.2.4.1.3 Homotheticity and returns to scale
The estimations allow for an additional check as to whether the typical assumption of
constant returns to scale in CGE models can be justified empirically. For this purpose
                                                
102 These empirical results contradict, for example, the theoretical model assumptions in Bovenberg
and de Mooij (1994:657). The authors employ a production structure which is intended to
account for complementarity between energy and capital and for a higher degree of
substitutability between labour and energy than between labour and capital. In a recent paper,
however, the authors refer to the study of Hesse and Tarkka (1986) and concede that in European
countries labour seems to be a poorer substitute for energy than capital (de Mooij and Bovenberg
1998:30).
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I compute sectoral economies-of-scale elasticities, λ, from the estimated parameters
according to (3-7) and depict them in Table 9.
Table 9: Sectoral economies-of-scale elasticities, concavity restricted and non-
nested translog model (at 1990 data)
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* t-statistics for the null hypothesis that λ=1, i.e. constant returns to scale.
** Sectors are listed in Table 17 in Appendix I.
The null hypothesis of constant returns to scale (λ=1) is supported only for 17 sectors
(mainly energy-intensive manufacturing). For the remaining 32 sectors, λ is
significantly different from unity, indicating that increasing or decreasing returns to
scale prevail.
The majority of energy supply and service sectors are characterised by increasing
returns to scale (λ is significantly greater than 1). Among the group of nonenergy-
intensive manufacturing sectors empirical evidence is mixed: increasing returns to
scale are computed for six sectors, whereas decreasing returns to scale are obtained
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for eleven sectors. For two further sectors of this sector group – ‘shipbuilding’ (29)
and ‘electrical appliances’ (31) – the constant-returns-to-scale hypothesis cannot be
rejected.
Results of the Wald test statistics are depicted in Table 10.103 As I mentioned
previously, the null hypothesis (i.e. constant returns to scale) cannot be rejected on
empirical grounds for 17 individual sectors, however, the hypothesis that the pooled
sectors are jointly homothetic or homogeneous in output is rejected at a 5% level of
significance for all four sector groups.104
Table 10: Homotheticity and homogeneity: Wald chi-square test statistics
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The estimates suggest that the German economy is characterised by a non-homothetic
production function with non-constant returns to scale. Future research should thus
concentrate on the application of production functions in CGE models allowing for
non-homothetic technologies. In this chapter, however, which focuses on
substitutional relationships between inputs, I will not pursue this line further.
3.2.4.2 Three-stage estimation
3.2.4.2.1 Substitution patterns
Table 11 depicts aggregated Morishima elasticities that are derived from aggregated
own- and cross-price elasticities for GEM-E3 sectors105 and contrasts them with the
                                                
103 The Wald test statistic is distributed asymptotically as a chi-square random variable with degrees
of freedom equal to the difference between the number of free parameters estimated in the
homotheticity (homogeneity) unconstrained and constrained model (cf. Berndt 1991). The
degree of freedom for the Wald test statistic in the case of homotheticity equals six (βix=0,
i=K,L,M,EL,F, βxt=0), and in the case of homogeneity it equals seven (βix=0, i=K,L,M,EL,F,
βxx=βxt=0).
104 This outcome principally is in line with the results of Betts (1997) or Denny and May (1978) for
Canadian manufacturing.
105 Parameter estimates of the nested translog models are depicted in Table 19 in Appendix I. For
four of 49 sectors, the fitted cost shares of fossil fuels (at 1990 data) are negative, but only
slightly below zero. These are the sectors 27, 32, 39, and 60 which are all characterised by very
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previously used values in the GEM-E3 model. For every sector, the substitution
elasticity between labour, fossil fuels, and nonenergy materials (σLFM) is calculated as
the weighted sum of MES between individual input pairs.
While some sectors reveal considerable differences between the previously used
parameter values (‘best guess’ estimates) and the econometric estimates, both are
nearly equivalent for other sectors. The importance of these differences in terms of
GEM-E3 model results will be analysed in Section 3.3.
Table 11: Morishima elasticities of substitution for GEM-E3 sectors, three-level
nested translog model (at 1990 data)
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small cost shares of fossil fuels (below 0.5% in 1990, see Table 14 in Appendix I). In all other
input components, however, the estimated translog increases monotonously. Table 20 in
Appendix I depicts estimates of own- and cross-price elasticities aggregated with respect to the
sectoral breakdown of the GEM-E3 model.
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continued Table 11
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3.2.4.2.2 Testing for weak homothetic separability
In order to examine whether the multi-stage estimation procedure applied in the
previous section can be justified empirically, several restrictions of weak homothetic
separability – describing alternative nesting levels of the underlying production
function – are tested according to (3-11) and the Wald test statistics.
First, let me turn to the results obtained from testing the service sectors aggregate. In
contrast to the other aggregates, the service sectors aggregate covers a considerable
number of sectors which allow for consistent aggregation of inputs. Table 12 depicts
Wald test statistics for the service sectors aggregate which are below the critical
value, indicating that weak homothetic separability is accepted at a 5% level.106
For example, (K,M), (K,F), and (K,L) form weakly homothetically separable groups
for seven service sectors; in six service sectors weak homothetic separability of
(K,EL,M), (EL,M), and (K,EL) cannot be rejected.
                                                
106 The chi-square critical value at a 5% level of significance is 12.59 (6 degrees of freedom) and
9.49 (4 degrees of freedom).
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Table 12: Weak homothetic separability in the service sectors aggregate: Wald chi-
square test statistics
Separability
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Sector No.*
* Sectors are listed in Table 17 in Appendix I.
In the other sector aggregates, separability is statistically rejected for the majority of
individual sectors. In the energy supply sectors aggregate, it is only for the
‘electricity’ (7) sector that the restriction of weak separability is not rejected for
(K,L,EL) and (F,M). Besides, the ‘mineral oil’ (15) sector allows for consistent
aggregation of K and EL.
With exception of the sectors ‘fine ceramics’ (19) and ‘glass’ (20), the sectors pooled
into the energy-intensive manufacturing sectors aggregate reveal a production
structure that is weakly homothetically separable in energy (fossil fuels and
electricity). Testing for (F,EL)-separability yields Wald test statistics which are all
below the critical value of 9.49. For five further sectors, namely ‘fabricated metals’
(24), ‘precision and optical instruments’ (32), ‘iron and steel’ (33), ‘paper and paper
products’ (38), and ‘printing and publishing’ (39), L and F turn out to be weakly
homothetically separable. For two other sectors, ‘non-ferrous metals’ (22) and ‘pulp,
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paper and board’ (37), the aggregation of K and EL can be justified on empirical
grounds as well.
Among the sectors pooled into the nonenergy-intensive manufacturing sectors
aggregate, it is only for the sectors ‘office and data processing’ (27), ‘automobiles
and parts’ (28), ‘shipbuilding’ (29), and ‘electrical appliances’ (31) that Wald test
statistics below 9.49 are calculated for (F,M)-separability. For the sectors ‘airspace
equipment manufacturing and repairing’ (30), ‘musical instruments and toys’ (34),
‘wooden furniture’ (36), and ‘leather’ (40) a consistent aggregation of EL and M can
be justified.
The empirical results indicate that weak homothetic separability is rejected
statistically at a 5% test level for labour, energy, and material in all sector
aggregates.107 Basically, this implies that the multi-stage procedure and the nesting
structure used in the GEM-E3 model are not consistent with German data.108 But, as
the results do not suggest any alternative nesting structure, I will proceed with the
separability structure given in GEM-E3.
In the next section, the estimates depicted in Table 11 are introduced into the nested-
CES specification of the GEM-E3 producer model. They provide the basis for
sensitivity analyses with respect to substitution patterns in production.
3.3 Sensitivity of GEM-E3 model results to substitution
patterns in production
The sensitivity of GEM-E3 model results to the choice of substitution elasticities in
production is tested by applying a simple ecological tax reform scenario to the
standard version of the single-country GEM-E3 model of Germany.109
                                                
107 See also Turnovsky and Donnelly (1984:59) who tested for weak separability restrictions using a
KLEM translog cost function for the Australian iron and steel industry. (L,E,M)-separability is
rejected at a 5% level as well, whereas (K,L,M)-separability is accepted.
108 Actually, (L,E,M)-separability assumes that substitutional possibilities between labour, fossil
fuels, and material do not depend on the installation of new capital. This is, of course, a critical
assumption.
109 In this chapter, I apply the single-country version for Germany since my econometric estimations
also refer only to Germany. In Chapter 4, however, I will employ the linked GEM-E3 EU-14
model version since terms-of-trade effects are more plausible for large countries, such as the EU-
14. A GEM-E3 model description is provided in Appendix IV.
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The German model is calibrated against a benchmark data set which includes a
number of pre-existing factor and commodity market tax distortions such as labour
income taxes, social security contributions, several commodity taxes or taxes on
capital income (cf. Schmidt 1999:267-271).
In the standard version, invested physical capital is assumed to be internationally and
sectorally immobile. Because sectoral capital stocks are quasi fixed, capital supply is
completely inelastic in the short run and capital owners have a share in the overall tax
burden. However, capital is supplied with some degree of elasticity in the long run.
The labour market is neo-classical with flexible wages and homogeneous and
internationally immobile, sectorally mobile labour.110 The consumer side is described
by a representative household that receives labour and capital income. Note that
lower capital income stimulates labour supply through income effects. According to
the Armington assumption of product heterogeneity, foreign import demand is
imperfectly price elastic thus allowing for tax shifting effects towards the foreign
sector.111
In the following simulations the balance of payments is assumed to be flexible,
implying that the real long-term interest rate and nominal exchange rates are fixed.112
Admittedly, the assumption of a flexible balance of payments and of an
internationally immobile capital stock can be justified in particular for short- or mid-
term analyses.113 The impact of a balance-of-payments restriction on the EDD
outcome is analysed in Chapter 4.
                                                
110 In Chapter 5 I introduce labour market imperfections into the GEM-E3 model.
111 The Armington concept of national product differentiation is more or less a standard assumption
in CGE models. It models domestic demand as a CES aggregate of imports and domestically
produced and demanded commodities. The Armington assumption for German import demand
implies that the German price level is not completely determined by (exogenous) world market
prices; the Armington assumption for foreign import demand leads to a finitely price elastic
import demand function of the rest of the world (cf. Chapter 4). Both specifications modify the
small-country assumption of exogenous world market prices.
112 Since a monetary sector is not included in the GEM-E3 standard version, the balance of
payments is in fact a current account.
113 Since the simulations in Chapter 4 are based on a flexible balance of payments, I will not impose
a restriction on the current account in this chapter either. As Germany has committed itself to a
CO2 emissions reduction which goes beyond –10%, I will also simulate the impacts of a –20%
CO2 emissions reduction tax policy (in contrast I assume only an EU-wide –10% CO2 emissions
reduction target in Chapter 4). Note at this point that the simulation results should be interpreted
with caution since no baseline scenario is applied (see below).
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Simulation results, reported in Table 13, are based on an ecological tax reform
scenario (Scenario D_TAX20) which assumes that Germany unilaterally reduces CO2
emissions by imposing an endogenous tax on CO2 emissions of households and
firms. A linear reduction path of CO2 emissions at a total of –20% (compared to the
base year) over a 10-year period is assumed (i.e. after 5 years, emissions are reduced
by –10%). Revenue neutrality is guaranteed by a fixed ratio of the public deficit to
the gross domestic product (GDP). Additional tax revenues are used to equally cut
the rate of social security contributions of employees and employers.
Here, and in all other simulations in this thesis, I refrain from applying a baseline
scenario, which reproduces the economic development (with respect to growth of
GDP, CO2 emissions, population etc.) in the absence of the CO2 abatement policy.
This reduces the political relevance of simulation results but enables clarification of
the effects of changed substitution elasticity values independently of their effects on
the baseline scenario.114 Thus the following simulations primarily serve to test the
model’s structure for its sensitivity to parameter changes but not to generate figures
that are really relevant to policy decision makers.
Table 13 considers several cases of parameter specifications. The first three columns
show the results of the standard case (Case 0), which are based on the previously
used elasticity values in the GEM-E3 model. The next nine columns refer to results
which are obtained when the econometrically estimated substitution elasticities
generated in the previous sections (see Table 21 in Appendix I) are used (Case 2) and
halved (Case 1) or doubled (Case 3), respectively.
Table 13 illustrates that (given the nesting structure in Figure 3) the GEM-E3 single-
country version for Germany produces a double dividend in terms of lower CO2
emissions and higher employment for a wide range of substitution elasticity
parameters. Basically, the approval of the EDD is in line with the numerical results
of, for example, de Mooij and Bovenberg (1998:30), who also obtain positive
employment effects in a model with fixed capital.
In the case of the econometric estimates (Case 2), a rise in private income of 0.61%
and in employment of 1.33% is realised if CO2 emissions fall by –20%. Capital
income falls by –2.36%. Economic welfare per GDP, however, decreases slightly by
–0.04%. Compared to Case 0, representing the previously used values in GEM-E3,
                                                
114 Assuming different substitution elasticities leads not only to differences in policy effects, but also
to different growth rates of baseline CO2 emissions or GDP.
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positive employment effects are only slightly stronger, and economic welfare
decreases less. In Case 0, private income and employment rise by 0.52% and 1.27%,
while capital income and economic welfare decrease by –2.29% and –0.06%.
Table 13: Scenario D_TAX20: macroeconomic aggregates for Germany,
variation of substitution elasticities in production (numbers indicate
percent changes from baseline except if defined otherwise)
Macroeconomic aggregates for Germany
Case 1: Case 2: Case 3:
1. year 5. year 10. year 1. year 5. year 10. year 1. year 5. year 10. year 1. year 5. year 10. year
Gross domestic product 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.20 0.06 0.03 0.07 -0.10 0.00 -0.02 -0.18
Employment 0.12 0.59 1.27 0.22 1.05 2.31 0.15 0.65 1.33 0.09 0.38 0.73
Production -0.14 -0.75 -1.76 -0.17 -0.93 -2.40 -0.19 -0.96 -2.24 -0.21 -0.93 -2.01
Domestic demand -0.13 -0.68 -1.58 -0.14 -0.82 -2.20 -0.16 -0.83 -1.98 -0.17 -0.79 -1.74
Private investment -0.03 -0.17 -0.52 -0.01 -0.22 -0.96 -0.02 -0.20 -0.73 0.00 -0.09 -0.39
Private consumption 0.09 0.35 0.50 0.15 0.54 0.63 0.12 0.43 0.59 0.09 0.31 0.45
Real net income 0.09 0.36 0.52 0.16 0.56 0.66 0.12 0.45 0.61 0.09 0.33 0.47
 - Labour income 0.43 1.96 3.92 0.77 3.42 6.85 0.53 2.23 4.19 0.35 1.38 2.46
 - Non-labour income -0.19 -0.96 -2.29 -0.35 -1.80 -4.48 -0.21 -1.02 -2.36 -0.12 -0.54 -1.18
Real consumer wage 0.31 1.36 2.61 0.54 2.34 4.44 0.38 1.57 2.82 0.26 1.00 1.72
Real producer wage -0.10 -0.55 -1.37 -0.17 -1.02 -2.80 -0.07 -0.41 -1.12 -0.03 -0.20 -0.54
Exports -0.22 -1.17 -2.77 -0.32 -1.57 -3.52 -0.37 -1.71 -3.67 -0.39 -1.72 -3.50
Imports -0.21 -1.05 -2.40 -0.28 -1.45 -3.38 -0.29 -1.37 -3.04 -0.28 -1.25 -2.64
Terms of trade 0.10 0.55 1.32 0.15 0.75 1.66 0.18 0.84 1.81 0.19 0.84 1.74
CO 2  tax rate (ECU’85)** 4.4 23.8 60.8 8.1 45.0 123.2 4.4 22.6 57.0 2.4 11.4 26.9
CO 2  tax revenue* 0.38 1.87 4.21 0.70 3.52 8.41 0.38 1.77 3.92 0.21 0.90 1.86
CO 2  emissions -2.00 -10.00 -20.00 -2.00 -10.00 -20.00 -2.00 -10.00 -20.00 -2.00 -10.00 -20.00
Equivalent variation (economic welfare) *** 0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.23 0.03 0.06 -0.04 0.03 0.07 0.03
*   in % of GDP, absolute difference from baseline
**  in value figures
*** in % of base year GDP, cumulative from 1st year
of GEM-E3
Econometric estimates
Doubled valuesHalved values Central values
Case 0:
Standard version
The differences between Case 0 and Case 2 are not very pronounced at the aggregate
level. A comparison between Case 1 to Case 3 is more appropriate to draw some
general conclusions. Obviously, higher substitution elasticities generate lower CO2
tax rates and lower ratios of CO2 tax revenues to the GDP. The former is the direct
result of the higher price sensitivity of input demand functions caused by higher
degrees of substitutability in production.115 Significantly lower tax rates are required
to realise a given CO2 emissions reduction. In actual figures, Table 13 shows that the
CO2 tax rate is 57.0 ECU for the central substitution elasticity values (Case 2), while
it is more than doubled in the case of halved values (Case 1) and more than halved in
the case of doubled values (Case 3): In Case 1 the computed CO2 tax rate is 123.2
ECU; in Case 3 it is 26.9 ECU.
Furthermore, I find that employment effects increase with a declining degree of
substitutability between inputs and input aggregates for all four nesting levels. This
result (partially) follows from the given nesting structure in the GEM-E3 producer
                                                
115 Kemfert and Welsch (2000) find a similar result.
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model. The more the substitution possibilities are restricted at the first nesting level
between capital and the LEM aggregate, the lower is the rise in capital demand in
response to an increase in the unit costs of the LEM aggregate. Hence, given a quasi-
fixed capital stock, capital income falls the most in Case 1 (–4.48%) and the lowest
in Case 3 (–1.18%). This corresponds to a further result: The ecological tax reform
causes the highest reduction in real labour costs and the highest increase in the real
consumer wage in Case 1, where substitution possibilities are mostly restricted, while
in Case 3 the real producer wage and the real consumer wage reaches its highest or
lowest level, respectively.
How can the positive employment effects generally computed by the GEM-E3 model
be explained? In all four cases of substitution patterns, the real consumer wage rate
steadily increases with higher CO2 emission reduction rates, while real net non-
labour income (i.e. capital income) is reduced – indicating tax shifting effects from
labour to capital income. Assuming a neo-classical labour market, where labour
supply depends positively on the real consumer wage and negatively on the real non-
labour income, both effects induce an increase of labour supply. Labour demand
increases due to substitution processes in response to the changed ratio of labour to
fossil fuel prices. Obviously, substitution effects towards labour input dominate
negative output effects (note that domestic production decreases in all cases of
parameter choice due to higher energy costs). Moreover, in addition to tax shifting
effects towards capital, the GEM-E3 model allows for shifting parts of the tax burden
abroad (see below).
The rise in employment in all cases of elasticity values supports the EDD hypothesis.
If the second dividend, however, is measured in terms of economic welfare, the
ecological tax reform – defined by the Scenario D_TAX20 – produces a double
dividend only in Case 3. This is the only case where economic welfare (measured at
the –20% CO2 reduction goal) increases as the loss of utility through reduced leisure
is compensated by the utility gain associated with the higher consumption level.
The development of GDP can be explained by the development of consumption,
investment, and net exports. Both real exports and real imports are reduced, the
former because of increased production costs, the latter because of the reduction of
domestic demand (the positive impact of the higher price ratio on domestic import
demand is overcompensated by the negative effect of lower overall domestic
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demand).116 The improvement of the German terms of trade reflects tax shifting
effects to the foreign sector. Actually, the GEM-E3 single-country version for
Germany allows for terms-of-trade effects. Due to the Armington assumption, which
underlies the specification of Germany’s and the rest of the world’s (RoW) import
demand, imports are imperfect substitutes for domestically produced goods. Thus,
import demand of the RoW for German goods is imperfectly price elastic, and higher
prices of German exports can be partially shifted abroad. Some reasons, why
empirical models frequently rely on the Armington assumption, are provided in
Chapter 4. Actually, in the specific case of Germany and in particular for several
export industries (e.g. automobiles or chemical industry), it is appropriate not to
assume a infinitely price elastic foreign import demand, but to allow for terms-of-
trade effects.
GDP shows positive growth rates, which at the beginning increase due to the strong
rise in consumption levels. With increasing CO2 tax rates, however, exports lose
international competitiveness and decline more and more. This effect increasingly
slows down GDP growth to even negative growth rates. The German terms of trade
as well as the net exports per GDP increase in all cases. This is possible because the
balance of payments is flexible, i.e. imbalances have no feedback on the German
economy. As will be shown in Chapter 4 in the context of the GEM-E3 EU-14
model, the introduction of a fixed balance of payments and the variation of price
elasticities in foreign trade functions may affect results.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter the influence of substitution patterns in production on the EDD
outcome in the GEM-E3 single-country version for Germany is examined.
Considering the lack of empirical studies for Germany, I first estimate substitution
elasticities between capital, labour, material, electricity, and fossil fuels for four
sector aggregates (including the energy supply sectors, the energy-intensive
manufacturing sectors, the nonenergy-intensive manufacturing sectors, and the
service sectors) using a non-nested translog cost function. Empirical basis is a pooled
                                                
116 According to the Armington approach, which assumes that imports and domestically produced
goods are imperfect substitutes, domestic demand is a CES aggregate of imports and
domestically produced and demanded commodities. Thus German import demand depends
positively on the ratio of the CES price aggregate to the import price and on the level of
domestic demand.
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time-series cross-section data sample for 49 German producing and service sectors
over the period 1978-90. In addition, I estimate substitution elasticities for a three-
level nested translog cost function that fits into the given nesting structure in the
GEM-E3 producer model. The estimates are introduced into the GEM-E3 German
single-country version and sensitivity analyses are performed.
The major conclusions from this chapter can be summarised as follows:
1. Estimates of the non-nested translog cost function indicate that differences
between unrestricted models and the local concavity restricted models are of
minor importance. The constant-output own-price elasticity is (in absolute terms)
highest for capital demand, whereas electricity and fossil fuel demand are less
price elastic (except for the energy supply sectors aggregate).
2. Positive Morishima elasticities of substitution below unity are obtained for the
majority of sectors and input pairs. This indicates an overall dominance of weak
substitutability relationships. Due to the high absolute own-price elasticity of
capital demand in the service sectors, I find a strong substitutability relationship
in particular in the service sectors aggregate for input pairs involving capital. The
results support the hypothesis that capital and energy are substitutes.
3. Negative Morishima elasticities of substitution are computed between labour and
fossil fuels in the energy-intensive and the nonenergy-intensive manufacturing
sectors (when the wage rate changes) and in the service sectors (when the fossil
fuel price varies), and between material and electricity in the nonenergy-intensive
manufacturing and the service sectors (when the price of material varies). Only
for the two latter sector aggregates does labour seem to be a better substitute for
electricity than capital or material; in most other cases, labour is more difficult to
substitute for energy than capital or material.
4. The estimation of sectoral economy-of-scale elasticities yields the result that it is
only for 17 of 49 sectors (mainly energy-intensive manufacturing sectors) that the
hypothesis of constant returns to scale cannot be rejected at a 5% level of
significance, indicating that the majority of sectors is described by decreasing
returns to scale (mainly nonenergy-intensive manufacturing sectors) or increasing
returns to scale (mainly energy supply and service sectors). Testing for
homotheticity and homogeneity shows that the aggregates are characterised by
non-homothetic and non-homogeneous production functions.
5. In order to improve the empirical basis of the computable general equilibrium
model GEM-E3, I estimate substitution elasticities for a three-level nested
production function. A comparison with the values previously used in GEM-E3
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indicates considerable numerical differences for several sectors. Testing for weak
homothetic separability restrictions, however, proves that inputs can be
aggregated only in exceptional cases. Thus the econometric estimates of the
multi-stage estimation are surrounded by some uncertainty, and sensitivity tests
are required. Since the econometric tests support no alternative nesting structure, I
retain the four-level nesting scheme of the GEM-E3 standard model in the
simulations.
6. Simulations are based on the single-country version of the GEM-E3 model for
Germany and an ecological tax reform scenario that assumes a unilateral –20%
CO2 emissions reduction in Germany. The model computes a double dividend in
terms of lower CO2 emissions and higher employment for a wide range of
substitution elasticity values. Simulation results indicate that – in terms of the
sign – the employment effects of an ecological tax reform in Germany are
relatively insensitive to a change of substitution elasticities in production.
Economic welfare, however, decreases in most cases; it rises only in the case of
doubled substitution elasticity values, where the increase in utility due to higher
consumption can offset the decrease of utility due to lower leisure.
7. Positive employment effects increase with a declining degree of substitutability
between the inputs and input aggregates at all four nesting levels. This result
(partially) follows from the given nesting structure of the GEM-E3 producer
model. The more restricted substitution possibilities are at the first nesting level,
the lower is the rise in capital demand and the higher is the fall in capital income
(indicating tax shifting effects towards capital) in response to an increase in the
unit costs of the LEM aggregate. Moreover, the ecological tax reform causes the
highest reduction in real labour costs and the highest increase in the real
consumer wage in the case where substitution elasticities are halved.
8. For the neo-classical labour market specification that is assumed in the standard
version of the GEM-E3 model labour supply increases in response to the rising
real consumer wage and the reduction in real non-labour income. Labour demand
increases due to substitution processes in response to the changed ratio of labour
to fossil fuel prices. Obviously, substitution effects towards labour input
dominate negative output effects.
The discussion of simulation results supports the theoretical finding of Chapter 2 that
the specification of the foreign closure (terms-of-trade effects) and the assumptions
concerning labour supply and wage formation are further key factors for the
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employment impacts of an ecological tax reform. The role of both factors will be
examined in the following Chapters 4 and 5.
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Appendix I
Table 14: Sectoral cost shares [%]
Sectors Year Fossil fuels 
(F )
Electricity 
(EL )
Labour 
(L )
Capital 
(K )
Material 
(M )
Agriculture, forestry 78 4.5 1.4 10.9 31.9 51.4
and fishing (1) 84 4.8 1.4 9.9 33.7 50.0
 
90 3.4 1.5 10.4 39.5 45.2
Electricity production 78 28.6 4.3 16.1 24.7 26.3
and distance 84 25.4 3.7 12.3 22.5 36.1
district heating (7) 90 18.1 4.1 12.9 25.7 39.3
 
78 58.4 0.1 7.1 8.9 25.5
Gas (8) 84 55.9 0.1 3.9 6.0 34.0
 90 41.5 0.1 7.0 12.4 39.0
 
78 24.5 2.9 40.4 11.5 20.7
Coal mining (11) 84 23.5 3.4 37.5 13.0 22.6
 90 16.2 3.4 37.8 15.7 27.0
 78 2.8 2.1 22.6 21.2 51.3
Other mining (12) 84 3.5 1.7 21.1 18.8 54.8
 90 1.6 1.5 17.9 19.9 59.2
Chemical 78 6.3 2.9 23.7 9.0 58.1
products (14) 84 10.6 2.8 22.3 8.0 56.4
 90 5.2 2.6 25.4 9.5 57.2
78 75.1 1.1 4.3 6.3 13.2
Mineral oil (15) 84 75.1 0.8 2.8 3.7 17.6
 90 48.0 1.2 3.4 3.9 43.6
Synthetic 78 0.8 1.7 29.0 7.5 61.0
resins and plastic (16) 84 0.8 1.9 25.9 7.5 64.0
 90 0.4 2.1 27.7 8.3 61.6
 
78 1.8 2.0 33.7 8.3 54.2
Rubber processing (17) 84 2.1 2.1 31.1 8.2 56.5
 90 1.0 1.9 30.7 8.6 57.8
Extraction of 78 6.4 3.0 27.1 11.8 51.6
sand, gravel, stone (18) 84 7.7 3.1 25.1 11.5 52.6
 90 4.4 3.2 25.3 11.5 55.6
78 6.5 2.2 48.5 9.8 33.0
 Fine ceramics (19) 84 7.6 2.4 45.4 10.9 33.8
 90 3.9 2.3 43.4 11.5 38.9
 
78 7.3 2.8 33.3 10.4 46.2
Glass (20) 84 12.1 3.3 28.7 11.9 44.0
 90 4.5 3.6 28.6 12.8 50.5
78 5.1 1.4 26.1 11.2 56.1
 Iron and steel (21) 84 6.2 1.7 23.8 12.2 56.1
 90 5.0 1.8 25.1 10.9 57.2
Non-ferrous 78 1.7 5.7 17.1 7.0 68.6
metals (22) 84 2.3 5.2 13.8 6.2 72.4
 90 1.2 4.9 16.0 7.0 70.9
 78 2.5 3.0 41.3 9.0 44.1
Foundry (23) 84 2.6 4.9 37.3 9.3 46.0
 90 1.5 3.5 38.0 9.6 47.4
Fabricated 78 1.0 1.7 29.4 7.0 60.9
metal (24) 84 1.3 2.0 28.3 7.9 60.5
 90 0.6 2.0 29.6 7.5 60.3
Steel, light metal, 78 0.9 0.5 30.2 3.9 64.4
rail machinery (25) 84 1.4 0.7 34.8 5.7 57.3
 90 0.7 0.6 33.0 5.1 60.6
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continued Table 14
Sectors Year Fossil fuels 
(F )
Electricity 
(EL )
Labour 
(L )
Capital 
(K )
Material 
(M )
78 0.7 0.7 35.8 5.6 57.2
Machinery (26) 84 0.9 0.8 34.6 6.5 57.2
 90 0.4 0.8 34.4 6.5 57.9
Office and 78 0.3 0.8 34.2 15.1 49.6
data processing (27) 84 0.3 0.8 26.4 12.1 60.4
 90 0.1 1.0 27.2 10.6 61.1
Automobiles and 78 0.9 0.9 26.5 6.0 65.8
parts (28) 84 1.0 0.9 25.8 7.9 64.5
 90 0.5 0.8 23.0 7.8 67.9
 
78 0.5 1.1 35.7 6.7 56.0
Shipbuilding (29) 84 0.6 1.1 28.9 8.0 61.5
 90 0.3 1.0 27.3 6.7 64.7
Airspace 78 0.6 0.8 43.5 5.0 50.1
equipment manufacturing 84 0.5 0.8 38.9 6.9 52.9
and repairing (30) 90 0.2 0.7 36.3 6.8 56.0
Electrical 78 0.7 0.8 37.7 5.7 55.1
appliances (31) 84 0.9 0.8 35.3 6.6 56.4
 90 0.4 0.8 34.4 7.4 57.1
Precision and optical 78 0.6 0.9 42.8 5.2 50.5
  instruments (32) 84 0.8 1.0 39.0 6.6 52.6
 90 0.4 0.9 38.1 7.2 53.4
Iron, steel, and 78 1.1 1.0 33.4 6.7 57.8
steel products (33) 84 1.3 1.2 31.2 7.6 58.7
90 0.6 1.3 31.4 7.6 59.1
Musical 78 0.6 1.1 31.4 6.1 60.8
instruments and toys (34) 84 0.7 1.2 29.1 8.3 60.7
 90 0.4 1.3 28.5 9.0 60.9
Timber processing and 78 2.2 3.0 21.3 9.2 64.3
wood products (35) 84 2.3 3.2 21.3 10.0 63.2
 90 1.3 3.3 20.6 10.2 64.6
Wooden   78 1.1 0.9 31.2 5.9 61.0
furniture (36) 84 1.3 1.1 31.7 7.0 58.9
 90 0.8 1.1 30.2 6.3 61.7
Pulp, paper 78 4.7 6.2 24.1 11.5 53.5
and board (37) 84 6.4 6.7 18.4 10.2 58.2
 90 4.0 6.8 19.0 13.0 57.2
Paper and paper 78 1.1 0.8 28.6 7.8 61.7
products (38) 84 1.5 1.0 24.3 8.4 64.8
 90 0.6 1.0 23.5 8.3 66.6
Printing and 78 0.4 1.0 40.6 8.7 49.2
publishing (39) 84 0.6 1.3 36.7 10.3 51.1
 90 0.3 1.3 34.7 10.3 53.4
 78 0.8 0.7 28.8 6.9 62.8
Leather (40) 84 0.9 0.8 25.2 7.1 66.1
 90 0.5 0.8 22.6 7.7 68.4
 78 1.4 1.8 28.1 8.9 59.8
Textiles (41) 84 2.0 2.1 25.2 9.2 61.5
 90 1.0 2.4 24.7 9.9 62.1
 78 0.6 0.5 28.7 3.8 66.5
Clothing (42) 84 0.8 0.5 26.3 4.3 68.1
 90 0.4 0.5 23.8 4.1 71.1
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continued Table 14
Sectors Year Fossil fuels (F )
Electricity 
(EL )
Labour 
(L )
Capital 
(K )
Material 
(M )
 78 1.2 1.1 13.2 4.5 80.1
Food (43) 84 1.6 1.2 12.6 4.9 79.7
 90 1.0 1.3 14.5 5.8 77.5
 
78 2.3 1.1 20.3 13.1 63.2
Beverages (44) 84 3.2 1.3 18.0 14.5 63.1
 90 1.7 1.2 16.2 15.2 65.6
 
78 0.6 0.8 21.2 7.5 70.0
Tobacco (45) 84 0.7 0.7 17.4 8.7 72.5
 90 0.3 0.7 14.3 7.8 76.9
Building and 78 1.8 0.1 39.6 5.2 53.4
construction (46) 84 2.1 0.1 38.6 5.1 54.0
 90 1.1 0.1 36.6 4.6 57.5
 
78 1.8 0.9 6.4 1.5 89.4
Wholesale trade (51) 84 2.2 1.0 6.1 1.7 89.0
 90 1.7 1.2 7.4 2.2 87.5
 78 2.0 2.5 11.3 3.0 81.1
Retail trade (52) 84 2.7 3.1 12.0 3.6 78.7
 90 1.8 2.9 11.7 4.1 79.6
 
78 2.8 3.8 45.6 34.2 13.5
Railways (54) 84 3.5 4.9 40.5 39.3 11.9
 90 1.7 4.8 35.6 44.5 13.4
Water 78 10.0 0.3 19.2 29.1 41.4
transport (55) 84 16.0 0.2 15.7 29.7 38.5
 90 8.7 0.2 18.7 28.7 43.8
 
78 0.7 0.5 53.0 32.1 13.7
Postal services (56) 84 0.7 0.7 45.2 39.3 14.1
 90 0.5 0.7 36.9 43.2 18.6
 
78 7.2 0.6 24.7 11.9 55.6
Other transport (57) 84 8.4 0.5 21.7 12.4 56.8
 90 5.3 0.4 23.3 12.0 59.0
 Banking and 78 0.4 0.6 48.7 11.2 39.1
finance (60) 84 0.5 0.7 46.6 13.3 38.9
 90 0.3 0.7 48.5 14.1 36.4
 
78 0.4 0.5 39.2 9.4 50.5
Insurance (61) 84 0.4 0.6 33.7 12.5 52.8
 90 0.2 0.6 29.2 13.3 56.7
Hotels, catering and 78 1.5 2.7 21.8 8.2 65.8
public houses (64) 84 1.7 3.0 22.8 9.9 62.6
 90 0.9 2.5 23.9 9.8 62.9
Education, science 78 1.0 0.8 29.7 23.3 45.2
and culture (65) 84 1.0 0.9 29.5 29.6 39.0
 90 0.6 0.8 30.3 31.5 36.9
Health and sanitary 78 1.3 0.4 39.4 8.0 50.8
services (66) 84 1.2 0.4 34.8 10.4 53.3
 90 0.5 0.3 29.0 8.5 61.7
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Table 15: Parameter estimates, non-nested and concavity restricted translog model
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Table 16: Cross-price elasticities for sector aggregates, non-nested translog model
(at 1990 data)
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Table 17: Sectoral breakdown (national account system and GEM-E3 system)
National account (NA) sectors No. GEM-E3 sectors No. Sectoral aggregation for estimation (pooling)
Agriculture and forestry 1 Agriculture 1 Energy-intens. manufact. sectors
Electricity production 7 Electricity 5 Energy supply sectors
Gas 8 Natural gas 4 Energy supply sectors
Coal mining 11 Solid fuels 2 Energy supply sectors
Other mining 12 Other energy-intensive industries 8 Energy-intens. manufact. sectors
Chemical products 14 Chemical industry 7 Energy-intens. manufact. sectors
Mineral oil 15 Liquid fuels 3 Energy supply sectors
Synthetic resins and plastic 16 Consumer goods 12 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Rubber processing 17 Consumer goods 12 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Sand, gravel, stone 18 Other energy-intensive industries 8 Energy-intens. manufact. sectors
Fine ceramics 19 Other energy-intensive industries 8 Energy-intens. manufact. sectors
Glass 20 Other energy-intensive industries 8 Energy-intens. manufact. sectors
Iron and steel 21 Ferrous and non-ferrous metals 6 Energy-intens. manufact. sectors
Non-ferrous metals 22 Ferrous and non-ferrous metals 6 Energy-intens. manufact. sectors
Foundry 23 Ferrous and non-ferrous metals 6 Energy-intens. manufact. sectors
Fabricated metal 24 Other energy-intensive industries 8 Energy-intens. manufact. sectors
Steel, light metal 25 Other equipment goods 11 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Machinery 26 Other equipment goods 11 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Office and data processing 27 Other equipment goods 11 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Automobiles and parts 28 Transport equipment 10 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Shipbuilding 29 Transport equipment 10 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Airspace equipment 30 Transport equipment 10 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Electrical appliances 31 Electrical goods 9 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Precision and optical instr. 32 Other energy-intensive industries 8 Energy-intens. manufact. sectors
Iron, steel and steel products 33 Other energy-intensive industries 8 Energy-intens. manufact. sectors
Musical instruments and toys 34 Consumer goods 12 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Timber processing and wood 35 Consumer goods 12 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Wooden furniture 36 Consumer goods 12 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Pulp, paper and board 37 Other energy-intensive industries 8 Energy-intens. manufact. sectors
Paper and paper products 38 Other energy-intensive industries 8 Energy-intens. manufact. sectors
Printing and publishing 39 Other energy-intensive industries 8 Energy-intens. manufact. sectors
Leather 40 Consumer goods 12 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Textiles 41 Consumer goods 12 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Clothing 42 Consumer goods 12 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Food 43 Consumer goods 12 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Beverages 44 Consumer goods 12 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Tobacco 45 Consumer goods 12 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Building and construction 46 Building and construction 13 Nonenergy-intens. manufact. sectors
Wholesale trade 51 Other market services 17 Service sectors
Retail trade 52 Other market services 17 Service sectors
Railways 54 Transports 15 Service sectors
Water transport 55 Transports 15 Service sectors
Postal services 56 Telecommunication services 14 Service sectors
Other transports 57 Transports 15 Service sectors
Banking and finance 60 Credit and insurance 16 Service sectors
Insurance 61 Credit and insurance 16 Service sectors
Hotels, catering, publ. houses 64 Other market services 17 Service sectors
Education, science, culture 65 Other market services 17 Service sectors
Health and sanitary services 66 Other market services 17 Service sectors
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Table 18: Sectoral Morishima elasticities of substitution, non-nested and concavity
restricted translog model (at 1990 data)
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Table 19: Parameter estimates, three-level nested translog model
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continued Table 19
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Table 20: Own- and cross-price elasticities for GEM-E3 sectors, three-level nested
translog model (at 1990 data)
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continued Table 20
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*t-statistics at a 5% level. For a classification of GEM-E3 sectors see Table 17 in this
Appendix.
Note: Local concavity restrictions are imposed on the L-F-M estimation model when
estimating the service sectors and the energy-intensive manufacturing sectors aggregate. No
concavity restrictions are imposed on the group of energy supply sectors since – as in the
non-nested case – all computed own-price elasticities are negative for them. However, the
group of nonenergy-intensive manufacturing sectors as well as the LFM-EL and K-LEM
estimation models of all sectoral aggregates (first and second nesting levels) are not
restricted to local concavity, even if significantly positive own-price elasticities are
calculated for fossil fuel demand in several GEM-E3 sectors, such as electrical goods (9),
transport equipment (10), other equipment goods (11), consumer goods (12), and building
and construction (13). While insignificant price elasticities are obtained for nine sectors at
the second nesting level (LFM-EL), the price elasticities at the first nesting level (K-LEM)
are statistically significant without exception. Values I refer to elasticity aggregates that are
obtained when sectoral elasticity values which are insignificant at a 5% level enter
aggregation with zero, whereas values II are calculated as the weighted sum of all
significant and insignificant sectoral price elasticity values. For four of 49 sectors the fitted
cost shares of fossil fuels (at 1990 data) are negative, but only slightly below zero. These are
the sectors (27), (32), (39), and (60) which all are characterised by very small cost shares of
fossil fuels (below 0.5% in 1990, see Table 14 in Appendix I). In all other input
components, however, the estimated translog cost function increases monotonously.
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Table 21: Substitution elasticities in GEM-E3 sectors (Germany)
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σ M 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

σ F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Previously used estimates in GEM-E3 (standard version)
Econometric estimates
Note: For a classification of GEM-E3 sectors see Table 17 in Appendix I. Econometric
estimates are available only for σK,LEM, σEL,LFM, and σLFM in sectors (1)-(17) (see Table 11). In
the simulations the previously used GEM-E3 values are retained in all cases where no
econometric estimates are available. Estimated elasticity values of zero or negative values
have been replaced by 0.1 in order to keep the CGE model solvable.
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4 Employment double dividend and foreign trade
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter emphasised that substitution patterns in production have an
influence on the EDD outcome; numerical simulation results indicated that in the
GEM-E3 single-country version for Germany the EDD hypothesis is accepted for a
wide range of plausible substitution elasticity values.
A second important aspect in numerical open economy models is the specification of
foreign trade patterns. In this chapter I study the effects of different foreign trade
specifications on the EDD outcome. While substitution elasticities in production
influence the size of tax shifting effects between production factors, foreign trade
elasticities determine the size of terms-of-trade and tax shifting effects to the foreign
sector.
The specification of the foreign trade system depends on whether a multi-country or a
single-country model is considered.117 Both model types differ with respect to the
modelling of trade determinants and export and import behaviour. In multi-country
models (or world models) production and demand are specified for all countries
participating in trade. All regions covered are linked together by bilateral world trade
matrices or trade pools. In single-country models the behaviour of the rest of the
world (RoW) is modelled rather roughly. Typically, a ‘closure rule’ for trade with the
external sector is incorporated that includes a crude specification of the RoW’s
import demand and export supply functions and usually a balance-of-payments
condition (cf. Shoven and Whalley 1992:81).
In order to scrutinise the role of different foreign trade specifications for the EDD
outcome, I use the GEM-E3 EU-14 model version which includes 14 EU countries
(EU-15 without Luxembourg) and the RoW (RoW covering all other industrialised
regions and all developing countries). Each EU-14 country is modelled explicitly as a
national applied general equilibrium model. The country models are linked through
bilateral trade relations. GEM-E3 EU-14, however, is not a global model but shows
elements of a single-country model with respect to the whole EU since the behaviour
of the RoW is exogenous in large parts. World production and export prices are
                                                
117 Shoven and Whalley (1992) give an overview of various multi-country and single-country
models.
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fixed, i.e. foreign export supply is assumed to be perfectly price elastic. This
assumption reflects price taking behaviour of the EU vis-à-vis RoW. But as price
taking behaviour is accompanied by product differentiation on the import side, the
EU-wide price level is not completely determined by the world market (and exchange
rates). An exogenous rise in foreign export prices would affect the EU-wide price
level only partially.
The assumption that the export prices of the RoW remain constant and are
independent of the amount of imports demanded by the EU is rather restrictive. It
should be taken into consideration that the EU-15’s share in the entire world trade
volume (measured on merchandise imports and imports of commercial services) is
around 40%. Bearing in mind that the share of intra-EU regional trade flows in total
EU merchandise imports is around 64%, the share of extra-EU imports in world
merchandise imports is still around 19% (1995 figures, WTO 1996). It seems, thus,
reasonable to relax the small-country assumption for the EU and to assume that trade
activities of the EU affect world market prices.
A further important aspect in the GEM-E3 model is the modelling of interactions
between macroeconomic developments in the EU and the foreign sector. Actually,
the only feedback between both economies is considered by a price elastic foreign
demand for EU exports. Optionally, for the long-term analysis an additional feedback
mechanism can be introduced to the GEM-E3 model by a balance-of-payments
constraint.
The objective of this chapter is to clarify the relationship between the foreign sector
and the EU economy in the GEM-E3 EU-14 model and to test the sensitivity of the
EDD outcome with respect to the foreign trade specification. The following
Section 4.2 presents some convenient concepts of world closure which are discussed
in the literature and are widely applied in numerical modelling. Section 4.3 deals
with the specification of the foreign trade system incorporated in GEM-E3 EU-14.
Several changes in the foreign trade system are then discussed in Section 4.4 and
tested with respect to their influence on EDD outcomes. Sensitivity analyses are
based on an ecological tax reform scenario that is slightly different to that used in
Chapter 3: First, it assumes that EU-wide CO2 emissions of households and firms are
reduced by -10% by means of an EU-wide, co-ordinated CO2 tax policy. A moderate
CO2 emissions reduction of –10% (instead of –20% in Chapter 3) is chosen, because
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this seems to be a more realistic target in the EU context.118 Second, each EU country
uses the revenue from the endogenous CO2 tax in order to reduce the employers’
social security contributions.
4.2 World closure rules and the Armington assumption of
product heterogeneity
4.2.1 Approaches of a world closure in empirical models
Whalley and Yeung (1984) find that the closure rule chosen in a general equilibrium
model may be of particular importance for simulation results119 and thus for the EDD
outcome of ecological tax reforms. The following survey clarifies that there is not
only a single option how to specify the foreign sector in CGE models, but there are
several ways of an external closure. The review indicates in particular that the foreign
trade specification of the GEM-E3 model incorporates several elements of the
different rules discussed below.
In the literature on applied trade models four basic external closure rules for single-
country models (including the domestic country and the RoW) were proposed and
assessed according to their appropriateness for empirical work. They mix small/big
country assumptions for imports/exports with homogeneity/heterogeneity of traded
goods and services and typically establish a balance-of-payments constraint.
The first three trade closure rules, which are explained below, are analysed in more
detail in Whalley and Yeung (1984); the last one is discussed in de Melo and
Robinson (1989) and Bhattarai et al. (1999).
                                                
118 Note that under the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 1997) the EU has committed itself to a reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions of –8% from 1990 until 2008-2012. As CO2 will have to carry a
slightly higher burden compared to the other five greenhouse gas emissions in the Kyoto basket,
the assumption of a –10% CO2 emissions reduction seems to be reasonable.
119 Whalley and Yeung examine how results from policy simulations depend on the assumptions
about international trade using a simple numerical example. The external sector specifications
vary according to the elasticity of the foreign offer curve. They include as extremes the
assumption of a large country and the assumption of a small, price taking country in which the
country has only marginal influence over its terms of trade. By calculating the equilibrium effects
of a distorting capital tax, Whalley and Yeung yield a substantial sensitivity of results in terms of
welfare gains to the external sector specification. While the terms-of-trade loss offsets the gain
from the removing tax in the case of the large country, the domestic gain is assumed to attain its
highest value where the small country is concerned.
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First external closure rule
The first approach presented in Whalley and Yeung (1984:127-130) is based on a
very simple formulation with two homogeneous commodities which are both traded
between the home country and the RoW.120 Foreign import demand and foreign
export supply functions are characterised by constant price elasticities:121
(4-1)
ε



⋅=
e
p
IMIM EXrowrow 0, ,    −∞< ε <0 (foreign import demand)
(4-2) γ)(0, rowEXrowrow pEXEX ⋅= ,    0 < < ∞γ (foreign export supply)
where IMrow  and EXrow  are imports demanded and exports supplied by RoW.
IMrow,0  and EXrow,0  denote base year imports and exports of RoW. The variable pEX
represents the price obtained by the domestic country for exports to RoW (given in
domestic currency), e denotes the exchange rate from domestic into foreign currency,
and 
e
pEX
 is the world market price for exports from the domestic country to RoW.
rowEXp  expresses the world market price paid by the home country for foreign
exports. ε  and γ  represent the own-price elasticities of foreign import demand and
foreign export supply. The authors introduce a zero trade balance condition in order
to close the system:
(4-3) rowEXrowEX IMpEXpe row ⋅=⋅⋅ )( (balance-of-payments condition).
In equilibrium, the value of RoW’s exports equals the value of its imports. This also
implies equalisation of the value of the home country’s exports and imports.
As this closure rule is not very common in CGE modelling, I will not discuss its
properties in more detail here. I would just like to mention one interesting feature of
the equation system (4-1) to (4-3) which is, however, less relevant to multi-sectoral
CGE models than to econometric models: Whalley and Yeung (1984:130) state that
the proposed external closure rule “can be misleading both in creating an appearance
of monetary non-neutralities, and in potentially leading to misspecification of
intended elasticity values”. They demonstrate particularly that the trade balance
                                                
120 Actually, this closure rule is rather atypical of CGE models which normally have a higher
sectoral disaggregation and include traded as well as non-traded goods.
121 In the following equations, notation has been brought into line with the nomenclature used in the
GEM-E3 model. Variables without indices refer to the domestic country.
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constraint establishes an analytical interrelation between the trade elasticities ε  and
γ , which should be considered in econometric estimations of ε  and γ .122
Second external closure rule
The second closure rule discussed here also relies on a two-goods formulation but is
closer to reality and shows a higher field of application. It differs from the first rule
primarily in two aspects:
– The assumption of homogeneous goods is given up and, following the Armington
assumption, product differentiation on the import side is introduced. The
advantages and implications of the Armington concept are explained in Section
4.2.2 in more detail.
– The domestic economy is faced with fixed world market prices for imports (price
taking behaviour for imports). This implies that RoW supplies any amount of
goods that is demanded by the home country at fixed world market prices.
Whalley and Yeung (1984:131-134) formalised this second external closure rule.
Their specification of the domestic import demand function, however, deviates from
the Armington concept but is – for reasons of simplicity – characterised by a constant
own price elasticity.123 Like in the first rule, foreign import demand is a downward
sloping function with a constant own price elasticity, ε , that is less than infinite.
Domestic export prices are not determined by the world market but are given as cost-
covering prices from zero profit conditions of the model, i.e. export prices are
determined domestically and are converted into foreign currency by using the
exchange rate. Again, a zero trade balance equation completes the system. The
system is described by the following five equations:
                                                
122 In CGE modelling the econometric problem of identification and misspecification of foreign
trade elasticity parameters is less important since elasticity values are normally not estimated
econometrically but are ‘best guess’ estimates (cf. Section 4.4.3). Moreover, the degree of
sectoral disaggregation is typically high – the GEM-E3 model for example includes 18
commodities. This implies that any change in one market will be cushioned by reactions in the
other markets so as to satisfy the balance-of-payments constraint. In multi-sector models the
interdependence of trade elasticities will be less significant than in the two-goods model
framework. In addition, the interdependence is relaxed if – like in the GEM-E3 model – the
balance-of-payments constraint can be eliminated.
123 Usually, import demand functions in CGE models do not have a constant price elasticity but are
specified, for example, as CES functions. Whalley and Yeung (1984), who choose a constant
price elasticity formulation, note that their results remain unchanged, even if an Armington CES
specification is used.
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(4-4) ,0,
ε



⋅=
e
p
IMIM EXrowrow     −∞< ε <0 (foreign import demand)
(4-5) IM EX IMrowS D= = (equilibrium condition)
(4-6) η)(0 rowEX
D peIMIM ⋅⋅= ,   −∞<η <0 (domestic import demand)
(4-7)
rowEXEX pp row = (foreign export supply)
(4-8) rowEXEX IMpIMpe row ⋅=⋅⋅ )( (balance-of-payments condition).
IMrow,0  and IM0  are base year imports of RoW and the home country, IM D  denotes
the domestic import demand, while EXrowS  represents export supply of RoW. rowEXp ,
which is fixed at 
rowEXp , denotes the price of RoW’s exports in foreign currency;
(
rowEXpe ⋅ ) is the domestic price for imports from RoW. )/( epEX  is the price of
exports of the home country (resulting from zero profit conditions) in foreign
currency. The parameters ε  and η  represent the foreign and the domestic import
demand price elasticities. In equilibrium, the balance-of-payments condition is
satisfied, and the price vectors EXp  and rowEXp  guarantee that excess demands equal
zero.
A comment should be made on this second external closure rule. Similar to the first
rule, equation (4-8) establishes an interdependence of both trade elasticities, ε  and
η , which should be considered in econometric estimations. Whalley and Yeung
(1984:132-133) show that the equation system (4-4) to (4-8) does not define a well-
behaved foreign offer curve but a locus of external sector equilibria. Consequently,
the foreign and domestic offer curves do not intersect but lie one on top of each other
– a feature which is contradictory to neo-classical trade theory.
Third external closure rule
The third closure rule proposed by Whalley and Yeung (1984:134-136) is
characterised by
– the inclusion of tradable and non-tradable goods,
– price taking behaviour for all tradable goods, and
– the assumption of product homogeneity among countries (no Armington
assumption for tradable goods).
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Further properties of the third rule are that
– domestic prices for non-tradable goods are determined endogenously in such a
way that demand-supply equalities hold for each non-traded good,
– relative domestic prices for tradables are the same as relative world market prices,
– the exchange rate is determined endogenously in such a way that the zero trade
balance is satisfied.
According to Whalley and Yeung (1984:135) the foreign offer curve in a two-goods
case is a straight line with a slope given by the world market prices of traded goods,
whereas the domestic offer curve incorporates some degree of elasticity. Equilibrium
quantities of tradables can thus be determined by the point of intersection of both
curves. The main disadvantage of this rule refers to the small-country assumption;
i.e. this rule is inappropriate for large countries such as the EU-14. In addition, due to
missing product heterogeneity, it cannot account for empirically observable intra-
industry trade flows. Moreover, de Melo and Robinson (1989:49) argue that the
assumption of price taking behaviour and product homogeneity for all tradable goods
may cause extreme unrealistic specialisation effects if, for example, a tax policy is
simulated.
Fourth external closure rule
The fourth closure rule which is widely used in numerical modelling is discussed in
de Melo and Robinson (1989) and Bhattarai et al. (1999). It is characterised by the
following features:
– symmetric product differentiation on both the import and export side: a CES
function for domestic aggregate import demand (Armington assumption) and a
CET (constant elasticity of transformation) function for the domestic export
transformation function are introduced,
– the small-country assumption, i.e. the domestic country can sell or purchase any
amount of imports and exports at fixed world market prices, and
– the assumption of a zero balance of trade.
De Melo and Robinson demonstrate that this specification is theoretically well-
behaved. As was the case in the third rule, the balance-of-trade condition defines the
foreign offer curve as a straight 45° line (choosing units so that world market prices
for exports and imports equal one), while the domestic offer curve is well-behaved
with an elasticity depending on both elasticity of substitution and transformation.
Hence the problem of identical offer curves arising from the second rule is avoided.
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In contrast to the third rule, the domestic price level is not fully determined by world
market prices (despite the small-country assumption) due to the Armington
assumption. In a recent study, however, Bhattarai et al. (1999) identify some possible
risks of this fourth closure rule. The authors demonstrate that under specific elasticity
constellations perverse offer curves may arise even in the case of the two-sided
Armington product differentiation structure (exports falling as imports rise with
increasing ratio of export prices to import prices).
In summary, all models described above introduce a fixed trade balance for the
external sector with a flexible exchange rate variable that clears the foreign exchange
market. Alternatively, the exchange rate can be fixed, while the trade balance is
allowed to adjust in order to retain equilibrium on the foreign exchange market. As
Francois and Shiells (1994:32) note, ideally in general equilibrium models the current
and capital accounts and the exchange rate would be determined endogenously.
However, this more complex approach is not widely used in CGE models. A third
alternative – which is chosen for the (real) standard version of the GEM-E3 model
without a money market – is a fixed exchange rate system that is combined with a
fixed or a variable current account. In the first case, the long-term real interest rate
and national prices adjust to satisfy the trade balance equilibrium (see Section 4.3.4);
in the second case, the long-term real interest rate is fixed.
As will be shown in Section 4.3, the trade relations between the EU-14 and the RoW
in the GEM-E3 model integrate elements of the last three external closure rules.
4.2.2 The Armington assumption
CGE trade models differ widely in the specification of import demand. While
imports and competing domestic goods are treated as perfect substitutes in some
models according to the Heckscher-Ohlin model (e.g. in the first and third closure
rule discussed in the previous section), the Armington assumption of national or of
firm level product differentiation is employed in other models.124 Models differ also
with respect to the functional forms used. Some apply nested or non-nested CES
functional forms, while others employ flexible functional forms, such as the almost
ideal demand system (AIDS). Armington (1969) and most CGE modellers gave
                                                
124 In the GREEN model, for example, the Armington specification is implemented for all import
goods apart from crude oil for which homogeneity across countries of origin is assumed. This is
due to relatively low transportation costs, e.g. compared to natural gas or coal (cf. Burniaux et al.
1992).
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preference to CES functions as these require relatively less estimation effort and as
regularity conditions (global concavity) are satisfied. On the other hand, the AIDS
avoids some of the restrictions imposed by the CES by giving up constancy and
pairwise equality of substitution elasticities (see Francois and Shiells 1994, Shiells
and Reinert 1993).
However, the majority of empirically based CGE models have introduced the
Armington assumption of national product differentiation on the import side,
frequently using CES functions with two levels of nesting (cf. Lächler 1985:74,
Shiells and Reinert 1993:300).125 The nested specification includes an upper-level
function that specifies a country’s demand for the composite of imports (aggregated
over all countries) relative to domestic substitutes (see equation (4-10) in
Section 4.3.1). The lower-level function defines allocation of imports on competing
foreign sources, i.e. countries (see equation (4-12) in Section 4.3.1).
The upper-level Armington elasticity measures the sensitivity of a country’s or
industry’s competitive position in international trade and controls the degree to which
the country’s price system is ruled by foreign prices. The higher the sectoral upper-
level elasticity is, the higher the degree of demand responsiveness to relative prices.
Ultimately, the Armington assumption gives small-country models more reality,
since it provides a certain degree of autonomy in the domestic price system while
preserving all the features of standard neo-classical models (cf. de Melo and
Robinson 1989:56).
In practice, the wide use of the Armington assumption is motivated by two further
advantages. First, it addresses the phenomenon of intra-industry trade flows which is
increasingly observable in the international trade data. Instead of increasing
specialisation countries simultaneously increase exports and imports of goods that
are classified in the same commodity category, even if an industry is highly
disaggregated. This phenomenon of cross-hauling can be explained, for example, by
qualitative differences between domestic and foreign goods or transportation costs. A
second reason for the popularity of the Armington assumption is that difficulties,
                                                
125 Some CGE models, for example the Deardorff and Stern model, assume a single level CES
function, where domestic production competes with an aggregate of imports (Deardorff and
Stern 1981). Other CGE models, for example the models of Cox and Harris (1992), Sobarzo
(1992), and Roland-Holst et al. (1992), have adopted the non-nested specification in order to
describe national product differentiation. In this case the two-tiered utility function is fitted
together into one level by assuming that utility is a function of domestic output and imports from
each separate source (Shiells and Reinert 1993:301,303).
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such as unrealistically extreme specialisation effects due to homogeneous products
and linear production possibility frontiers, can be avoided (see Shoven and Whalley
1992:230, de Melo and Robinson 1989:49).
Among economists and econometricians, however, scepticism of the Armington
concept has arisen. Some argue that the empirical relevance of cross-hauling mainly
depends on the level of data disaggregation. Thus the main goal is to determine
which aggregation level is appropriate for the concept of an industry (cf. Lächler
1985:75). Additionally, some authors describe the Armington approach as a “simple,
restricted and ad hoc (but effective) means of capturing the rigidities apparent in
observed trade flows patterns” (Abbott 1988:67). Similarly, Norman (1990:726)
argues that: “Typically, the Armington approach is used within perfectly competitive
models; and must be regarded as a purely ad hoc means of describing intra-industry
trade flows and reducing the sensitivity of trade flows to changes in relative prices –
essentially, it is an attempt to capture supply-side imperfections through modification
of the model demand side“. In their general equilibrium model Trela and Whalley
(1994:263) also refrain from using the Armington assumption and treat products as
homogeneous referring to the “strong and often artificial terms-of-trade effects“ that
the Armington assumption induces in numerical results.
Nevertheless, as long as heterogeneous products are not modelled explicitly, the
Armington assumption is a useful approximation to reality. This is why I maintain it
in the GEM-E3 model for the import side.
4.3 Specification of foreign trade in GEM-E3 EU-14
Table 22 illustrates the characteristics of the foreign trade system of the GEM-E3
EU-14 model.
International prices that clear domestic and foreign product markets are not
completely determined by the model but are partly exogenous. World import demand
depends exclusively on international terms of trade and does not include any variable
measuring the RoW’s economic performance, e.g. in terms of world income.
Section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 describe the EU countries’ and the RoW’s export and import
supply and demand functions that are incorporated in GEM-E3. Section 4.3.3 deals
with the specification of Armington elasticity parameters. The ‘closure’ of the
external sector system through the balance-of-payments constraint is explained in
Section 4.3.4.
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Table 22: Characteristics of the foreign trade specification in GEM-E3 EU-14
Export supply
EU-14 - finite price elastic - finite price elastic 
- depends on international price 
relations and EU economic 
performance (e.g. income)
- export prices given by 
cost-covering domestic 
production prices 
- Armington assumption
RoW - finite price elastic - perfectly price elastic
- depends on international price 
relations
- exogenous
-
Armington assumption
Import demand
4.3.1 Foreign trade system: EU countries
Import demand
The specification of the import demand of each EU country for tradable commodities
is based on the Armington model of national product differentiation which is
combined with the two stage nested CES specification.126 It is assumed that the
allocation of expenditure for tradable goods takes place in two stages. At the upper
level of substitution, expenditure is allocated between domestic demand of
domestically produced goods and an aggregate of imported goods from all sources.
At the lower level, the expenditure for the import composite is allocated by origin,
i.e. imports are distinguished by place of production (other EU countries and
RoW).127
The import function for EU country c is derived at the first level of substitution. The
price for domestic supply, 
cYp , in country c is given as a CES aggregate of the
import price, 
cIMp , and of the price of domestically demanded and produced goods,
cXDp :
                                                
126 The specification of the import demand for tradable goods takes into account that a fixed share
of sectoral imports is non-competitive, i.e. it is not determined by relative prices according to the
Armington substitution elasticity. In the actual GEM-E3 model version, this share is uniformly
set to 0.5 for all countries and sectors. Non-competitive imports reflect these amounts of goods
which cannot be substituted by domestic production. Demand of non-competitive imports is
therefore price inelastic and depends on the domestic production level. The import demand for
non-tradable goods is specified in close analogy to the demand of non-competitive imports (see
Appendix II-A).
127 In order to keep the notation as simple as possible, the sector specific indices are not explicitly
noted in the following equations.
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Applying Shephard’s lemma to the unit cost function yields the demand function for
competitive imports of EU country c:
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cIMC  are competitive imports and Yc  is domestic supply in country c. The share
parameters 
cIMCδ and cXDδ  are calibrated to the benchmark data. cYσ  denotes the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods (upper-level Armington
elasticity) which is assumed to be equal across countries in the GEM-E3 model
( 14,,1, =∀= ccYcY σσ ). Imports and domestic production are complements for
0→Yσ , while they are perfect substitutes for ∞→Yσ . The latter case corresponds
to the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
At the second level of substitution, import demand for each good is distinguished by
place of production. Hence the aggregate import demand must be allocated to the 14
EU-member countries and to RoW. An import unit cost function in the CES
functional form is expressed by
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where kcIMPp ,  represents the price of imports in country c for goods produced in
country k. Since there are import taxes and duties, dutkct , , it follows that
)1(
,,,
dut
kckckEXkcIMP tepp +⋅⋅= ; kEXp  is the price in currency of country k for exports
(no price differentiation between destinations), and ec k,  denotes the nominal
exchange rate in the currency of country c per unit of currency of country k. The
nominal exchange rates ec k,  are fixed and are used exclusively to convert currencies.
kcIMP ,δ  represent share parameters which are specified by calibration. cIMσ  denotes
the lower-level elasticity of substitution between imports from different EU countries
and RoW. Since 
cIM
σ  is assumed to be equal for all EU countries, we have
.14,,1, =∀= ccIMcIM σσ
A cost-minimising composition of the import aggregate with respect to countries of
origin is given by the following equation:
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where IMPc k,  denotes the imports of country c coming from country k in country c’s
currency. IMc comprises competitive and non-competitive imports of country c.
The demand function of the EU as a whole for imported goods from RoW is the
aggregate of all imports from non-EU countries demanded by EU countries, i.e.
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As ce  denotes the price of currency of country c in ECU, IMEU row,  is expressed in
ECU.
Demand for exports
Each EU country k is faced with a downward sloping export demand curve for all
commodities. The demand for the exports of country k is the sum of the
corresponding import demands across all other EU countries and RoW. Exports enter
the product market equilibrium condition:
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Export supply
The EU-14 version of the GEM-E3 model is characterised by asymmetric product
differentiation: Product differentiation is introduced for the import side by means of
the Armington assumption on the first and second level, but not for the export side.
Domestically produced goods sold on the domestic market are perfect substitutes for
goods that are sold on EU and RoW export markets.128 Furthermore, no assumption
is made about a differentiation of exports by export markets. Exports enter a trade
pool and are distributed according to the demands of import countries. A country’s
sectoral export price is thus not differentiated by importing countries.
Domestic producers of country c supply exports at the price 
cEXp :
                                                
128 This contrasts with other CGE models and earlier versions of GEM-E3 (see Conrad and Schmidt
1999). The latter and, for example, the model of de Melo and Robinson (1989) specify the
transformation possibilities between domestic market productions and export market productions
by applying a CET (constant elasticity of transformation) function.
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where 
c
xp  is the price of domestically produced goods, and tsub c,  denotes the rate of
export subsidies that is calibrated. 
c
xp  is determined for each EU country by the
internal costs and the zero profit condition.
4.3.2 Foreign trade system: RoW
As previously mentioned, RoW’s production and consumption behaviour is
exogenous. Assuming a fixed price of domestically produced goods, i.e. an infinite
domestic supply elasticity, RoW supplies exports at fixed export prices. Strictly
speaking, with regard to RoW’s exports the EU-14 is a price taker on world markets;
it does not influence RoW’s export prices with its own import demand behaviour.
Import demand
Basically, the RoW’s import demand function is modelled in complete analogy to the
EU countries’ import demand functions. In contrast to this, however, all imports (and
not only the competitive part of tradables) are covered by the Armington
specification. In addition, it is assumed that sectoral upper-level elasticities are
identical to sectoral lower-level elasticities, i.e. rowrowIMrowY σσσ == .
Taking into account that krowkEXkrowIMP epp ,, ⋅=  and considering that world market
prices 
rowXDp  and world domestic demand for domestic goods XDrow  are exogenous,
RoW’s demand for imports from EU country k can be expressed by:
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,
 (calibrated) and 
rowXDp  denotes the price for
domestically demanded and produced goods in RoW. Since 
rowXDp  is exogenous
RoW’s demand for imports from different EU countries depends only on EU country
specific export prices. RoW’s demand for imports from the EU-14 as a whole is:
(4-17) IM IMProw row c
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.
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Demand for exports
As is the case for every EU country, RoW is faced with a negatively sloped demand
function for its exports:
(4-18) crow
c
rowcrow eIMPEX ,
14
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,
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.
Since RoW’s export prices are fixed, demand of EU countries for RoW’s exports
exclusively depends on the price of the import aggregate (and on the level of
aggregated imports).
Export supply
The export supply of RoW is perfectly price elastic. Any amount of goods will be
supplied at export prices which are fixed in foreign exchange terms:
(4-19)
rowEXrowEX pp = .
4.3.3 Specification of Armington elasticities
Table 23 contains upper- and lower-level Armington elasticity values that are used in
EU and RoW import demand for tradable goods in the GEM-E3 standard version.129
Elasticities differ among sectors, but values for each sector are identical across EU
countries.
The upper-level elasticity values of each EU country are greater than 1 for sectors
with a relatively high degree of international competition, such as the energy-
intensive or consumer goods industry, while values of service sectors are set
below 1.130 Note that lower-level elasticity values are set higher than upper-level
elasticities. As Shiells and Reinert (1993) – with reference to Brown (1987) – note,
the two-level nested Armington approach may imply large terms-of-trade effects that
rise with increasing upper-level elasticities relative to the lower-level elasticities.
                                                
129 Non-tradable sectors in EU countries are the sectors (2), (4), (5), (13), and (18).
130 The sector liquid fuels (3) is characterised by an upper-level elasticity value below unity, even if
this sector is characterised by a relatively homogeneous output good and thus by relatively high
competitive pressure. This choice can be explained primarily on the basis of modelling
techniques.
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Thus lower-level elasticities often attain higher values than upper-level elasticities in
empirical trade models in order to avoid large terms-of-trade effects.131
The last column of Table 23 presents values of substitution elasticities that are used
in RoW’s import demand. Lower-level elasticity values are set equal to upper-level
elasticity values. With regard to relative sectoral degrees of substitutability RoW’s
elasticities are specified as being nearly comparable to EU elasticities.
Table 23: Armington elasticity values in GEM-E3 EU-14
EU-14 RoW
GEM-E3 Sector σ Y σ IM σ row
Agriculture (1) 1.2 1.6 1.4
Solid fuels (2) - - 0.6
Liquid fuels (3) 0.6 0.8 0.6
Natural gas (4) - - 0.6
Electricity (5) - - 0.6
Ferrous and non-ferrous metals (6) 1.5 2.4 2.2
Chemical industry (7) 1.5 2.4 2.2
Other energy-intensive ind. (8) 1.5 2.4 2.2
Electrical goods (9) 1.5 2.4 2.2
Transport equipment (10) 1.5 2.4 2.2
Other equipment goods (11) 1.5 2.4 2.2
Consumer goods (12) 1.7 2.8 2.5
Building and construction (13) - - 1.4
Telecommunication services (14) 0.6 1.6 1.4
Transports (15) 1.2 2.4 2.2
Credit and insurance (16) 0.6 1.6 1.4
Other market services (17) 0.6 1.6 1.4
Non-market services (18) - - 0.6
4.3.4 Balance-of-payments equation
The GEM-E3 EU-14 model can be solved either with a binding or a non-binding
balance-of-payments constraint for each of the EU countries or for the EU as a
whole. As nominal exchange rates are fixed, the feedback of a surplus or deficit on
the performance of the EU economy when the constraint is binding is established
through the real long-term interest rate.
                                                
131 In his seven region model Whalley (1985:109) uses, for example, upper-level elasticity values
that are based on literature values of import price elasticities. The lower-level elasticity values
are set for all sectors and regions on a common value of 1.5 that roughly approximates literature
estimates of export price elasticities.
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In the real standard version of the GEM-E3 model, where asset markets and
international capital flows are missing, the balance of payments is reduced to the
current account. The current account surplus (deficit) of EU country c for all traded
or non-traded goods s is defined as the difference between the value of aggregate
exports and the value of aggregate imports. TSc  in (4-20) denotes the trade balance of
country c for a given level of exchange rates (aggregating TSc  over all EU countries
c, c=1,…,14, leads to the current account of EU-14 vis-à-vis RoW):
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In the case of a free variation of the EU current account, the aggregate net EU trade
surplus (deficit) is balanced by a corresponding net currency inflow (outflow).
However, these currency flows affect neither EU equilibrium prices nor quantities.
The market of foreign currency may be unbalanced. Strictly speaking, the model
allows long-lasting external deficits for the EU without considering any feedback on
the domestic economy.
In the case of a binding balance-of-payments constraint, the EU trade surplus (deficit)
in terms of percentage of GDP is fixed at the value of the reference run. In this case,
a feedback of a surplus or deficit on the EU economy is considered in GEM-E3. As
exchange rates are fixed, adjustment mechanisms run through the real long-term
interest rate. An EU current account increase compared to the reference run (which is
computed in the case of a flexible current account but not depicted in Table 24) is
balanced through a decrease of real long-term interest rates in the EU countries.132
This drop reduces long-term capital costs and savings and stimulates capital and
investment demand as well as private consumption. On the demand side of the
economy, the decrease of the real interest rates thus pushes up EU domestic prices.
On the supply side, the increase in investment raises the stock of real capital. Short-
term interest rates that clear markets for real capital will fall, provided that the
demand effect is no longer sufficient to offset the supply effect. Domestic prices rise
just enough to maintain product market equilibrium. When holding foreign prices at a
constant level, a rise in EU prices increases EU imports and diminishes EU exports
                                                
132 In all simulations of this chapter the current account per GDP of EU-14 rises in response to the
tax reform, but the increase is less than 0.1 percentage points compared to the value in the
reference run.
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and therefore reduces the surplus; the terms of trade improve. Table 24 shows that
employment rises less if a balance-of-payments restriction is imposed.
Note that more or less similar adjustment processes can be observed in a model that
includes a monetary sector. A surplus of the balance of payments would also be
eliminated by a decrease in the EU interest rate. Effects on the product markets,
however, would be smaller as the capital account provides an additional mechanism
of adjustment. If EU interest rates decrease, EU citizens will shift their portfolios
towards foreign assets. Thus the equilibrium net capital outflow increases, which in
turn reduces the balance-of-payments surplus additionally. Since a growing trade
surplus would be cushioned by a revaluation of exchange rates, a model with flexible
exchange rates would offer a third adjustment process.
Simulations of an ecological tax reform scenario with the GEM-E3 EU-14 model
reveal that results differ between both cases, the case of a variable and the case of a
fixed current account (see Table 24).
The ecological tax reform scenario applied in the following prescribes an EU-wide
reduction of aggregate CO2 emissions by –10%. In each of the 14 EU-countries I
implement an endogenous tax (with a uniform tax rate) that is levied on CO2
emissions of households and industries. Tax revenue neutrality is guaranteed, since
employers’ social security contributions are reduced to keep the public deficit
constant. This scenario, which is also applied in the following simulations of this
chapter, is called Scenario EU_TAX10.
Simulation results of the standard version with a non-binding current account will be
analysed in detail in the next section. Therefore, at this point I will just mention the
main differences between the constrained and unconstrained specification. In the
unconstrained version, the ecological tax reform produces both a current account
surplus and higher positive employment effects. In the constrained model version, the
feedback mechanism described above leads to comparably higher EU prices and
these lead, in turn, to a greater fall in exports and a lower drop in imports.
While a long-term analysis should consider the feedback mechanism introduced by
the balance-of-payments constraint, a flexible current account seems to be more
reasonable in the short or medium term. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to notice that
the assumption about the flexibility in the current account does not alter the results in
principle. The ecological tax reform defined by Scenario EU_TAX10 generates an
EDD in both a flexible case and a fixed current account case.
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Table 24: Scenario EU_TAX10: macroeconomic aggregates for EU-14,
variable current account and fixed current account (numbers indicate
percent changes from baseline except if defined otherwise)
Macroeconomic aggregates for EU-14
Variable Fixed
current account current account
Gross domestic product -0.04 -0.09
Employment 0.58 0.51
Production -0.57 -0.63
Domestic demand -0.56 -0.52
Private investment -0.18 -0.16
Private consumption 0.21 0.40
Exports -1.02 -1.81
Imports -1.46 -1.05
EU-intra trade -1.20 -1.68
Terms of trade 1.03 1.84
Consumers’ price index 1.19 1.71
GDP deflator in factor prices -0.74 -0.16
CO 2  tax rate (ECU’85)** 22.0 22.3
CO 2  tax revenue* 1.49 1.50
Energy consumption in volume -6.21 -6.22
CO 2 emissions -10.00 -10.00
Equivalent variation (economic welfare) * 0.23 0.37
*  in % of GDP, absolute difference from baseline
** in value figures
4.4 Sensitivity of GEM-E3 model results to foreign trade
specifications
In this section sensitivity analyses are performed with respect to alternative foreign
trade specifications. Three approaches are tested:
– An additional price equation for exports from RoW to EU is introduced. Instead
of fixed world market prices for exports, the EU is now faced with a finite price
elastic export supply function (Section 4.4.1).
– The introduction of a link between the activity levels of domestic (EU) and
foreign (RoW) economies changes the foreign import demand function (Section
4.4.2).
– Variations in the degree of substitution between goods entering the sectoral
aggregate import demand functions of both EU countries and RoW are analysed
(Section 4.4.3).
The sensitivity analyses are based on the Scenario EU_TAX10 defined in the previous
section. As mainly short- and medium-term aspects are considered, the balance of
payments is kept variable. Policy induced impacts are calculated for all variations in
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the foreign trade specification suggested above. The sensitivity of results is analysed
by comparing the results with those produced by the (unchanged) standard version of
the GEM-E3 EU-14 model. For reasons of clarity, the discussion of results
concentrates on selected EU-14 macroeconomic aggregates and sectoral trade flows.
4.4.1 Changes in RoW’s export supply
4.4.1.1 Specification of RoW’s export supply
In this section the assumption of a perfectly price elastic export supply function of
the RoW is given up. A foreign export supply function with a constant own-price
elasticity is introduced instead for each sector (sectoral indices are omitted):
(4-21) ( ) ∞<<⋅= γγ 0,0, rowEXrowrow pEXEX
where EXrow,0 denotes exports of the base year. γ is the RoW’s export supply
elasticity. An increase in the sectoral export price by 1% would increase the supply of
exports by γ %. Solving (4-21) for 
rowEXp  yields:
(4-22) ∞<<



= γ
γ
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0,row
row
rowEX EX
EXp .
In the following, (4-22) is introduced as an additional price equation for all sectors in
the GEM-E3 EU-14 standard model version. Prices of exports from RoW are no
longer fixed; instead they increase with the amount of RoW’s exports, or, because of
(4-18), with the amount of EU-14 imports, respectively. The new specification may
lead to some changes in simulation results, particularly if the policy induced impact
on EU imports is substantial.
The new specification is tested for three alternative parameter values of γ  (see
Table 25). For reasons of simplicity, γ  is not differentiated among sectors.
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Table 25: Values of parameter γ
Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3:
GEM-E3 Sector Standard version of GEM-E3
Halved 
values
Central 
values 
Doubled 
values
1 - 18 ∞ 0.5 1 2
Econometric estimates indicate that the own-price elasticity of export supply is below
unity. Diewert and Morrison (1989:207), for example, find that the own price
elasticity of export supply for the U.S. economy is nearly constant between 0.32 and
0.375 over the sample period 1967-1982. Hence Case 1 with γ = 0 5.  seems to be the
closest to reality and might be interpreted as an upper limit value.
4.4.1.2 Simulation results
The following simulations of an EU-wide ecological tax reform include the cases of a
perfectly elastic export supply function (reflecting the standard version of GEM-E3
EU-14) and of an imperfectly elastic export supply function (as specified in the
previous section). The results are reported in Table 26 in terms of selected
macroeconomic aggregates for EU-14 and in Table 27 in terms of sectoral extra-EU
imports and exports.
The results indicate that the EU-14 as a whole would gain from more flexible export
prices in terms of economic welfare. The lower the own-price elasticity of foreign
export supply, the more the ecological tax reform raises EU-wide economic welfare.
While in the GEM-E3 EU-14 standard version with fixed export prices the welfare
effect of the ecological tax reform is around 0.23% of GDP, it rises to 0.32% in
Case 3, to 0.42% in Case 2 and, finally, to 0.62% in Case 1. The percentage increase
in employment is also the highest in Case 1, where RoW’s export prices are the most
flexible.
Overall, the GDP, production, private investment, private consumption, extra-EU
imports, and energy consumption increase with a declining own-price elasticity of
export supply. For example, the GDP drops in the standard version (γ → ∞ ) by
-0.04% and in Case 3 (γ = 2 ) by –0.01% but rises in Case 2 (γ = 1) by 0.01% and in
Case 1 (γ = 0 5. ) by 0.05%.
The impacts on exports are opposite to those described above. Exports run parallel to
the magnitude of the own-price elasticity of export supply. The reduction rate of
exports is the highest (i.e. the export level is the lowest) in Case 1 (–2.64%) and the
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lowest in the standard version (–1.02%). The volume of intra-trade in the EU reacts
in the same way. Intra-EU trade, defined as intra-EU exports, decreases the most in
Case 1 and the least in the standard version.
All in all, the degree of sensitivity of the results to a variation of the RoW’s export
supply elasticity values is significant, even if an EDD is gained in every case. How
can this be explained? To this end I will take a closer look at what happens in the
standard version of the GEM-E3 EU-14 model when the ecological tax reform is
implemented.
First of all, the EU-wide introduction of a CO2 tax leads to an increase in production
costs, particularly in energy-intensive sectors which produce above-average CO2
emissions. Secondly, labour costs are reduced due to the cut of the rate of employers’
contributions to social security. Hence substitution processes from energy-intensive
capital and energy to labour are launched, i.e. demand for labour increases, this, in
turn, forces real consumer wages in all EU countries to rise. As Table 29
demonstrates, the country specific rises in the real net wage lie within a range of
0.29% to 1.48%, while real non-labour income (i.e. real capital income) declines in
all EU countries. The latter reflects tax shifting effects towards capital. In response to
increasing real wage rates and lower non-wage income, households are willing to
supply more labour. As a result, EU-wide aggregate employment increases by 0.58%.
On the other hand, substitution processes between inputs and losses in production are
responsible for a –6.21% drop in energy consumption. The increase in real disposable
income stimulates consumption demand, which, in turn, pushes up the consumption
price index by 1.19%.
The picture is not as glossy for costs. The EU-wide costs pressure results in a decline
of exports by –1.02%. Import demand decreases as well by –1.46%. This is due to the
fact that the price induced substitution effect from domestic to foreign products is not
high enough to compensate for the negative effect caused by a reduced production.
Table 27, however, shows that sectoral patterns differ. In particular positive growth
rates are observed for exports of fossil fuels which are exempted from taxation. The
decrease in domestic consumption lowers prices and enhances the competitiveness of
fossil fuels.
If RoW’s export prices are specified according to (4-22), the model’s reactions
change as follows:
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As was the case in the standard version, the ecological tax reform leads to an increase
in production costs. Measured in terms of GDP deflator the overall price level is
higher than in the standard case in which world export prices are constant.
Obviously, European producers are able to evade cost pressures more easily by
changing demand patterns and switching to foreign supply in the standard case.
Table 28 indicates that RoW’s export prices rise for almost all sectors with exception
of the energy sectors 2 to 4 in all cases and sectors 5 and 9 in Case 3. Particularly,
foreign suppliers of carbon-intensive fossil fuels suffer big income losses since both
EU import demand and world market prices drop in response to the EU-wide CO2 tax
policy. The size of impact on world market prices increases with the declining own-
price elasticity of export supply, γ .
EU-wide imports develop the exact opposite: Extra-EU imports are higher in the case
of flexible world market prices than in the standard version and even take positive
growth rates in Case 1, where sectoral export prices of RoW are the highest.
According to the Armington assumption underlying the specification of EU import
demand, higher RoW export prices depress import demand, however, on the other
hand, higher domestic prices and higher domestic demand stimulate the demand for
imported goods from RoW. Obviously, the latter effects dominate. Note that the new
specification leads to an increase in the terms of trade, which is the highest in Case 2
with 2.46% and the less in Case 3 with 1.94%. Case 1 lies in the middle with 2.27%.
As already mentioned, the new specification leads to a greater fall in EU-14 exports.
This is due to an additional increase in EU production costs which is caused by
higher prices for RoW’s exports. Producers in the EU now have less possibilities to
cushion the tax induced EU-wide price increase.
As Table 26 shows, positive employment effects are stronger in the case of flexible
RoW’s export prices. This can be easily understood by taking into account that
particularly energy-intensive goods, for which domestic prices rise considerably, will
be substituted to an increasing extent by imported goods from RoW or by input
factors with relatively lower prices, such as labour. As higher world market prices
restrict cost-effective possibilities of a switch to foreign products, the switch to
labour is reinforced. As labour demand rises sharply, real wage rates are pushed up to
a greater extent as well (see Table 29). Thus labour supply and employment increase.
Rising income stimulates consumption of private households, which, in turn, reduces
the negative impact on production. Note that in all cases the positive effect on
consumption outweighs the loss in leisure; hence welfare increases.
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Table 26: Scenario EU_TAX10: macroeconomic aggregates for EU-14,
finite price elastic foreign export supply (numbers indicate percent
changes from baseline except if defined otherwise)
Macroeconomic aggregates for EU-14
Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3:
Standard version of 
GEM-E3  
Halved values 
(γ=0.5)
Central values 
(γ=1)
Doubled values 
(γ=2)
Gross domestic product -0.04 0.05 0.01 -0.01
Employment 0.58 0.82 0.70 0.64
Production -0.57 -0.50 -0.54 -0.56
Domestic demand -0.56 -0.26 -0.41 -0.49
Private investment -0.18 -0.01 -0.09 -0.13
Private consumption 0.21 1.03 0.61 0.41
Exports -1.02 -2.64 -1.81 -1.41
Imports -1.46 0.04 -0.74 -1.11
EU-intra trade -1.20 -2.20 -1.71 -1.47
Terms of trade 1.03 2.27 2.46 1.94
Consumers’ price index 1.19 6.51 3.02 1.92
GDP deflator in factor prices -0.74 4.50 1.05 -0.04
CO 2  tax rate (ECU’85)** 22.0 29.8 26.0 24.10
CO 2  tax revenue* 1.49 1.91 1.72 1.62
Energy consumption in volume -6.21 -5.80 -6.01 -6.12
CO 2 emissions -10.00 -10.00 -10.00 -10.00
Equivalent variation (economic welfare) * 0.23 0.62 0.42 0.32
*  in % of GDP, absolute difference from baseline
** in value figures
Table 27: Scenario EU_TAX10: extra-EU imports and extra-EU exports,
finite price elastic foreign export supply (numbers indicate percent
changes from baseline)
Extra-EU imports (EU-14) Extra-EU exports (EU-14)
Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3: Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3:
GEM-E3 Sector
Standard 
version of 
GEM-E3 
Halved 
values 
(γ=0.5)
Central 
values 
(γ=1)
Doubled 
values 
(γ=2)
Standard 
version of 
GEM-E3 
Halved 
values 
(γ=0.5)
Central 
values 
(γ=1)
Doubled 
values 
(γ=2)
Agriculture (1)        
Solid fuels (2)        
Liquid fuels (3)        
Natural gas (4)        
Electricity (5)        
Ferrous and non-ferrous metals (6)        
Chemical industry (7)        
Other energy-intensive ind. (8)        
Electrical goods (9)        
Transport equipment (10)        
Other equipment goods (11)        
Consumer goods (12)        
Building and construction (13)        
Telecommunication services (14)        
Transports (15)        
Credit and insurance (16)        
Other market services (17)        
Non-market services (18)        
All sectors        
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Table 28: Scenario EU_TAX10: sectoral export prices of RoW,
finite price elastic foreign export supply (numbers indicate percent
changes from baseline)
Sectoral export prices of RoW
Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3:
GEM-E3 Sector
Standard 
version of 
GEM-E3
Halved 
values 
(γ=0.5)
Central 
values 
(γ=1)
Doubled 
values 
(γ=2)
Agriculture (1) 0.00 3.64 1.14 0.43
Solid fuels (2) 0.00 -36.48 -22.63 -12.87
Liquid fuels (3) 0.00 -5.30 -3.54 -2.00
Natural gas (4) 0.00 -5.87 -3.58 -1.93
Electricity (5) 0.00 1.67 0.18 -0.05
Ferrous and non-ferrous metals (6) 0.00 5.10 2.11 1.05
Chemical industry (7) 0.00 4.25 1.55 0.70
Other energy-intensive ind. (8) 0.00 4.31 1.39 0.53
Electrical goods (9) 0.00 2.89 0.48 -0.03
Transport equipment (10) 0.00 4.36 1.26 0.38
Other equipment goods (11) 0.00 3.40 0.77 0.12
Consumer goods (12) 0.00 4.23 1.37 0.53
Building and construction (13) 0.00 1.98 0.39 0.07
Telecommunication services (14) 0.00 3.72 1.00 0.29
Transports (15) 0.00 3.99 1.32 0.54
Credit and insurance (16) 0.00 3.66 0.85 0.14
Other market services (17) 0.00 4.73 1.49 0.53
Non-market services (18) 0.00 2.78 0.73 0.23
Table 29: Scenario EU_TAX10: real consumer wage and real non-wage income,
finite price elastic foreign export supply (numbers indicate percent
changes from baseline)
Real consumer wage Real non-wage income
Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3: Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3:
Standard 
version of 
GEM-E3
Halved 
values 
(γ=0.5)
Central 
values 
(γ=1)
Doubled 
values 
(γ=2)
Standard 
version of 
GEM-E3 
Halved 
values 
(γ=0.5)
Central 
values 
(γ=1)
Doubled 
values 
(γ=2)
Austria 1.05 2.73 1.93 1.51 -0.70 0.49 -0.19 -0.45
Belgium 1.48 3.32 2.43 1.98 -0.30 0.37 0.03 -0.13
Germany 0.99 2.25 1.59 1.28 -0.68 -0.29 -0.51 -0.60
Denmark 1.15 2.96 2.15 1.69 -0.52 0.70 0.01 -0.28
Finland 0.83 1.83 1.30 1.06 -0.78 -0.07 -0.52 -0.67
France 0.67 1.88 1.29 0.99 -0.53 -0.04 -0.29 -0.41
Greece 0.29 0.94 0.67 0.50 -1.20 -1.86 -1.40 -1.27
Ireland 0.71 2.36 1.57 1.15 -0.39 1.33 0.29 -0.09
Italy 0.52 1.88 1.19 0.85 -0.73 -0.18 -0.47 -0.61
Netherlands 0.82 1.94 1.36 1.09 -0.33 0.01 -0.18 -0.25
Portugal 0.51 0.99 0.80 0.67 -0.90 -1.10 -0.96 -0.92
Spain 1.17 2.62 1.91 1.55 -0.99 -0.30 -0.65 -0.81
Sweden 0.99 2.48 1.72 1.35 -0.31 0.58 0.05 -0.15
Un. Kingdom 1.14 1.94 1.53 1.33 -1.45 -1.87 -1.68 -1.57
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4.4.2 Changes in RoW’s import demand
4.4.2.1 Specification of RoW’s import demand
In the standard version of the GEM-E3 EU-14 model neither production and
consumption nor domestic supply in RoW is endogenous. The domestic demand for
domestically produced goods that enter RoW’s import demand function is given as
well. Hence no linkage to the economy’s activity level (i.e. no income effects) is
considered in RoW’s import demand specification. In contrast to the EU import
demand specification, import demand of RoW exclusively depends on relative prices
(terms of trade).
The idea behind the specification presented below is to introduce an additional
endogenous variable in the foreign import demand function that measures the
economic performance of RoW. Since in the GEM-E3 EU-14 standard version
production of RoW is fixed, RoW’s exports are used as ‘activity variable’ entering
import demand. However, as RoW’s actual exports are completely determined by
import demand of EU-14, RoW’s import demand is no longer influenced exclusively
by EU country specific export prices, but also by the amount of imports demanded by
EU-14.
The proposed specification represents a rough attempt to provide RoW’s import
demand function with more flexibility and empirical evidence by taking into account
economic interactions between the EU and RoW. If in reality, for instance, the
economy of EU-14 expands and income rises, EU imports will also rise because part
of the additional income will be spent for additional imports. This implies a rise in
the RoW’s exports. Up to this point, the interactions have been covered by the
standard model version. In addition to this, however, an actual increase in RoW’s
exports would result in an increase in RoW’s income and therefore in an increase in
RoW’s import demand as well. This feedback mechanism which is ignored in the
standard model version has been included in the new specification presented in the
following.
The specification of the RoW’s demand for domestically produced and demanded
goods, rowXD , will be changed by relating RoW’s production to RoW’s exports. First
of all, I will assume that production in RoW, rowx , is a function of RoW’s exports,
rowEX :
(4-23) ϕβ )( rowrow EXx ⋅= .
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ϕ  may be interpreted as the elasticity of RoW’s production with respect to RoW’s
exports; it measures the degree of linkage between the EU and foreign economies. It
is assumed that the share of RoW’s exports in RoW’s production, θ , is fixed, as is
the share of domestically sold and domestically produced goods in domestic
production, ( )1− θ . Substituting (4-23) in (4-16) on the basis of this assumption leads
to (4-24):
(4-24) ,14,...,1,)(
,
,
=∀


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⋅⋅= kk
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EXIMP
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)1(  is calibrated to the observed benchmark data.
In order to specify ϕ , (4-23) is used as a regression equation with RoW’s exports as
the explanatory (exogenous) variable and RoW’s production as the dependent
(endogenous) variable. The regression coefficients β  and ϕ  are estimated by the
least-squares method. The empirical data base is constituted by time series of RoW’s
exports and production indices (see Table 42 in Appendix II-B). There is a lack of
data concerning production data of the GEM-E3 sectors agriculture (1), building and
construction (13), telecommunication services (14), transports (15), credit and
insurance (16), other market services (17), and non-market services (18).
The elasticity ϕ  is estimated for energy-intensive goods industries (sectors 6, 7, 8)
( 47.0ˆ =ϕ ), equipment goods industries (sectors 9, 10, 11) ( 57.0ˆ =ϕ ) and consumer
goods industries (sector 12) ( 25.0ˆ =ϕ ). The elasticity values of the remaining sectors
are calculated as a linear average of these three estimates ( 43.0=ϕ ).
Table 30: Sectoral values of parameter ϕ
Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3:
GEM-E3 Sector Standard version 
of GEM-E3
Halved 
values  
Central 
values 
Doubled 
values 
1 - 5, 13 - 18 0 0.22 0.43 0.86
6 - 8 0 0.24 0.47 0.94
9 - 11 0 0.29 0.57 1.14
12 0 0.13 0.25 0.50
The sectoral estimates of ϕ  are used as central values in the sensitivity analyses
below; they are halved and doubled (Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3 in Table 30). Case 0
represents the standard version of the GEM-E3 EU-14 model, in which ϕ  is set
equal to zero for all sectors.
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4.4.2.2 Simulation results
Simulation results of the Scenario EU-TAX10 are reported in Table 31 for
macroeconomic aggregates and in Table 32 for sectoral trade flows. The introduction
of a linkage between production and exports has only slight impacts on the model
results. The impacts are the greatest in Case 3, where the feedback parameter, ϕ ,
attains the highest values.
No changes can be observed with respect to the GDP. The percentage reduction rate
of –0.04% remains the same in all cases. In Case 3, the fall in imports (-1.24%) and
the GDP deflator in factor prices (–0.38%) is slightly cushioned. EU-wide economic
welfare is not much affected by a variation of ϕ . However, economic welfare as
percentage of the GDP increases in Case 3 by 0.25%, compared to the reference
scenario. Compared to the standard version, economic welfare rises by 0.02
percentage points, or by 10% respectively.
These differences in results can be explained as follows. In Section 4.4.1.2 I argued
that the ecological tax reform brings about a rise in production costs and in consumer
prices for domestically produced goods. As a result, domestic demand and exports
are reduced. This reduction is responsible for a decrease in the overall production
level in EU-14 together with the decline in exports. Thus the quantity of imports
demanded, or the quantity of RoW’s exports respectively, are reduced as well, since
the substitution effect from domestic to foreign goods is not large enough to
compensate the negative income effect in EU-14. According to the new import
demand specification, production in RoW decreases if RoW’s exports are reduced,
and thus RoW’s imports, or EU-14 exports respectively, go down, too.
Ultimately, aggregate exports of EU-14 are forced back further if RoW’s import
demand is modelled in a way that it depends on RoW’s exports. According to
Table 31 exports fall by –1.02% only in the standard case, while in Case 1 to 3 they
are reduced by –1.04%, or –1.05% respectively.
To summarise, in the modified model version a reduction of EU-14 imports has a
negative effect on imports of RoW (all other variables being held constant). This
negative effect grows with ϕ , i.e. with the degree of linkage between RoW’s exports
and imports.
However, in contrast to its impact on aggregate exports, the new specification softens
the fall of aggregate imports. While imports are reduced by –1.46% in the standard
case, they show a slightly smaller decrease in Case 2 and 3. In particular, imports
only fall by –1.24% in Case 3. As Table 32 indicates, this pattern is also evident for
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the development of sectoral imports (apart from a few exceptions, e.g. solid fuels and
liquid fuels). The increased import level (with growing values of ϕ ) can be
explained with the rise of the terms of trade and higher domestic demand. The
consumer price index changes by 1.19% in Case 0 and goes up by 1.22% in Case 1,
to 1.27% in Case 2, and to 1.55% in Case 3. This increase is explained by declining
EU-14 exports due to the setting of . As prices of exported goods include (to a
certain degree) tax payments which have been paid by European producers, the tax
burden share that can be shifted indirectly abroad declines with decreasing exports.
Consequently, if exports go down, European consumers themselves must bear a
greater part of the CO2 tax burden.
Employment rises slightly with increasing ϕ  values from 0.58% in Case 0 to 0.60%
in Case 3. As production falls in all cases by nearly the same percentage rate, the
increase in employment must be explained mainly by a higher substitution effect
from energy and energy-intensive products to labour.
All in all, the impact of the changed import demand specification is very low.
Certainly, impacts will be stronger if higher values for ϕ  are chosen. But the strength
of the feedback between EU imports and RoW imports should not be overestimated.
While the specification must be interpreted with reservations, there is not enough
evidence to support it for higher ϕ  values.
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Table 31: Scenario EU_TAX10: macroeconomic aggregates for EU-14,
changed RoW’s import demand (numbers indicate percent changes from
baseline except if defined otherwise)
Macroeconomic aggregates for EU-14
Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3:
Standard version of 
GEM-E3 Halved values
Central 
values 
Doubled 
values 
Gross domestic product -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
Employment 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.60
Production -0.57 -0.58 -0.57 -0.58
Domestic demand -0.56 -0.56 -0.55 -0.54
Private investment -0.18 -0.17 -0.17 -0.15
Private consumption 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.26
Exports -1.02 -1.04 -1.05 -1.05
Imports -1.46 -1.46 -1.44 -1.24
EU-intra trade -1.20 -1.23 -1.27 -1.36
Terms of trade 1.03 1.05 1.06 1.06
Consumers’ price index 1.19 1.22 1.27 1.55
GDP deflator in factor prices -0.74 -0.71 -0.67 -0.38
CO 2  tax rate (ECU’85)** 22.0 22.1 22.2 22.6
CO 2  tax revenue* 1.49 1.50 1.50 1.52
Energy consumption in volume -6.21 -6.24 -6.27 -6.31
CO 2 emissions -10.00 -10.00 -10.00 -10.00
Equivalent variation (economic welfare) * 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.25
*  in % of GDP, absolute difference from baseline
** in value figures
Table 32: Scenario EU_TAX10: extra-EU imports and extra-EU exports,
changed RoW’s import demand (numbers indicate percent changes from
baseline)
Extra-EU imports (EU-14) Extra-EU exports (EU-14)
Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3: Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3:
GEM-E3 Sector
Standard 
version of 
GEM-E3 
Halved 
values
Central 
values 
Doubled 
values 
Standard 
version of 
GEM-E3 
Halved 
values 
Central 
values 
Doubled 
values 
Agriculture (1)        
Solid fuels (2)        
Liquid fuels (3)        
Natural gas (4)        
Electricity (5)        
Ferrous and non-ferrous metals (6)        
Chemical industry (7)        
Other energy-intensive ind. (8)        
Electrical goods (9)        
Transport equipment (10)        
Other equipment goods (11)        
Consumer goods (12)        
Building and construction (13)        
Telecommunication services (14)        
Transports (15)        
Credit and insurance (16)        
Other market services (17)        
Non-market services (18)        
All sectors        
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4.4.3 Variation of Armington elasticity values
Armington elasticities may represent a key parameter in CGE models as they affect
substitution possibilities between imported and domestically produced goods and the
own-price elasticity of import demand. One would assume in particular that they
influence the strength of terms-of-trade effects and, along with production and
consumption effects, the policy induced impact on welfare (see Whalley 1985:110).
The choice of elasticity values is thus a critical issue in CGE modelling. While share
parameters are calibrated to the base year’s observed data set in the GEM-E3 model,
the values of sector and country specific substitution elasticities need to be specified
from the outside of the model. Direct econometric estimates of substitution
elasticities in foreign trade, especially at the required sectoral aggregation level, are
rarely available in literature. Thus CGE models often rely on ‘best guess’ estimates.
Frequently, values are derived indirectly from estimates of import price elasticities
for which substantial and disaggregated data exist in the empirical trade literature
(see Fehr et al. 1995:157, Shoven and Whalley 1984:1042, Deardorff and Stern 1981,
Shiells et al. 1986).133 Literature, however, offers a wide range of substitution and
import price elasticity values. Differences in results can be mainly explained by
different import demand specifications and varying estimation methods (cf. Kohli
1982, Thursby and Thursby 1988). Hence sensitivity analysis on the degree of
substitution is a common procedure to gain insights into the robustness of results and
the model’s reactions to alternative parameter values.
Section 4.4.3.1 provides a short literature survey on econometric estimates of
Armington elasticities. In Section 4.4.3.2 and Section 4.4.3.3 I calculate sets of
country and sector specific Armington elasticity values. These values are compared
with the elasticity values actually used in the standard version of the GEM-E3 EU-14
model. Finally, I test the sensitivity of model results to alternative elasticity values.
4.4.3.1 Literature survey of empirical studies
Despite the popularity of the Armington concept, only few studies on direct
econometric estimates of substitution elasticities have been published. Elasticities of
upper-level substitution between imported and domestic goods are estimated, for
example, by Shiells et al. (1986) and Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992). Further
                                                
133 The compendium of estimates of trade elasticities provided by Stern et al. (1976) is still widely
used.
137
examples are the studies of Shiells and Reinert (1993), who estimate lower-level
elasticities and non-nested elasticities, and of Sobarzo (1994) and Roland-Holst et al.
(1994). The estimated values from the literature are difficult to compare since the
sectoral aggregation levels differ considerably according to the statistical data base
used.
A study for Germany is provided by Lächler (1985). Lächler estimates disaggregated
substitution elasticities between demand for imports and domestic substitutes in
Germany. He finds that it is precisely the primary goods industry consisting of
relatively homogeneous and easily replaceable goods and facing fierce international
competition that has the highest elasticity ranking. Apart from two exceptions,
elasticity values range from 0.23 to 2.25. In contrast, technological rigidities restrict
the substitutability in the case of the investment goods sector and particularly in the
case of capital goods in the short run; thus, elasticity values are rather low and range
between –2.28 to 1.21. Finally, the sectors that are classified as belonging to the
consumption goods industry differ with respect to the degree of international
competitive pressure. This is reflected in wide differences in measured substitution
elasticities (–0.70 to 1.09).
Likewise, Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992) present substitution elasticities between
imported and domestic goods for 163 U.S. mining and manufacturing sectors. Their
estimation is based on U.S. trade time series data of both prices of domestic and
imported goods, and real values of domestic sales of domestic goods and imports. In
about two-thirds of the cases, Reinert and Roland-Holst obtain positive and
statistically significant estimates ranging from 0.14 to 3.49. Their results allow the
conclusion that (at the particular level of aggregation chosen) imports and U.S.
domestic products are far from being perfect substitutes.
Furthermore, Shiells et al. (1986) published estimates of own-price elasticities of
import demand for 122 3-digit SIC U.S. industries (covering mainly mining and
manufacturing sectors) that serve, in turn, as a basis for inferring upper-level
Armington substitution elasticities. The estimations are based on annual data over the
period 1962-1978. In 48 cases, positive and statistically significant substitution
elasticities are obtained that lie in a range from 0.45 for SIC 208 (‘beverages’) to
32.13 for SIC 373 (‘yachts’).
Shiells and Reinert (1993) estimate both lower-level nested and non-nested
substitution elasticities among U.S. imports (from Mexico, Canada, RoW) and
competing domestic production for 22 mining and manufacturing sectors.
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Estimations are based on quarterly data for 1980-88. In the non-nested specification,
U.S. imports from Mexico, Canada, and RoW as well as domestic substitutes enter a
single CES function. The estimates of the non-nested substitution elasticities range
from 0.10 (sector ‘primary lead, zinc, and non-ferrous metals’) to 1.49 (sector
‘primary aluminium’). The nested specification is composed of an upper-level CES
aggregation function for U.S. imports as a whole and a lower-level CES aggregate
function for the various import sources, i.e. lower-level substitution elasticities are
present in U.S. imports from Mexico, Canada, and RoW. Estimates range from 0.04
(sector ‘clay, ceramic, and non-metallic minerals’) to 2.97 (sector ‘iron, and
ferroalloy ores mining’).
A comparison of estimates for non-nested, lower-level and upper-level elasticities for
selected sectors taken from Shiells and Reinert (1993) and Reinert and Roland-Holst
(1992) show that values differ. While the non-nested estimates lie mainly above the
upper-level estimates, they are lower than the lower-level estimates in half of the
cases and higher than these in the other half of the cases. Lower-level elasticities are
not generally higher than upper-level elasticities; only in about two thirds of the
sectoral cases do they exceed the upper-level values. However, the range of positive
values (0.04-2.97) is larger in the case of lower-level estimates than in the case of the
non-nested specification (0.1-1.49) and in the case of upper-level estimates (0.02-
1.22).
All in all, the sectoral values used in the GEM-E3 model are close to the typical
values found in literature. In most cases, the estimates arise from U.S. data, whereas
there are no estimates available for EU countries in literature. In the following two
sections, literature based values are thus broken down to the country and sector
specific aggregation scheme used in the GEM-E3 model. This breakdown is based on
values presented in Shiells et al. (1986).
4.4.3.2 Variation of Armington elasticities: RoW
4.4.3.2.1 Specification of Armington elasticities
There are four variations of upper-level substitution elasticities taken into
consideration in Table 33 that are used for subsequent sensitivity analyses. The first
column contains the values of the standard version of the GEM-E3 model (Case 0)
on which sensitivity analyses are performed. In Case 1, all sectoral elasticity values
are halved from those used in the standard model. In Case 2, values are doubled. The
fourth and the fifth columns depict ‘best guess’ estimates (Case 3) as well as
econometric estimates (Case 4), both taken from the Shiells et al. study (1986). As
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this study is based on the three-digit ISIC classification, the values are aggregated
according to the GEM-E3 18-sector scheme using 1988 RoW’s import shares as
weights. U.S. literature based estimates are taken as crude proxy for the RoW’s
behaviour. Unfortunately, the data base provided by Shiells et al. is not sufficient to
calculate elasticity values for all GEM-E3 sectors. Since no elasticity values are
available for sectors 1, 3, 4, and sectors 13 to 18, the corresponding sectoral values
from the standard specification (Case 0) are used.
Table 33: Sectoral values of upper-level Armington elasticities in
RoW’s import demand
Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3: Case 4:
GEM-E3 Sector Standard version 
of GEM-E3
Halved 
values 
Doubled 
values 
U.S. ’best 
guess’ 
estimates *
U.S. 
econometric 
estimates **
Agriculture (1) 1.40 0.70 2.80 1.40 1.40
Solid fuels (2) 0.60 0.30 1.20 2.36 7.12
Liquid fuels (3) 0.60 0.30 1.20 2.36 -0.34
Natural gas (4) 0.60 0.30 1.20 0.60 0.60
Electricity (5) 0.60 0.30 1.20 0.60 0.60
Ferrous and non-ferrous metals (6) 2.20 1.10 4.40 1.44 2.44
Chemical industry (7) 2.20 1.10 4.40 2.61 9.40
Other energy-intensive ind. (8) 2.20 1.10 4.40 2.91 1.78
Electrical goods (9) 2.20 1.10 4.40 2.11 7.46
Transport equipment (10) 2.20 1.10 4.40 3.59 2.01
Other equipment goods (11) 2.20 1.10 4.40 1.07 3.20
Consumer goods (12) 2.50 1.25 5.00 2.07 2.65
Building and construction (13) 1.40 0.70 2.80 1.40 1.40
Telecommunication services (14) 1.40 0.70 2.80 1.40 1.40
Transports (15) 2.20 1.10 4.40 2.20 2.20
Credit and insurance (16) 1.40 0.70 2.80 1.40 1.40
Other market services (17) 1.40 0.70 2.80 1.40 1.40
Non-market services (18) 0.60 0.30 1.20 0.60 0.60
*Based on ‘best guess’ U.S. estimates constructed by Shiells et al. (1986), weighted by 1988
import shares of RoW. **Based on U.S. econometric estimates of sector specific
substitution elasticities provided by Shiells et al. (1986), weighted by 1988 import shares of
RoW.
4.4.3.2.2 Simulation results
Table 34 shows the simulation results of the Scenario EU-TAX10 in terms of
macroeconomic aggregates for the various cases defined in Table 33. Table 35
depicts the results in terms of sectoral imports and exports.
The variations in elasticity values have some impact on the results, but, seen as a
whole, the percentage change of quantities, related to the standard case, lies within a
range of ±0.5 percentage points. Nor is the sensitivity of economic welfare and
employment to alternative parameter values very high. With declining Armington
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elasticity values in foreign import demand, i.e. lessening foreign sector reactions to
increasing production prices in the EU economy, the EU obviously gains more and
more from the ecological tax reform policy in terms of economic welfare. In other
words, lower Armington elasticities in the RoW import demand function offer
greater possibilities of shifting the tax burden abroad.
In the following, I discuss the basic mechanisms that are triggered by a variation of
the degree of substitutability in RoW’s import demand.
In Case 1, where values of the sectoral upper-level Armington elasticities are halved,
RoW shows weaker reactions to an increase in EU export prices. Although in the
standard case exports fall by –1.02%, they are reduced by only –0.92% in the case of
halved elasticity values. This reflects the lower degree of substitutability between
domestic and foreign production in RoW’s import demand. Exports, however,
develop in different ways at a sectoral level (Table 35). While exports are reduced
less compared to the standard case for some sectors, they show a higher reduction
rate, or diminished growth rates, respectively (fossil fuel sectors), for some other
branches (e.g. electrical goods, equipment and consumer goods industries, transports
and both service sectors). The increase in world demand for EU exports in Case 1
compared to Case 0 is the main reason for a comparatively lower drop in the GDP
deflator. Prices for domestic production and consumption are higher in Case 1 than
in the standard case, since both domestic and foreign demand are higher as well. The
slowing down of the price decrease in EU-14 in Case 1 results in a relatively higher
import demand. As exports, investment, and consumption settle down (all at a higher
level in Case 1 than in Case 0), production and GDP both rise (–0.56% reduction of
production in Case 1 instead of –0.57% in Case 0, –0.03% reduction of GDP instead
of –0.04%). Thus energy consumption decreases also with a lower rate (–6.18%
compared to –6.21%), and employment rises EU-wide by an additional 0.02
percentage point.
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Table 34: Scenario EU_TAX10: macroeconomic aggregates for EU-14,
variation of upper-level Armington elasticities in RoW’s import demand
(numbers indicate percent changes from baseline except if defined
otherwise)
Macroeconomic aggregates for EU-14
Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3: Case 4:
Standard version of 
GEM-E3 Halved values Doubled values
U.S. ’best guess’ 
estimates
U.S. econometric 
estimates
Gross domestic product -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04
Employment 0.58 0.60 0.56 0.57 0.59
Production -0.57 -0.56 -0.59 0.57 0.58
Domestic demand -0.56 -0.52 -0.58 -0.55 -0.58
Private investment -0.18 -0.15 -0.20 -0.18 -0.19
Private consumption 0.21 0.29 0.15 0.22 0.16
Exports -1.02 -0.92 -1.08 -0.98 -1.12
Imports -1.46 -0.99 -1.73 -1.33 -1.80
EU-intra trade -1.20 -1.26 -1.17 -1.20 -1.21
Terms of trade 1.03 0.93 1.09 0.99 1.13
Consumers’ price index 1.19 1.65 0.93 1.27 0.95
GDP deflator in factor prices -0.74 -0.27 -0.98 -0.63 -1.01
CO 2  tax rate (ECU’85)** 22.0 22.5 21.5 21.9 22.00
CO 2  tax revenue* 1.49 1.52 1.46 1.48 1.49
Energy consumption in volume -6.21 -6.18 -6.23 -6.21 -6.26
CO 2 emissions -10.00 -10.00 -10.00 -10.00 -10.00
Equivalent variation (economic welfare) * 0.23 0.27 0.20 0.24 0.19
*  in % of GDP, absolute difference from baseline
** in value figures
Mechanisms change direction if doubled upper-level elasticity values are introduced
(Case 2). The RoW’s reactions to an increase in relative prices are now stronger than
in the standard case. Consequently, EU exports go down more sharply (by –1.08%).
Due to diminished foreign demand, both EU prices (expressed by the GDP deflator)
and imports fall to a greater extent. Overall, the GDP and production drop further.
While the results in Case 3 lie, like Case 0, somewhere between the two extremes –
i.e. the halved and the doubled value cases – Case 4 causes greater impacts on
exports and imports. Case 4 is characterised by very high elasticity values for some
sectors, e.g. the coal sector, the chemical goods and the electrical goods industry.
Aggregated exports of the EU drop by the highest percentage rate in this case
compared to all other cases. The relatively high reduction of aggregate demand,
expressed by a smaller increase in consumption and a greater decrease in investment
and exports, results in a greater percentage reduction of the GDP deflator. This, in
turn, leads to a larger drop in imports.
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Table 35: Scenario EU_TAX10: extra-EU imports and extra-EU exports,
variation of upper-level Armington elasticities in RoW’s import demand
(numbers indicate percent changes from baseline)
Extra-EU imports (EU-14) Extra-EU exports (EU-14)
Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3: Case 4: Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3: Case 4:
GEM-E3 Sector
Standard 
version of 
GEM-E3
Halved 
values
Doubled 
values
U.S. ’best 
guess’ 
estimates
U.S. econometric 
estimates
Standard 
version of 
GEM-E3
Halved 
values
Doubled 
values
U.S. ’best 
guess’ 
estimates
U.S. econometric 
estimates
Agriculture (1)          
Solid fuels (2)          
Liquid fuels (3)          
Natural gas (4)          
Electricity (5)          
Ferrous and non-ferrous metals (6)          
Chemical industry (7)          
Other energy-intensive ind. (8)          
Electrical goods (9)          
Transport equipment (10)          
Other equipment goods (11)          
Consumer goods (12)          
Building and construction (13)          
Telecommunication services (14)          
Transports (15)          
Credit and insurance (16)          
Other market services (17)          
Non-market services (18)          
All sectors          
4.4.3.3 Variation of Armington elasticities: EU countries
4.4.3.3.1 Specification of Armington elasticities
To the best of my knowledge, no econometric estimates of sector and country
specific substitution elasticities for EU countries are available in the literature. The
required set of Armington elasticities for the 14 EU countries is thus generated
following a procedure proposed by Harrison et al. (1991:100). The procedure
involves three steps:
1. I take the sector specific ‘best guess’ upper-level Armington elasticities for the
U.S. presented in Shiells et al. (1986) as a starting point. Using country specific
import weights (drawn from 1993 data134) country specific average Armington
substitution elasticities, av
cY
σ , are calculated (see Table 37).
2. The country specific average Armington substitution elasticities, av
cY
σ , are then
compared with country specific Armington elasticities, inf
cY
σ , that are inferred
from country specific import price elasticities, 
cPIMIM ,
ε , and from import shares,
cω . While the national import price elasticities are taken from the empirical trade
literature (Stern et al. 1976), the import shares are calculated from the equilibrium
benchmark data set.
                                                
134 United Nations (1993).
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3. Finally, I re-scale the sector specific elasticities for each country so that the
aggregated import weighted elasticity, av
cY
σ , is equal to the country specific
elasticity, inf
cY
σ , which is derived from the national import price elasticity. The
results of the sectorally and nationally disaggregated substitution elasticities are
reported in Table 38.
While step 1 and step 3 are more or less self-explanatory, some comments should be
made on the derivation of the national Armington elasticities from literature based
import price elasticities (step 2).
Obviously, the procedure proposed encounters some problems which arise from the
existence of non-tradable sectors and non-competitive imports in the GEM-E3
model. Import demand of both non-traded and non-competitive commodities is
excluded from the Armington assumption. It is assumed that it is determined not by
price relations, but by the domestic production level and institutional settings, such as
supply contracts. As national import price elasticities taken from literature normally
refer to the national aggregate of import demand (aggregating all sectors), they may
provide a distorted picture of Armington elasticities. This problem, however, is less
important here. Fortunately, the national shares of imports of non-tradable goods in
total imports are low and in the majority of cases below 5% in the GEM-E3 model
(see Table 36). Thus the literature based import price elasticity values are reasonable
approximates for the price elasticity of import demand of tradable goods in the GEM-
E3 model.
Table 36: Country specific import shares of non-tradable commodities
in GEM-E3 EU-14 [%]
Austria 4.14 Ireland 2.29
Belgium 4.02 Italy 4.87
Germany 5.70 Netherlands 1.90
Denmark 3.48 Portugal 0.41
Finland 10.34 Spain 2.92
France 5.36 Sweden 1.00
Greece 0.44 Un. Kingdom 3.26
More importance should be attached to the problem that arises from non-competitive
imports. Given the same import price elasticity value, the assumed share of non-
competitive imports influences the inferred Armington elasticity values, inf
cY
σ ,
decisively. This can be demonstrated by using (4-25) and (4-26) for the derivation of
the Armington elasticities. According to the specification in the GEM-E3 EU-14
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model the price elasticity of the aggregate import demand, 
cPIMIM ,
ε , in EU country c
in terms of the country specific upper-level Armington elasticity, 
cY
σ , and
empirically measurable import shares, cω , is given by
(4-25) ( )1
,
−⋅= ccYcPIMIM
ωσε
if all imports are competitive, and by
(4-26) ( ) ( )


−⋅+−⋅⋅= NCcc
c
c
c
c
c
cY
NC
cPIMIM IM
IMNC
IM
IMC
ωωωσε 1
,
if non-competitive imports exist (see Appendix II-A for the derivation of (4-25) and
(4-26)). cIM  are total (competitive and non-competitive) imports of tradable goods
in country c, cIMC  represent the competitive portion and IMNC  the non-competitive
part. cω  denotes country c’s share of total import expenditure in expenditure on
domestically supplied goods, and NCcω  expresses the ratio of expenditure on only
non-competitive imports to expenditure on domestically produced and demanded
goods, i.e.
ccY
ccIM
c Yp
IMp
⋅
⋅
=ω   and  
ccXD
ccIMNC
c XDp
IMNCp
⋅
⋅
=ω .
For cc IMIMC =  and 0=cIMNC , (4-26) is identical with (4-25).
Table 37 shows that a variation of the share of non-competitive imports in total
imports of tradable goods leads to different Armington elasticity values. In summary,
one can say that the Armington elasticity corresponding to a given import price
elasticity will rise with an increasing share of non-competitive imports. In the GEM-
E3 EU-14 model the shares of non-competitive imports are set equal to 0.5 for all
countries and all sectors. For this reason I will apply the country specific upper-level
Armington elasticities, inf
cY
σ , depicted in the fourth column of Table 37. Keeping in
mind that values of own-price elasticities of import demand vary widely between
alternative import demand specifications (see Kohli 1982), the Armington elasticities
that are derived from the import price elasticities have to be interpreted as crude
approximations. Whalley (1985:103), however, states that import price elasticity
values in the neighbourhood of unity still reflect the current consensus on import
price elasticities.
Finally, re-scaling the average Armington elasticity values av
cY
σ  according to step 3
leads to the final values which are reported in Table 38.
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Table 37: Country specific price and substitution elasticities of import demand for
different shares of non-competitive imports
ε IM,PIM c σ Y c
DY  σ Y c
LQI 
(IMNC c /IM c =0) (IMNC c /IM c =0.5) (IMNC c /IM c =0.8) 
Austria -1.32 2.13 1.88 4.57 10.48
Belgium -0.83 2.13 1.67 5.03 6.53
Germany -0.88 2.12 1.09 2.90 6.09
Denmark -1.05 1.99 1.53 2.61 -10.31
Finland -0.5 2.37 0.62 2.97 3.46
France -1.08 1.63 1.31 2.36 7.31
Greece -1.03 2.15 1.04 2.10 5.24
Ireland -1.37 1.95 1.62 2.65 8.94
Italy -1.03 2.01 1.77 6.39 8.57
Netherlands -0.68 2.03 1.20 3.32 5.63
Portugal -1.03 1.92 1.33 3.05 7.52
Spain -1.03 2.03 1.21 2.63 6.68
Sweden -0.79 2.06 0.80 1.38 1.99
Un. Kingdom -0.65 1.93 0.66 1.17 1.83
* ‘Best guess’ estimates of uncompensated import price elasticities suggested by Stern et al.
(1976:20) and constructed as point estimates for several countries according to the three-
digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). As no data are available for
Greece, Spain, and Portugal, I use Italian data. ** Based on Shiells et al. (1986).***
Elasticities are inferred from (4-25) for IMNC/IM=0 and from (4-26) for IMNC/IM>0.
Import shares ω  and NCω  are based on observed data of the benchmark equilibrium.
Table 38: Sector and country specific upper-level Armington elasticities of
substitution in EU-14 import demand
GEM-E3 Sector Austria Belgium Germany Denmark Finland France Greece
Liquid fuels (3) 5.1 5.6 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.4 2.3
Ferrous and non-ferrous metal (6) 3.1 3.4 2.0 1.9 1.8 2.1 1.4
Chemical industry (7) 5.6 6.2 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.8 2.5
Other energy-intens. ind. (8) 6.2 6.5 3.7 3.3 3.5 3.8 2.4
Electrical goods (9) 4.5 5.0 2.9 2.8 2.6 3.1 2.1
Transport equipment (10) 7.7 8.5 4.9 4.7 4.5 5.2 3.5
Other equipment goods (11) 2.3 2.5 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.0
Consumer goods (12) 5.2 4.9 3.2 2.6 2.7 2.0 1.9
GEM-E3 Sector Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden Un. Kingdom
Liquid fuels (3) 3.2 7.5 3.9 3.8 3.1 1.6 1.4
Ferrous and non-ferrous metal (6) 2.0 4.6 2.4 2.3 1.9 1.0 0.9
Chemical industry (7) 3.5 8.3 4.3 4.2 3.4 1.7 1.6
Other energy-intens. ind. (8) 3.5 8.3 4.2 3.8 3.4 1.9 1.5
Electrical goods (9) 2.9 6.7 3.5 3.4 2.7 1.4 1.3
Transport equipment (10) 4.9 11.4 5.9 5.7 4.6 2.4 2.2
Other equipment goods (11) 1.4 3.4 1.7 1.7 1.4 0.7 0.6
Consumer goods (12) 2.8 5.9 3.4 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.2
Table 39 reports the values of the upper-level Armington elasticity for which
sensitivity analyses are performed. As in the previous section, the case of doubled
and halved elasticity values are tested. Additionally, the calculated sector and country
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specific values (depicted in Table 38) are applied. The policy underlying the
simulations is again the Scenario EU-TAX10.
Table 39: Sectoral values of upper-level Armington elasticities of substitution in
EU-14 import demand
Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3:
GEM-E3 Sector Standard version 
of GEM-E3
Halved 
values 
Doubled 
values U.S. ’best guess’ estimates 
Agriculture (1) 1.2 0.60 2.40
Liquid fuels (3) 0.6 0.30 1.20 Country and sector
Ferrous and non-ferrous metals (6) 1.5 0.75 3.00 specific values 
Chemical industry (7) 1.5 0.75 3.00
Other energy-intensive ind. (8) 1.5 0.75 3.00 (for sectors 3,  6- 12: 
Electrical goods (9) 1.5 0.75 3.00 values as shown in Table 38;
Transport equipment (10) 1.5 0.75 3.00 for sectors 1, 14-17:
Other equipment goods (11) 1.5 0.75 3.00 values as in standard version)
Consumer goods (12) 1.7 0.85 3.40
Telecommunication services (14) 0.6 0.30 1.20
Transports (15) 1.2 0.60 2.40
Credit and insurance (16) 0.6 0.30 1.20
Other market services (17) 0.6 0.30 1.20
4.4.3.3.2 Simulation results
As Table 40 indicates, the four cases of parameter choice differ only slightly with
respect to macroeconomic impacts. Differences arise mainly in trade flows and price
indices. All other macroeconomic variables reveal only marginal changes. As
consumption and employment remain nearly constant, economic welfare scarcely
varies. One can conclude, however, that the EU-wide ecological tax reform generates
positive employment effects, no matter what parameter is selected. Sectoral trade
flows between EU-14 and RoW are given in Table 41.
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Table 40: Scenario EU_TAX10: macroeconomic aggregates,
Variation of upper-level Armington elasticities in import demand of EU
countries (numbers indicate percent changes from baseline except if
defined otherwise)
Macroeconomic aggregates for EU-14
Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3:
Standard version of 
GEM-E3 Halved values Doubled values
U.S. ’best guess’ 
estimates
Gross domestic product -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
Employment 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57
Production -0.57 -0.57 -0.58 -0.58
Domestic demand -0.56 -0.55 -0.56 -0.56
Private investment -0.18 -0.17 -0.18 -0.18
Private consumption 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20
Exports -1.02 -1.05 -0.97 -1.02
Imports -1.46 -1.48 -1.42 -1.45
EU-intra trade -1.20 -1.25 -1.11 -1.14
Terms of trade 1.03 1.06 0.98 1.03
Consumers’ price index 1.19 1.21 1.16 1.18
GDP deflator in factor prices -0.74 -0.72 -0.77 -0.73
CO 2  tax rate (ECU’85)** 22.0 22.1 21.9 21.9
CO 2  tax revenue* 1.49 1.50 1.49 1.49
Energy consumption in volume -6.21 -6.21 -6.22 -6.25
CO 2 emissions -10.00 -10.00 -10.00 -10.00
Equivalent variation (economic welfare) * 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.23
*  in % of GDP, absolute difference from baseline
** in value figures
The interpretation of results starts with the examination of the pure effects of a
variation of Armington elasticities.
In Case 1, Armington elasticity values in the aggregate import demand of all EU
countries are halved, i.e. substitution possibilities between domestic production and
imports are more restricted for all EU countries. In Case 1, for instance, a policy
induced price increase in European domestic supply will induce a lower substitution
effect than in the standard version, i.e. import demand for tradable goods will
expand, however, not as much as in the standard case. This implies that (relatively
expensive) domestic production has a relatively larger share in overall EU domestic
supply in Case 1. The pure substitution effect leads to relatively higher prices in Case
1. The latter is expressed by a decrease in the GDP deflator by –0.72% (compared to
–0.74% in Case 0).
In Case 2, I argue the other way round. Doubling the Armington elasticities increases
the substitution effect, i.e. a shift in the price relation of domestic supply and imports
results in a comparatively higher demand for imports. Domestic production
constitutes a lower share in domestic supply compared with both Case 0 and Case 1.
This, in turn, results in a decrease in domestic prices. To conclude, the price level is
at its highest in Case 1 and at its lowest in Case 2. Case 0 lies in between.
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Let me reiterate the main mechanisms running in the standard version that already
have been described in Section 4.4.1.2. In the standard model, the ecological tax
reform policy results in a decrease in exports and imports and in a drop in the GDP
deflator (resulting from a decrease in aggregate demand).
As was just mentioned, in the case of halved Armington elasticity values (Case 1) the
drop in the GDP deflator is less significant, i.e. prices are higher. This accurately
reflects the cost effects of a lower degree of substitution for European producers and
consumers. Due to comparably higher prices, EU exports go down. Whereas exports
fall by –1.02% in the standard version, they fall by –1.05% in Case 1. The greater
percentage reduction of imports can be explained by reduced substitution
possibilities in Case 1, i.e. import demand increases more slowly in response to an
increase in domestic production prices.
In the case of doubled Armington elasticities (Case 2) domestic prices are lower.
Thus, exports decline but not as fast (by –0.97% compared to –1.02% in Case 0).
Imports also decrease more slowly (by –1.42% compared to –1.46% in Case 0) due
to the higher substitution possibilities given by doubled elasticity values.
The variation of Armington elasticities according to the calculated set of country and
sector specific parameter values given in Table 38 (Case 3) indicates that impacts lie
between those of Case 1 and Case 2.
Table 43 and Table 44 in Appendix II-B illustrate the impacts of the ecological tax
reform at a national level for the standard case and for Case 3. While economic
welfare goes down in Greece, Italy, and Portugal, all EU countries without exception
gain in terms of employment.
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Table 41: Scenario EU_TAX10: extra-EU imports and extra-EU exports,
variation of upper-level Armington elasticities in import demand of EU
countries (numbers indicate percent changes from baseline)
Extra-EU imports (EU-14) Extra-EU exports (EU-14)
Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3: Case 0: Case 1: Case 2: Case 3:
GEM-E3 Sector
Standard 
version of 
GEM-E3
Halved 
values
Doubled 
values
U.S. ’best 
guess’ 
estimates
Standard 
version of 
GEM-E3
Halved 
values
Doubled 
values
U.S. ’best 
guess’ 
estimates
Agriculture (1)        
Solid fuels (2)        
Liquid fuels (3)        
Natural gas (4)        
Electricity (5)        
Ferrous and non-ferrous metals (6)        
Chemical industry (7)        
Other energy-intensive ind. (8)        
Electrical goods (9)        
Transport equipment (10)        
Other equipment goods (11)        
Consumer goods (12)        
Building and construction (13)        
Telecommunication services (14)        
Transports (15)        
Credit and insurance (16)        
Other market services (17)        
Non-market services (18)        
All sectors        
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter deals with the influence of different foreign trade specifications on the
macroeconomic effects of ecological tax reforms. As previously mentioned in
Chapter 2, the impact of terms-of-trade effects has been widely neglected in the
theoretical double dividend literature; the majority of analytical models relies on the
small-country assumption and assumes that exogenous world market prices
completely determine the domestic price level. Terms-of-trade effects can be
observed in the case of a large country that exerts market power on world markets.
Hence, in order to investigate terms-of-trade effects, I apply the GEM-E3 EU-14
model version and an EU-wide ecological tax reform scenario. The focus of this
chapter, however, is not only on terms-of-trade effects, but also on the effects of
varying foreign closure specifications on the EDD outcome. Even if GEM-E3 EU-14
is a multi-country model, a closure rule is necessary because the behaviour of the rest
of the world is exogenous in large parts.
In this chapter, I suggest three changes in the foreign trade specification and test them
with respect to the employment effects of an EU-wide ecological tax reform. The
first replaces the assumption of fixed world market prices by a finite price elastic
foreign export supply function. The second concerns the modelling of foreign import
demand and introduces an additional variable which accounts for income effects. The
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third change refers to the empirical specification of Armington elasticities in the
import demand function of both the EU-14 and the rest of the world and, thus, to
import price elasticities. The main findings of this chapter can be summarised as
follows:
1. The closure rule incorporated in the GEM-E3 EU-14 model is advantageous in
empirical applications as it avoids complete specialisation in production, allows
for modelling of intra-industrial trade flows, and includes non-traded and traded
goods. In particular intra-EU trade activities, which account for around 60% of
the whole EU trade, are modelled realistically as they depend on an endogenous
EU-price system.
2. In the standard version of GEM-E3 EU-14, the EU-wide ecological tax reform
(Scenario EU_TAX10) leads to an employment double dividend, i.e. to a
reduction in EU-wide CO2 emissions by –10% and simultaneously to an increase
in employment by 0.58%. Real net consumer wages go up, while capital income
falls in all EU countries. The EU-wide terms of trade rise (by 1.03%), implying
income redistribution between the EU-14 and the rest of the world. Tax shifting
effects arise not only from labour to the foreign consumers of exported
(intermediate and final) goods from the EU-14, but also from labour to capital
income.
3. Relaxing the assumption of fixed prices facing the EU as a whole for exports
from RoW leads to considerable effects for the EDD outcome. The simulation
results suggest that the EU-14 as a whole gains from more flexible export prices.
Sensitivity analyses with respect to the export price elasticity indicate that a lower
own-price elasticity of foreign export supply leads to a stronger rise in EU-wide
economic welfare and employment. For an export price elasticity of 0.5 for all
sectors, employment increases by 0.82%. World market prices increase (except
for energy products) with the declining own-price elasticity of export supply.
Positive employment effects are stronger in the case of a finite price elastic
foreign export supply function, since cost-effective substitution possibilities to
foreign imports are restricted; this reinforces the switch to labour. Increased
labour demand leads to higher real wage rates and to higher labour supply.
4. The introduction of RoW’s exports as ‘activity variable’ into foreign import
demand shows only slight impacts on simulation results. Sensitivity analyses with
respect to the estimated degree of linkage show that employment nearly remains
unaffected compared to the standard version (for the highest degree of linkage
considered, employment rises by 0.60%). As expected, aggregate exports of EU-
14 are forced back further, while the fall of aggregate imports is diminished.
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5. Both changes, the introduction of finite elastic foreign export supply and of
income effects into foreign import demand through an ‘activity’ variable, have
some shortcomings which can only be overcome by extending the regional scope
of the GEM-E3 EU-14 model towards a global model with an endogenous
representation of the behaviour of agents in RoW. Recent developments of a
world model version (GEM-E3 World) are geared toward this issue.
6. Additionally, the sensitivity of the GEM-E3 EU-14 model to variations in the
upper-level Armington elasticities is analysed. Obviously, the EU increasingly
benefits from the ecological tax reform policy in terms of economic welfare and
employment with declining Armington elasticity values in foreign import
demand. In other words, lower Armington elasticities in foreign import demand
offer the EU-14 countries greater possibilities of shifting the tax burden abroad.
Sensitivity analyses based on an EU-wide ecological tax reform scenario
(Scenario EU_TAX10) indicate that employment increases by 0.56% for doubled
upper-level Armington substitution elasticity values (recall that employment rises
in the standard version by 0.58%). This increase is associated with a stronger rise
in the EU-wide terms of trade. However, the sensitivity of economic welfare and
employment to variations in upper-level Armington elasticities is not very high;
the GEM-E3 EU-14 model proves to be rather robust.
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Appendix II
II-A Derivation of the own-price elasticity of import demand in EU country c
Competitive imports only
If all tradable imports are competitive, it is IMCIM =  (IMC denotes competitive
imports). The own-price elasticity of the EU country’s demand for aggregate imports,
IMpIM ,
ε , is derived from (4-9) and (4-10) in Section 4.3.1. The price elasticity of
import demand with respect to the price of aggregate imports is defined by:135
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Assume that the level of domestic supply, Y, is fixed. From (4-10) we obtain:
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The first derivative of (4-9) with respect to pIM is:
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Inserting (4-29) into (4-28) and considering equation (4-10) yields:
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where ω , 
Yp
IMp
Y
IM
⋅
⋅
=ω , defines the share of expenditure on imports in expenditure
on domestically supplied commodities. (4-30) is equivalent to (4-25) in Section
4.4.3.3.1.
                                                
135 I omit sector and country specific indices in the following equations.
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Competitive and non-competitive imports
If the share of non-competitive imports in aggregate tradable imports is positive, total
tradable imports IM are given by IMNCIMCIM += , where IMC denotes
competitive imports and IMPNC stands for non-competitive imports.
In the case of non-competitive imports the price for domestically produced and
demanded goods, XDp , is no longer independent of the price for the import
aggregate, IMp , in the GEM-E3 model (px is the price of domestically produced good
x):
(4-31) IMxXD pRTNCpp ⋅+= .
Non-competitive imports are modelled as a fixed share, RTNC, in domestically
produced and demanded goods:
(4-32) XDRTNCIMNC ⋅=
where RTNC is calibrated. Applying Shephard’s lemma to (4-9) in Section 4.3.1
yields the demand for domestically produced and demanded goods XD:
(4-33)
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The demand for competitive imports is determined by (4-10):
(4-34)
Y
IM
Y
IMC p
pYIMC
σ
δ 



⋅⋅= .
The own-price elasticity of aggregate demand for competitive and non-competitive
imports is defined by:
(4-35)
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Assume again that the level of domestic supply, Y, is fixed. Then the first term of the
right hand side of (4-35) is:
(4-36)
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The price for domestically produced and demanded goods, XDp , depends on the
import price, IMp , according to (4-31). Hence 
IM
Y
p
p
∂
∂
 is calculated as follows:
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Inserting (4-37) into (4-36) yields
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The second term of the right hand side of (4-35) is:
(4-39)
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Finally, inserting (4-38) and (4-39) into (4-35) leads to equation (4-26) in
Section 4.4.3.3.1:
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II-B Tables
Table 42: Time series of RoW’s exports (in Million ECU) and RoW’s production
indices
GEM-E3 Sector RoW 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
2 Exports * 3868.08 4495.84 3780.43 5026.61 6832.42 4966.65 3488.00 3583.98
Production index ** 102.23 104.32 105.03 115.41 121.44 123.55 125.87 124.65
3 Exports 93306.74 98029.52 92467.82 100092.51 113494.63 52879.79 48242.00 37288.92
Production index 93.76 82.27 78.53 81.13 78.50 79.03 80.31 86.13
4 Exports 3803.35 5628.27 6182.69 8946.74 10366.69 5284.65 3822.00 3418.23
Production index 102.25 103.88 109.60 116.53 120.40 121.03 126.45 134.88
5 Exports 560.01 676.99 766.47 735.16 690.89 689.72 622.00 576.81
Production index 102.25 103.88 109.60 116.53 120.40 121.03 126.45 134.88
6, 7, 8 Exports 44220.12 49732.27 55368.53 68174.47 71924.02 67330.66 62690.00 72657.05
Production index 101.08 95.57 101.45 110.72 113.05 115.86 123.30 132.54
9, 10, 11 Exports 46253.22 52220.73 61945.58 76218.53 83647.36 84721.98 85592.00 100963.29
Production index 104.43 101.45 107.21 125.61 131.89 135.51 142.86 159.18
12 Exports 78223.76 87558.70 96681.84 113522.75 120066.87 111887.58 108606.00 114056.56
Production index 102.18 100.52 106.23 110.17 97.40 115.48 120.61 123.74
* Disaggregated extra-EU imports for the period 1981 to 1988 are taken from the OECD
Statistic ‘External Trade’. These values are set equal to exports of RoW to the EU. RoW’s
exports are deflated to the base year 1987. The values of RoW’s exports are deflated using a
merchandise export price index (1987=100) that is created from World Bank data (World
Data 1995, World Bank Indicators on CD-ROM). ** Production indices (1980=100).
Unfortunately, data of RoW’s production in absolute terms are not available for the
necessary disaggregation level. I thus calculate the weighted sum of the index numbers of
industrial production for three main RoW regions, EFTA, ASIA, and North America, with
the share of these regions in total industrial production (taken from Industrial Statistics
Yearbook 1991). The shares of the three RoW regions in total production are calculated on
the basis of World Bank data.
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Table 43: Scenario EU_TAX10: macroeconomic aggregates, GEM-E3 standard
version (numbers indicate percent changes from baseline except if
defined otherwise)
Macroeconomic aggregates for EU-14
Austria Belgium Germany Denmark Finland France Greece
Gross domestic product
-0.23 -0.25 -0.07 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.28
Employment 0.38 0.69 0.51 0.39 0.26 0.43 0.51
Domestic demand
-0.53 -0.80 -0.60 -0.43 -0.41 -0.44 -0.93
Private investment
-0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -0.17 -0.13 -0.17 -0.47
Private consumption 0.46 0.63 0.29 0.45 0.33 0.13 -0.27
Exports
-1.35 -1.57 -1.14 -1.56 -1.27 -0.96 -1.36
Imports
-1.08 -1.41 -1.09 -1.34 -0.86 -1.27 -1.84
Consumers’ price index 1.12 1.30 1.19 2.11 1.41 0.99 0.94
GDP deflator in factor prices
-0.18 -0.39 -0.71 -0.06 -0.03 -0.60 -0.85
Energy consumption in volume
-5.73 -6.69 -6.55 -7.35 -6.19 -5.26 -7.37
CO 2 emissions -10.39 -13.80 -8.78 -10.93 -11.69 -8.76 -13.26
Equivalent variation (economic welfare) * 0.35 0.41 0.34 0.46 0.23 0.26 -0.22
,UHODQG ,WDO\ 1HWKHUODQGV 3RUWXJDO 6SDLQ 6ZHGHQ 8Q.LQJGRP
Gross domestic product -0.40 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.01 -0.13 -0.02
Employment 0.51 0.26 0.74 0.61 0.76 0.94 0.21
Domestic demand -0.53 -0.55 -0.19 -0.52 -0.65 -0.29 -0.71
Private investment -0.36 -0.16 -0.09 -0.44 -0.29 -0.14 -0.22
Private consumption 0.36 -0.10 0.24 -0.14 0.25 0.57 0.27
Exports -1.44 -0.56 -0.39 0.09 -1.29 -1.48 -0.94
Imports -1.13 -1.72 -0.62 -0.85 -1.78 -1.08 -0.89
Consumers’ price index 1.52 0.74 0.51 0.49 1.27 1.96 1.73
GDP deflator in factor prices -0.10 -0.91 -0.89 -1.13 -0.82 0.35 -1.11
Energy consumption in volume -6.49 -5.92 -3.55 -5.39 -6.00 -5.21 -7.49
CO 2 emissions -12.67 -9.94 -7.41 -8.70 -10.50 -8.91 -11.36
Equivalent variation (economic welfare) * 0.35 -0.08 0.13 -0.18 0.17 0.47 0.27
* in % of GDP, absolute difference from baseline
Table 44: Scenario EU_TAX10: macroeconomic aggregates,
respecified Armington elasticity values in import demand of EU
countries – Case 3 (numbers indicate percent changes from baseline
except if defined otherwise)
Macroeconomic aggregates for EU-14
$XVWULD %HOJLXP *HUPDQ\ 'HQPDUN )LQODQG )UDQFH *UHHFH
Gross domestic product -0.22 -0.29 -0.07 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 -0.28
Employment 0.37 0.68 0.51 0.38 0.29 0.43 0.51
Domestic demand -0.55 -0.86 -0.61 -0.43 -0.42 -0.45 -0.92
Private investment -0.16 -0.16 -0.14 -0.17 -0.13 -0.17 -0.47
Private consumption 0.41 0.57 0.28 0.43 0.32 0.11 -0.27
Exports -1.15 -1.46 -1.06 -1.54 -1.20 -0.90 -1.30
Imports -0.98 -1.34 -1.03 -1.34 -0.82 -1.22 -1.79
Consumers’ price index 1.04 1.24 1.15 2.10 1.38 0.96 0.92
GDP deflator in factor prices -0.31 -0.45 -0.75 -0.09 -0.06 -0.62 -0.86
Energy consumption in volume -5.67 -6.93 -6.62 -7.15 -6.17 -5.47 -7.36
CO 2 emissions -10.46 -13.90 -8.77 -10.95 -11.65 -8.76 -13.23
Equivalent variation (economic welfare) * 0.33 0.38 0.33 0.45 0.23 0.25 -0.22
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continued Table 44
,UHODQG ,WDO\ 1HWKHUODQGV 3RUWXJDO 6SDLQ 6ZHGHQ 8Q.LQJGRP
Gross domestic product -0.47 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.01 -0.13 -0.02
Employment 0.25 0.74 0.62 0.76 0.96 0.20 0.56
Domestic demand -0.60 -0.55 -0.19 -0.50 -0.65 -0.29 -0.69
Private investment -0.40 -0.17 -0.08 -0.41 -0.29 -0.14 -0.21
Private consumption 0.22 -0.10 0.25 -0.12 0.24 0.55 0.32
Exports -1.34 -0.51 -0.41 -0.03 -1.23 -1.48 -1.14
Imports -1.13 -1.69 -0.62 -0.91 -1.73 -1.10 -0.98
Consumers’ price index 1.44 0.72 0.53 0.55 1.24 1.95 1.84
GDP deflator in factor prices -0.22 -0.93 -0.84 -1.05 -0.84 0.34 -0.93
Energy consumption in volume -6.74 -5.83 -3.66 -5.28 -6.00 -5.25 -7.44
CO 2 emissions -12.81 -9.96 -7.41 -8.65 -10.47 -8.93 -11.35
Equivalent variation (economic welfare) * 0.28 -0.08 0.14 -0.16 0.17 0.46 0.31
* in % of GDP, absolute difference from baseline
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5 Employment double dividend and labour market
imperfections
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 stressed that only a few attempts have been made as yet to analyse the
impacts of ecological tax reforms in the presence of wage setting institutions and
involuntary unemployment; in particular applications in large-scale models are hardly
available.136 Typically, labour market imperfections are introduced by an upward
sloping wage setting curve which replaces the labour supply curve used in the
competitive model. The equilibrium wage and employment level are now determined
by the intersection of the wage setting and the labour demand curve. I also pointed
out in Chapter 2 that the theory of equilibrium unemployment offers three
microeconomic models, which all capture specific institutional factors of actually
existing labour markets – namely trade union models, efficiency wage models, and
mismatch models. Each model is appropriate to describe a specific part of the multi-
facetted phenomenon of involuntary unemployment. Like the recent double dividend
literature, however, I will concentrate exclusively on trade union behaviour in this
chapter in order to address involuntary unemployment on the German labour market.
As will be substantiated empirically in the next section, the trade union model is best
suited to describe the unemployment situation in Germany. Nickell and Layard
(1999), for example, find that strong trade unions – in addition to generous and long-
lasting unemployment benefit payments – are the key institutional factor of
involuntary unemployment. In a cross-sectional study covering 20 OECD countries,
the authors find that trade unions increase wage pressure and raise unemployment.
Actually, among labour market economists there is little dispute that trade unions
have a strong influence on wage formation in continental Europe, whereas they are of
less importance in the USA. Consequently, in the majority of studies referring to
European countries wages are supposed to be the outcome of a collective bargaining
process.
                                                
136 Exceptions, for example, are the MIMIC model (an applied general equilibrium model for the
Netherlands, cf. Graafland/de Mooij 1998) and the WARM model (an econometric general
equilibrium model for the EU and the member states, including Germany, cf. Carraro et al.
1996).
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In the following Section 5.2, I empirically motivate the wage setting equation applied
at a later stage and summarise the evidence on collective wage bargaining and its
institutional structure in Germany. I present a simple macroeconomic model of the
labour market in Section 5.3 and introduce it into the single-country version of the
GEM-E3 model for Germany. Sensitivity analyses are conducted with respect to the
labour market specification. Alternatively to the trade union model, I assume
exogenous real wage rigidities and test model results with respect to different rules of
wage fixing.
5.2 Wage bargaining in Germany: empirical facts and
theoretical background
5.2.1 Institutional structure of wage bargaining
According to the literature, important institutional features of a wage bargaining
system are the bargaining coverage (measured by union density figures and the
degree of contract coverage) and the degree of trade union centralisation and co-
ordination (cf. Layard et al. 1991: Chapter 2).
Over the period 1988-94 around 30-40% of wage and salary earners belonged to a
trade union in (West-)Germany (cf. Nickell and Layard 1999:3041). But since union
wage agreements are frequently extended by law to non-union firms, union coverage
is much higher: Effectively around 90% of all German employees are directly or
indirectly covered by wage settlements (cf. Carruth and Schnabel 1993:298, Franz
1999:235). Hence, even if the German economy is only partly unionised, wages in
nearly all sectors are influenced by trade union behaviour.
A further important institutional aspect is the degree of centralisation of wage
setting. In this context, the literature distinguishes between three levels (cf. Booth
1995:244): First, wage setting can be decentralised to the level of the individual firm
(i.e. one union per firm); second, it can take place at the industry level (intermediate
bargaining); or, third, it can be centralised on the economy level. In the latter case, a
centralised union confederation bargains with an employers’ association that
represents all firms in the economy. According to Calmfors and Driffill (1988:18)
wage setting among 17 OECD countries has the highest degree of centralisation in
Austria and the Nordic countries and the highest degree of decentralisation in the
United States, Canada, Japan, and Switzerland; Germany ranks among the first six
countries. In actual figures, 49,540 collective agreements were valid in Germany at
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the end of 1998. While approximately two thirds of them were concluded between an
employers’ organisation at the sectoral or regional level and a trade union, only
around one third were between a firm and a trade union (Franz 1999:237). This
suggests that the vast majority of collective agreements is concluded at the level of
individual industries in Germany. Actually, trade unionism in Germany is dominated
by the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB) – the umbrella organisation of the
German industry trade unions. In 1998, the DGB covered around 80% of the
economy-wide union members (cf. Franz 1999:240). At present it includes eleven
trade unions that are mainly organised as industry trade unions. In terms of union
membership, the three most important among them are the ‘Metal Workers’ Union’
(IG Metall), integrating one third of all DGB members, ‘Public Services, Transport
and Traffic’ (ÖTV), integrating 19%, and the industry union ‘Mining, Chemicals,
Energy’, including 11% of all DGB members (see http://www.dgb.de).137
Theory indicates that the degree of centralisation of wage setting affects the influence
of trade unions on the aggregate real wage. Calmfors and Driffill (1988), for
example, formulate the hypothesis of a hump-shaped relationship between the degree
of centralisation and the aggregate real wage level and support it with empirical
evidence. The hump-shaped hypothesis suggests that intermediate bargaining leads to
a higher aggregate real wage and – provided labour demand decreases with higher
real labour costs – to higher economy-wide unemployment than decentralised or
centralised wage setting.138
If wages are negotiated at the decentralised level (i.e. at the level of individual firms)
the firms’ output goods are close substitutes to each other so that a single firm is
faced with a high elasticity of product demand. Hence higher nominal wage costs that
increase the output price lead to a significant decrease in the firm’s output and labour
demand. As this is a far-reaching effect for the individual trade union, it will enforce
only a low wage rate. To conclude, strong market forces and high competitive
pressure favour real wage moderation in the case of decentralised bargaining.
The Calmfors/Driffill hypothesis further suggests that in the case of centralised wage
bargaining the aggregate real wage is relatively low as well. The authors argue that
                                                
137 The balance of power within the DGB will change through the formation of the influential trade
union ‘ver.di’ which was born from the merger of five trade unions that all cover mainly service
sectors (see http://www.verdi-net.de).
138 See also Layard et al. (1991), Calmfors (1993), and Booth (1995).
161
inter-union and inter-employer co-operation imply internalisation of wage
externalities (a central confederation of unions, for example, is aware of its impact on
the aggregate price level and employment and will thus take into account that higher
nominal wages lead to higher unemployment).
In the case of industry-level bargaining, however, neither market forces nor
internalisation effects restrain wages. Since industry demand is relatively inelastic
(because of a relatively low degree of substitutability between products of different
industries), industry output demand and employment drop only marginally in
response to higher nominal wage claims and higher sectoral output prices. As the
employment effect is insignificant for an individual trade union, it is reasonable to
assume that the union does not take into account the impact of its wage claim on the
aggregate price level and on aggregate output demand. On the assumption that all
industry trade unions behave in the same way, the aggregate price level rises and,
given constant nominal money supply, aggregate demand and employment are
reduced considerably.
Apart from the degree of centralisation, the degree of co-ordination of wage offers
and wage claims among the different employers’ associations and trade unions
affects the wage setting process. If industry trade unions try to co-ordinate their
bargaining activities, for example by wage leadership, the external effects on the
economy-wide consumption price level generated by industry-level wage bargaining
might be partly internalised as well. This is shown in a recent study by Grandner
(2000). He finds that – given an oligopolistic product market structure and firm-level
bargaining – wage leadership increases the utilities of all trade unions involved, but,
ultimately, it cannot substitute full centralisation. In Germany, the degree of union
co-ordination is in the middle range, and that of employer co-ordination is high (cf.
Nickell/Layard 1999:3041). Discussions on the ‘going rate’ are typically held in
advance of the annual wage round between a leading powerful trade union (e.g. the
Metal Workers’ Union) and an employers’ federation. This wage agreement then
serves as a guideline for the majority of negotiating partners in the whole economy; a
departure from the ‘pilot’ agreement can be explained only by sector specific
features. In this context, Franz (1999:294) emphasises: “Zwar finden
Tarifverhandlungen auf regionaler und sektoraler Ebene statt, gleichwohl werden die
Lohnabschlüsse einer Branche in der Regel völlig oder mit nur geringen
Modifikationen in den anderen Tarifgebieten übernommen und besitzen somit einen
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ausgeprägten Pilotcharakter für die nachfolgenden Lohnverhandlungen anderer
Branchen”.
In spite of the high degree of union coverage in Germany and the unions’ tendency to
co-ordinate wage agreements, wages differ between sectors and firms according to
the wage drift. This empirically observable phenomenon describes the difference
(over time) between the standard wage (minimum wage), which is formally codified
in the collective agreement, and the actual earnings paid by the individual firms. The
wage drift can be explained theoretically, for example, with the efficiency wage
hypothesis or the presence of high fluctuation costs (e.g. search costs) of high skilled
labour (cf. Franz 1999:295).
When modelling trade unions, a further important issue is the degree of union power
and the factors that are negotiated. Both determine which theoretical model of trade
union behaviour is appropriate: The wage is negotiated between the union and
employers in the right-to-manage model, while employment is unilaterally set by the
firm ex post (cf. Layard et al. 1991, Manning 1994). In the monopoly union model
the union has the power to unilaterally determine the wage level subject to labour
demand (cf. Booth 1995). Furthermore, the union and the employer bargain over both
wage and employment level in the efficient bargaining model (cf. McDonald and
Solow 1981). Certainly, the latter approach can be ruled out to describe wage
bargaining in Germany since the employment level is rarely explicitly negotiated (cf.
Franz 1999:291). Taking into account that union density is limited at a level of 30-
40% and that employers’ associations are powerful in Germany, the degree of union
power is limited too.139 This gives empirical support for the right-to-manage model
which, in fact, is applied in most double dividend studies that consider imperfections
on European labour markets (cf. Section 2.3.3.3).
In summary, we need to know how unions operate in Germany. First, wage formation
is dominated by collective agreements, which are primarily made between industry
trade unions and employers’ associations. Second, wage leadership plays a role, and
wage settlements are co-ordinated to a certain extent. Third, nearly all employees
obtain standard wages, even though sector and firm specific wage differentials
                                                
139 In this context, Calmfors (1993:173-174) remarks: “Union membership in a given firm
determines how large a fraction of the labour force can go on strike, and hence also the damage
that the union can inflict on the employer in the case of a conflict. Therefore, a decrease in union
membership weakens the relative bargaining strength of the union and thus tends to restrain
wages and increase employment”.
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represent important elements of decentralisation. This implies that wage setting in
Germany takes place at both levels, the level of industry and the level of individual
firms.
In the following of this chapter, I first omit the effects of the wage drift on wage
formation and, second, assume that the union acts as a monopolist that is able to
unilaterally set the nominal wage level, while the employer only decides on
employment. Even if empirical evidence in Germany rather supports the right-to-
manage model, I will apply the monopoly union model as this is an easy to model
first approximation to wage setting behaviour of trade unions. It represents a special
case of the right-to-manage model and can be expanded to account for bilateral wage
bargaining.
5.2.2 Empirical evidence on real wage resistance and the
unemployment benefit system
In the context of the EDD analysis the incidence of labour taxes on real labour costs
(real wage resistance) is an essential point of interest. The empirical evidence on the
influence of different wedge140 terms on wage formation has been examined in a
series of recent econometric works. Literature, however, offers a mixed empirical
picture. The studies that oppose any permanent effects of wedge elements on the
equilibrium wage and the unemployment rate in Germany are, for example, Bean et
al. (1986), Turner et al. (1993), and Brunello (1996). In contrast to this, Tyrväinen
(1995) comes to the conclusion that the long-run elasticity of real labour costs with
respect to changes in different wedge factors is unity. Steiner (1998) corroborates this
result and finds that a proportionate increase in any element of the tax wedge leads to
an increase in real labour costs to the same extent in the long run.141 According to
some other studies, which are cited in Nickell and Layard (1999:3060), the degree of
                                                
140 As previously mentioned, the wedge describes the difference between real labour costs paid by
the firm and the real take home pay received by the employee and, typically, includes all labour
and consumption taxes (Tyrväinen 1995:7). Frequently, the wedge factors considered in the
econometric literature are employers’ social security contributions, consumption taxes and
income taxes (including employees’ social security contributions).
141 Furthermore, Tyrväinen (1995) shows that – provided the real value of non-wage income can fall
– a revenue-neutral shift from income taxes to consumption taxes reduces the producer wage and
increases employment in Germany. According to Steiner (1998), a revenue-neutral shift from
social security contributions to indirect or direct taxes may have positive wage and employment
effects in the short run as well, but in the long run these effects disappear.
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real wage resistance in Germany lies somewhere between zero and one (cf. Knoester
and Van der Windt 1987, Alesina and Perotti 1994).
In summary, most econometric works principally support the argument that income
and payroll taxes (including employees’ and employers’ social security contribution
rates) have an impact on real labour costs in Germany. The precise size of real wage
resistance, however, remains uncertain. Whereas some studies support real wage
resistance in the long run, others find only short- or mid-term effects. In this context,
Layard et al. (1991:210) summarise that “we have a plenty of evidence that taxes and
import prices have very long-lasting effects on product wages, and hence on the
equilibrium of the economy, operating via real wage resistance”. Referring to the
evidence reported in the OECD Employment Outlook (1990) the authors further note
that “it is hard to imagine that real wage resistance really is permanent”, but that “a
change in the wedge can have a significant impact on unemployment for at least a
decade”.
According to economic theory, the size of real wage resistance depends on both the
way of indexation of unemployment benefits and on the labour tax structure (cf.
Pissarides 1998).142 In particular real wage resistance arises if the replacement ratio,
i.e. the ratio between the real net wage and real unemployment benefits, is variable
and tax shifting effects from workers towards the unemployed are possible (cf.
Section 2.3.3.3). In the GEM-E3 standard model all taxes (including income taxes
and social security contributions) show linear tax rates. Unemployment benefits are
indexed to the nominal after-tax wage, while the benefit replacement ratio is fixed at
a 57% level for Germany, i.e. nominal unemployment benefits which are paid within
a period are calculated as a fixed share in the (equilibrium) nominal net wage of the
same period.143 In Germany, however, a complete indexation of unemployment
benefits at the going net wage cannot be observed, at least not in the short and mid
run. Unemployment benefits and unemployment assistance, which are paid by the
German Federal Labour Office, are granted as a share in the ‘generalised’ net
income144 which was received before dismissal. In nominal terms, unemployment
                                                
142 Empirical evidence on the hypothesis that a higher degree of progression of the labour tax leads
to lower wage pressure is reported in Lockwood and Manning (1993).
143 A replacement ratio of 57% is close to reality. Nickell and Layard (1999:3045) estimate an
average benefit replacement ratio of 63% over the period 1989-1994. Using a data sample of
pooled cross sections and time series over 1978-89 and eight EU countries Brunello (1996)
estimates a replacement ratio of 54% in Germany.
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benefits are rather fixed for a while and are calculated according to the previously
received gross earnings and the particular income tax class.
Taking this into account, I will assume – alternatively to a fixed replacement ratio –
that nominal unemployment benefits are constant over the simulation period. Under
this assumption, the replacement ratio is variable and the degree of real wage
resistance is higher. Whether positive employment effects are higher as well will be
tested in Section 5.3.2.
5.2.3 Specification of an aggregate wage equation for the German
labour market
In this section, I present a simple trade union model from which an aggregate wage
equation for the German labour market is derived. The model is stylised and neglects
essential features of the German labour market (such as the wage drift), which have
been discussed above. However, it serves as a first attempt to introduce labour
market imperfections into the neo-classical framework of the GEM-E3 model. Even
if wage bargaining mainly takes place at the industry level in Germany, an aggregate
wage bargaining model might be a reasonable first approximation to reality.145
First, I assume that the whole working force is covered by collective agreements and
that wages are determined by wage bargaining at the level of individual industries. I
further assume that a particular industry union (the Metal Workers’ Union) acts as
the wage leader. Wage leadership is modelled in a simple way: The leading trade
union does not take into account the impact of its wage claim on the aggregate price
and wage level; in other words, it is not aware of being the wage leader and does not
internalise wage externalities. The other industry unions simply adopt the wage
outcome without modifications; i.e. the wage outcome is directly binding for all other
sectors of the economy within the same period. Contrary to empirical evidence on
                                                                                                                                         
144 Unemployment benefits, which are granted for a limited period only, represent 60-67% of the
previously earned (generalised) net income in Germany. Unemployment assistance, which
follows the unemployment benefits whenever the person was not able to find a job and for which
payments are not limited in time, is calculated as 53-57% of the (generalised) net income that
was received before unemployment (see http://www.arbeitsamt.de). In the following, the term
‘unemployment benefits’ is used to subsume all governmental payments to the unemployed
without differentiating between unemployment benefits and unemployment assistance.
145 This argument can be also found in Carruth and Schnabel (1993) who stress the importance of
economy-wide rather than industry specific variables in the wage setting process in Germany and
thus clearly support an aggregate analysis of wage bargaining. As Booth (1995:264) mentions,
however, the macro-modelling of wage setting behaviour has been a neglected research area.
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wage differentials between skills, sectors, and regions, I maintain the assumption of
homogeneous labour and a uniform wage rate for all workers. Furthermore, I assume
that wage mark-ups are not productivity enhancing, like in the efficiency wage
model, but that they only lead to higher labour costs.
In Chapter 2 I argue that the existence of economic rents which can be shared
between the union and the firm is a necessary condition for a contract wage above the
competitive level (remember the sufficient condition that the union has the power to
appropriate a share of this surplus). I maintain the assumption of perfectly
competitive product markets in the GEM-E3 model and assume that firms net a profit
which arises from quasi-fixed sectorally and internationally immobile capital stocks.
The assumption that product markets are competitive, whereas the labour market is
non-competitive allows me to concentrate on the effects of labour market
imperfections on the EDD outcome. I should qualify that by saying that in the real
world imperfections in labour markets are very likely to be correlated with
imperfections in product markets (cf. Booth 1995:95, Weiss 1998). In this context, an
interesting result of Layard et al. (1991), who consider both non-competitive product
and labour markets, is that the firm level wage mark-up over alternative income
increases with declining product market competitiveness.
Concerning the relative bargaining power of industry unions and employers’
associations, I assume that the leading industry trade union has the power to
unilaterally set the wage level, whereas the representing firm of the same industry
chooses the employment level ex post. Hence the wage/employment outcome is on
the labour demand curve of this industry. As previously mentioned, considering
powerful employers’ associations and the rather poor degree of union density in
Germany, the right-to-manage model in which unions and firms bargain over the
wage is closer to reality. Thus the introduction of a right-to-manage model into the
GEM-E3 framework should be reserved for future work.
In the following, I describe the basic structure of the model. The utility of the
industry trade union is given by a Stone-Geary function of the type (cf. Farber 1986,
Goerke/Holler 1997:162):146
                                                
146 Sectoral indices are omitted in the following equations. Equation (5-1) assumes that the
minimum employment level is zero and that the minimum wage is represented by the reservation
wage, w . Note that the commonly used utilitarian objective function represents a special case of
(5-1). According to the utilitarian objective function the trade union maximises the sum of
individual utilities of employed union members, L, and unemployed union members, UM-L:
U(w,L)=Lu(w)+(UM-L)u( w ). On the assumption that the number of union members, UM, is
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(5-1) LwwLwV α)(),( −=
where w is the real net wage, w  is the reservation wage, L is the level of sectoral
employment, and α represents the relative importance of wages for the utility of the
trade union.147 Wages are interpreted in real terms, which implies that the trade union
correctly predicts the consumption price level. The reservation wage is specified
according to:
(5-2) ubwuw +−= ~)1(
where w~  is the alternative real net wage that is paid on average in other economic
sectors, and b stands for real unemployment benefits that are supplied by the
government. The variable u is the economy-wide unemployment rate that is intended
to represent the probability of being unemployed; accordingly, (1–u) is interpreted as
the probability of finding a job outside the leading sector. I assume that the leading
industry union does not take into account that its wage setting behaviour has an
impact on the outside option, i.e. it takes the alternative wage, w~ , and the economy-
wide unemployment rate, u, as exogenous.
As previously mentioned, I suppose that the industry trade union has sufficient
monopoly power to set the real net wage (without bargaining with an employers’
federation). This implies that the union is able to fully control the supply of labour to
this sector. The representative firm of the sector, however, chooses employment
according to its labour demand schedule. The first-order condition from
maximisation of (5-1) with respect to w and subject to labour demand L is:148
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exogenous and that individual utility, u, is linear in wages (i.e. risk neutrality of workers) the
utilitarian utility function implies rent maximisation (cf. Booth 1995). For α  =1 (i.e.
employment and wages enter utility with equal weights) the Stone-Geary utility function (5-1)
implies rent maximisation, too (the relevant maximand becomes )( wwL − ). The conceptual
difference between both specifications is that the Stone-Geary utility function is not derived from
the individual preferences of (identical) union members but rather from the objectives of trade
union officials.
147 A similar union utility function is used by de Mooij (2000:183), see footnote 149.
148 A similar monopoly union model is presented in Booth (1995).
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where LLε  is the own-price elasticity of labour demand which is defined by
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−=ε ; pL is the nominal producer wage (see Appendix III for the
derivation of the labour demand elasticity for the four-level nested CES production
function used in GEM-E3). Rearranging (5-3) yields:
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Expression (5-4) indicates that the real net wage is determined by the real outside
option (real income during unemployment, w ) plus a mark-up in the monopoly
union model. In order to derive the aggregate wage equation I assume in a next step
that all other industry unions exert monopoly power on the industry employers’
association as well. According to the hypothesis of wage leadership, they directly
follow the wage claim of the leading industry and – ignoring own sector specific
circumstances – enforce sectoral wages that are equal to w ( ww =~ ). With this
symmetry condition, the reservation wage is defined by ubwuw +−= )1( .
Reformulation of (5-4) leads to the following two expressions for the wage
equation:149
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According to (5-5) the real net wage is a mark-up on real unemployment benefits, b,
which increases with a decreasing elasticity of labour demand in the leading sector
(for given u and b). Intuitively this is clear, since the trade union can set a relatively
higher wage rate without suffering too many employment losses with a relatively
                                                
149 From a right-to-manage approach, in which a firm and a trade union bargain over the wage rate,
de Mooij (2000:186) obtains the following wage equation:
[ ] 1/)1())1/((/ −+−⋅−⋅⋅+= LLL wtwubw επββα
where π  represents profits (arising from fixed capital) and β is the bargaining power of the firm.
As is common in literature, the wage equation is derived from the first-order conditions from a
Nash bargaining maximisation problem which is described by: ββπ −1max V
w
 where V is defined
by (5-1). For 0=β  (i.e. no bargaining power of the firm) the wage equation turns into (5-5) of
the monopoly union model.
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lower labour demand elasticity. The mark-up also increases with the relative weight
α that the union attributes to wages in its utility function.
Since 0)//()/( 2 <−⋅−=
∂
∂
LLLL ub
u
w
εαεα , an increase in the unemployment rate
ceteris paribus reduces the real net wage, i.e. the wage curve – which describes the
relationship between the real net wage and the unemployment rate in w/L space – is
bending upward.
Furthermore we see from (5-6) that the real net wage rate grows (ceteris paribus)
with b, provided that 0)/( >− LLu εα .
Moreover, solving (5-5) or (5-6) for u yields:
(5-7)
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Obviously, the economy-wide unemployment rate grows (ceteris paribus) with the
replacement ratio wb / , or – as the following equation (5-8) can be derived from (5-
2) – with the reservation rate ww / :
(5-8)
w
b
uu
w
w
+−= )1( .
Equation (5-7) illustrates the channel through which real wage resistance affects
employment: As previously mentioned, real wage resistance can be observed if a
lower tax on labour income enlarges the gap between income during employment and
unemployment. This weakens the union’s bargaining position, reduces wage pressure
and favours employment.
In Section 5.3.2 the aggregate wage equation (5-6) is implemented into the single-
country version of the GEM-E3 model. I assume that the leading union sets the wage
for all employees who belong to one of the three GEM-E3 sectors: the ferrous and
non-ferrous ore industry (6), electrical goods industry (9), and transport equipment
industry (10). This sectoral classification was chosen to approximate the sphere of
influence of the German Metal Workers’ Union (IG Metall), which, in reality, mainly
covers the metal and engineering industry, the electrical industry, the timber and
plastics industry, and the automobile industry.
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5.3 Sensitivity of GEM-E3 model results to different
mechanisms of wage formation
In the next two sections I present simulation results of the Scenario D_TAX20. As in
Chapter 3, I apply the single-country version of the GEM-E3 model for Germany.
First, I introduce in Section 5.3.1 an exogenous real wage model; then the monopoly
union model is implemented in Section 5.3.2. In all simulations below, I assume that
individual labour supply (representing labour supply in the absence of labour market
institutions) is variable. The unemployment rate is calculated as the ratio of the
involuntarily unemployed (measured by individual labour supply minus labour
demand) to individual labour supply (cf. Section 2.3.3.1). Labour supply is computed
as the difference between exogenous time resources and endogenous demand for
voluntary leisure.
5.3.1 Exogenous real wage rigidities
The most simple approach to introducing involuntary unemployment is to assume
that real wages are fixed above the market-clearing level (cf. Section 2.3.3.2). By
applying this ad hoc specification, I provide a first test of the sensitivity of model
results with respect to different wage fixing rules. In particular it can be shown for
which real wage range the EDD hypothesis is accepted in the single-country version
of the GEM-E3 model for Germany.
In order to introduce an exogenous real wage into the GEM-E3 model, the
equilibrium condition for the real wage rate is replaced by a wage equation that fixes
the real wage level. The equilibrium employment level is determined by labour
demand at this fixed real wage, while equilibrium involuntary unemployment is
calculated as a residuum which results from the difference between individual labour
supply and labour demand. Concerning the unemployment benefit regime it is
assumed for the following simulations of this section that the replacement ratio is
fixed (see Section 5.3.2).
Table 45 depicts the simulation results of the Scenario D_TAX20 for the neo-
classical labour market specification (Case 0) and for different exogenous wage
models (Case 1 to Case 3).
Case 1 assumes that the real consumer wage is fixed, i.e. employees can preserve the
living standard they had before the tax reform was implemented. This implies that
both the incidence of the CO2 tax and the cut in the employers’ and employees’
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social security contribution rate is borne by the employers. In Case 2 and Case 3, the
additional tax burden associated with the CO2 tax is still borne by the employer side,
but the degree of real wage resistance is reduced: The incidence of a cut in the
employees’ share in social security contributions is now partially (Case 2) or even
fully (Case 3) borne by employees in terms of a higher real consumer wage. While
the real net wage increases compared to the reference run by the half of the reduction
in employees’ social security contribution rate in Case 2, employees can enforce a
real net wage in Case 3 that is raised by the whole amount of reduction in the
employees’ social security contribution rate.
Table 45: Scenario D_TAX20: macroeconomic aggregates for Germany,
exogenous real wage rigidities (numbers indicate percent changes from
baseline except if defined otherwise)
Macroeconomic aggregates for Germany
Case 1**** Case 2**** Case 3****
1. year 5. year 10. year 1. year 5. year 10. year 1. year 5. year 10. year 1. year 5. year 10. year
Gross domestic product 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.52 2.46 5.19 0.06 0.09 -0.34 -0.10 -0.67 -2.00
Employment 0.12 0.59 1.27 0.92 4.59 10.35 0.15 0.56 0.68 -0.11 -0.70 -2.04
Production -0.14 -0.75 -1.76 0.24 1.16 2.44 -0.13 -0.76 -2.03 -0.26 -1.38 -3.39
Domestic demand -0.13 -0.68 -1.58 0.12 0.58 1.24 -0.12 -0.68 -1.76 -0.20 -1.10 -2.69
Private investment -0.03 -0.17 -0.52 0.23 1.12 2.40 -0.02 -0.18 -0.71 -0.10 -0.61 -1.68
Private consumption 0.09 0.35 0.50 0.32 1.50 3.16 0.10 0.34 0.33 0.02 -0.05 -0.57
Real net income 0.09 0.36 0.52 0.33 1.56 3.29 0.10 0.35 0.34 0.02 -0.05 -0.59
 - Labour income 0.43 1.96 3.92 0.95 4.59 10.35 0.42 1.81 3.24 0.25 0.90 1.04
 - Non-labour income -0.19 -0.96 -2.29 -0.16 -0.93 -2.53 -0.16 -0.85 -2.05 -0.16 -0.83 -1.94
Real consumer wage 0.31 1.36 2.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 1.24 2.54 0.36 1.61 3.15
Real producer wage -0.10 -0.55 -1.37 -0.94 -4.55 -9.84 -0.13 -0.52 -0.75 0.15 0.79 2.00
Exports -0.22 -1.17 -2.77 0.73 3.43 7.15 -0.19 -1.19 -3.44 -0.50 -2.67 -6.53
Imports -0.21 -1.05 -2.40 -0.06 -0.29 -0.65 -0.20 -1.06 -2.50 -0.25 -1.30 -3.05
Terms of trade 0.10 0.55 1.32 -0.34 -1.57 -3.19 0.09 0.56 1.65 0.23 1.28 3.21
CO 2  tax rate (ECU’85)** 4.4 23.8 60.8 4.9 26.5 68.4 4.4 23.8 60.3 4.2 22.8 57.8
CO 2  tax revenue* 0.38 1.87 4.21 0.42 2.10 4.78 0.38 1.87 4.16 0.37 1.79 3.97
CO 2  emissions -2.00 -10.00 -20.00 -2.00 -10.00 -20.00 -2.00 -10.00 -20.00 -2.00 -10.00 -20.00
*   in % of GDP, absolute difference from baseline
**  in value figures
*** in % of base year GDP, cumulative from 1st year
**** Case 1: fixed real net wage; Case 2: the nominal gross wage is fully indexed to the consumer price index and only partially indexed to 
the employees’ social security contribution rate; Case 3: the nominal gross wage is indexed to the consumer price index only (fixed real gross 
wage).
Flexible real wage Fixed real wage
Case 0
Table 45 indicates that the employment effects computed with GEM-E3 are quite
sensitive to the wage fixing rule. As expected, positive employment effects are the
highest in Case 1 in which the real net wage is fixed throughout the simulation
period: In the 10th year after the introduction of the ecological tax reform, i.e. for a
-20% CO2 emissions reduction target, employment rises by more than 10% in
Germany. Associated with this increase is a sharp fall in real labour costs by more
than –9%. This effect is extreme, but considering that in the case of a flexible real
wage the real net wage rises by 2.61% – indicating large tax shifting effects away
from labour – it is easy to explain: A fixed real net wage makes it possible for the
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firms to employ formerly unemployed people at reduced labour costs. The
considerable increase in labour demand mainly reflects technological substitution
effects in production.
Employment still increases (although to a significantly lower extent) in Case 2, in
which employees successfully push up the real net wage by half of the cut in their
social security contribution rate: A –20% reduction in CO2 emissions leads only to a
moderate employment increase of 0.68%. Labour demand rises less since the real
producer wage drops only by –0.75%. In Case 3, employees enforce an increase in
the real net wage that even goes beyond the increase in Case 0. The rise in the real
net wage of 3.15% prevents the real labour costs from falling; labour demand and
employment drop by around -2%.
5.3.2 Monopoly union model
Next, I introduce the wage setting equation defined by equation (5-6) to the single-
country version of the GEM-E3 model for Germany. This equation differs from the
exogenous wage model above in that it relates the real net wage to the performance
of the labour market, such as the unemployment rate. An increase in employment
raises the real net wage, which, in turn, reduces the effect on labour demand. I
assume that the wage setting process is co-ordinated by wage leadership. The leading
industry union sets the contract wage for the employed in three GEM-E3 sectors:
ferrous and non-ferrous ore (6), electrical goods (9), and transport equipment (10).
This wage is then accepted by all other industry unions without modification.150
The implementation of the wage setting equation (5-6) requires the specification of
the parameter α  by calibrating to the benchmark data set:
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ε  is the aggregate labour demand elasticity of the three sectors that are
covered by the leading industry union in the base year. By calibration I obtain
                                                
150 This assumption implies that the other trade unions take utility losses, as they neglect sectoral
differences in labour demand elasticities. At any rate, the assumption of a unique wage rate
increases labour market inefficiencies compared to the case of sectorally differentiated wage
rates.
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005.0=α . Labour demand elasticity and the unemployment rate in the base year are
computed as 167.010,9,6
0
=LLε  and %80 =u .
In the first simulation run, I assume that the ratio between unemployment benefits
and the nominal after-tax wage is fixed at a (calibrated) level of 57% for all periods t:
Case 1: t
w
b
t
t
t ∀== 57.0ρ .
As a fixed replacement ratio is less close to reality in Germany and since econometric
studies support the existence of real wage resistance (cf. Section 5.2.2), I assume in
the second model run that unemployment benefits are fixed in nominal terms over the
whole simulation period at the calibrated base year value, B0. The replacement ratio
within a period t is calculated according to:
Case 2:
tLJt
t
t p
B
w
b 0
==ρ
where 
tLJp  is the actual nominal consumer wage and 0B  represents fixed nominal
unemployment benefits (which are not subject to social security contributions).
Table 46 depicts the simulation results of Scenario D_TAX20 for the monopoly union
model with both cases of unemployment benefits indexation (Case 1 and Case 2) as
well as for the neo-classical labour market specification (Case 0). Obviously, two
results which can also be found in the literature (e.g. in de Mooij 2000:209-217) can
be corroborated immediately:
– Positive employment effects of an ecological tax reform are higher if the initial
labour market equilibrium is distorted by trade unions.
– In the presence of wage setting behaviour, employment effects depend on the kind
of unemployment benefits indexation. In the case of a fixed replacement ratio,
real wage resistance is absent and employment effects are lower than in the case
of nominally fixed unemployment benefits, which allows for some degree of real
wage resistance.
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Table 46: Scenario D_TAX20: macroeconomic aggregates for Germany,
monopoly union model (numbers indicate percent changes from baseline
except if defined otherwise)
Macroeconomic aggregates for Germany
Case 1: b /w =const. Case 2: B =fix
1. year 5. year 10. year 1. year 5. year 10. year 1. year 5. year 10. year
Gross domestic product 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.21 0.19 0.13 0.33 0.45
Employment 0.12 0.59 1.27 0.20 0.71 1.48 0.23 0.90 1.92
Production -0.14 -0.75 -1.76 -0.06 -0.62 -1.55 -0.05 -0.53 -1.34
Domestic demand -0.13 -0.68 -1.58 -0.03 -0.51 -1.34 -0.02 -0.46 -1.20
Private investment -0.03 -0.17 -0.52 0.01 -0.09 -0.34 0.02 -0.03 -0.19
Private consumption 0.09 0.35 0.50 0.27 0.59 0.83 0.27 0.64 0.96
Real net income 0.09 0.36 0.52 0.28 0.61 0.86 0.29 0.66 1.00
 - Labour income 0.43 1.96 3.92 0.75 2.24 4.25 0.78 2.44 4.74
 - Non-labour income -0.19 -0.96 -2.29 -0.11 -0.74 -1.93 -0.12 -0.80 -2.09
Real consumer wage 0.31 1.36 2.61 0.55 1.53 2.73 0.54 1.53 2.76
Real producer wage -0.10 -0.55 -1.37 -0.05 -0.51 -1.35 -0.09 -0.72 -1.80
Exports -0.22 -1.17 -2.77 -0.34 -1.29 -2.82 -0.30 -1.06 -2.32
Imports -0.21 -1.05 -2.40 -0.20 -1.00 -2.29 -0.19 -0.96 -2.20
Terms of trade 0.10 0.55 1.32 0.14 0.60 1.36 0.12 0.50 1.11
CO 2  tax rate (ECU’85)** 4.4 23.8 60.8 3.9 21.7 57.4 4.0 21.9 57.8
CO 2  tax revenue* 0.38 1.87 4.21 0.34 1.72 3.99 0.34 1.73 4.02
CO 2  emissions -2.00 -10.00 -20.00 -2.00 -10.00 -20.00 -2.00 -10.00 -20.00
*   in % of GDP, absolute difference from baseline
**  in value figures
*** in % of base year GDP, cumulative from 1st year
Flexible wages
Case 0
Monopoly union model
In actual figures, I find that an ecological tax reform in Germany boosts employment
by only 1.27% in the standard model while employment increases by 1.48% in the
case of a fixed replacement ratio and even by 1.92% in the case of nominally fixed
unemployment benefits.
In all simulations, real capital income falls while the real net wage and real labour
income go up. In addition, the terms of trade increase in all cases. Hence the
ecological tax reform redistributes income from capital and the foreign sector
towards workers. Moreover, tax shifting effects from the unemployed to labour are a
further source for the rise in employment in the case of nominally fixed
unemployment benefits (Case 2).
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I investigate whether the labour market effects of an ecological tax
reform in Germany change if labour market forces are restrained by wage setting
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institutions, such as trade unions. Several conclusions can be drawn from the
previous analysis:
1. Germany is characterised by a degree of union coverage above 90%; this strongly
suggests the application of a trade union model in order to describe involuntary
unemployment. Although bargaining mainly takes place on an industry-by-
industry basis, unions’ wage claims are partly co-ordinated between sectors and
regions by wage leadership. Notwithstanding a rather low degree of union density
(below 50%) and the presence of influential employers’ associations, I apply a
textbook standard monopoly union model instead of the more realistic right-to-
manage model for reasons of simplicity. The monopoly union model, however,
represents a special case of the latter and can be extended to a bilateral bargaining
model. Apart from the assumed degree of union bargaining power, other critical
points of the wage setting model presented above are the exclusion of the wage
drift and different labour types, such as labour skills. In addition, wage leadership
is modelled in a simplified way. All these critical aspects point to the necessity of
extending the GEM-E3 labour market model in future work.
2. Nevertheless, the model represents a good first approximation to the wage setting
process in Germany and is sufficient to illustrate the influence of labour market
imperfections on the equilibrium employment level. According to the derived
wage setting rule, the aggregate wage level depends on the economy-wide
unemployment rate, the unemployment benefit system, and the aggregate labour
demand elasticity of the three sectors for which the wage is set by the leading
industry union. I assume that the Metal Workers’ Union (IG Metall) acts as the
wage leader.
3. For a first test of the sensitivity of the EDD outcome with respect to the wage
setting rule, I introduce exogenous real wage rigidities into the model. Simulation
results show that the employment effects are quite sensitive to the particular wage
fixing rule. As expected, positive employment effects are the highest if the real
net wage is fixed throughout the whole simulation period. In this case, the model
computes a positive employment effect of around 10% for the –20% CO2
emissions reduction target. Associated with this increase is a sharp decline in real
labour costs by more than –9%. Whereas in the case of flexible real wages an
increase in employment (by 1.27%) is associated with a rise in the real net wage
(by 2.61%), additional labour demand (stimulated by technological substitution
effects) can now be saturated by formerly unemployed workers at significantly
lower labour costs. The increase in employment is moderated considerably
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(0.68%), or even turns into a decrease (–2.04%), for two further wage fixing rules
cnsidered. These are based on the assumption that the real net wage increases by
half, and the whole respectively, of the cut in employees’ social security
contributions. Since this lowers the degree of real wage resistance, labour costs
are reduced to a lower extent or even rise.
4. In line with the EDD literature, the simulation results obtained from the
monopoly union model show that labour market imperfections may enlarge the
opportunity for an EDD. In the case of the single-country version of the GEM-E3
model – which computes positive employment effects even for a competitive
labour market – an ecological tax reform leads to stronger positive employment
effects if the labour market is initially distorted by trade unions.
5. Simulation results further indicate that employment effects are higher if real wage
resistance exists (i.e. if the ecological tax reform makes the income position of
the unemployed worse compared to that of the workers). This is the case for
nominally fixed unemployment benefits for which the benefit replacement ratio is
variable. Actually, a degeneration of the relative income position of the
unemployed reduces the union’s wage pressure and leads to lower
unemployment.
6. Finally, I would like to make the point that future research with the GEM-E3
model should not only concentrate on a better labour market specification, but
also on the introduction of imperfect output markets, since product market and
labour market imperfections are correlated. Imperfect competition on output
markets, however, will not explode but rather confirm the basic result that labour
market imperfections tend to increase the chance for an EDD.
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Appendix III
Derivation of the own-price elasticity of labour demand for the four-level nested
CES production function
Consider a representative firm that produces a single output good x. It faces a four-
level nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function with
capital, K, and the LEM aggregate at the first level of nesting; electricity, EL, and the
LFM aggregate are at the second level of nesting; and labour, L, the material
aggregate, M, and the fossil fuels bundle, F, are at the third nesting level (recall
Figure 3 in Section 3.2.3.2 that illustrates the nesting levels).151
For reasons of simplicity, I introduce the following notation for the CES substitution
elasticities of the first three nesting levels:
LFMLFMELLEMK σσσσσσ === 3,2,1 ,, .
The first nesting level is described by the following primal CES production function
in the GEM-E3 model:152
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where dK and dLEM are share parameters that are calibrated to the benchmark data set
( 1=+ LEMK dd ). Exogenous technical progress of capital is represented by the
parameter Kγ ; t denotes a time index.153 In the GEM-E3 model the dual concept of
the cost function is used. In order to obtain the unit cost function px which is dual to
the primal production function given by (5-10), I derive the factor demands for K and
                                                
151 At the fourth nesting level, the firm decides on the composition of the materials and the fossil
fuels bundle. This lowest aggregation stage, however, is irrelevant in the context of the own-
price elasticity of labour demand.
152 For the sake of simplicity, sectoral indices are omitted in all following equations.
153 In the GEM-E3 model, autonomous factor augmenting (or, respectively, price diminishing)
technical progress is considered at the lowest level of the individual input (not at the level of the
aggregates).
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LEM from the first-order conditions of profit maximisation and insert them into (5-
10). Solving (5-10) for px then yields the dual unit cost function:154
(5-11) ( )[ ] 11 11111 σσσγ δδ −−−⋅− ⋅+⋅⋅= LEMLEMtKKKx pepp
where 1σδ kK d=  and 1
σδ LEMLEM d= .
Applying Shephard’s lemma to the cost function, i.e. derivation of xpx  with respect
to the price of the LEM aggregate, pLEM, leads to the factor demand function for the
LEM aggregate:
(5-12)
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In close analogy, the unit cost function of the LEM aggregate and the factor demand
function for the LFM aggregate are derived:
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Finally, the unit cost function of the LFM aggregate and the factor demand function
for labour input, L, are calculated as follows:
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154 The derivation of the dual unit cost function from the primal production function is presented,
for example, in Schmidt (1999:62-65).
179
From (5-12), (5-14), and (5-16) the following expressions can be derived:
(5-17)
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The wage elasticity of labour demand with respect to the producer wage pL is defined
by:155
(5-19)
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Inserting (5-12) into (5-14) and (5-14) into (5-16) leads to the following expression
for labour demand:
(5-20) ( ) [ ]32312131 σσσσσσσγδδδ −−−−⋅− ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅= LLFMLEMxtLLLFMLEM ppppexL .
Differentiating of (5-20) with respect to pL yields (for given x):
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After rearranging (5-21) and considering equations (5-16), (5-17), and (5-18) I
obtain:
(5-22)
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With (5-12), (5-14), and having (5-16) in mind, the product before the square bracket
in (5-22) reduces simply to labour demand, L. Hence the labour demand elasticity
with respect to the producer wage can be written as follows:
                                                
155 Note that in contrast to Chapter 3 the own-price labour demand elasticity, εLL, is defined with a
minus sign.
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(5-23)
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Finally, I obtain the following expression for LLε :
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Table 47 depicts sectoral wage elasticities of labour demand which are computed
with the GEM-E3 single-country version for Germany and are evaluated at base year
data.
Table 47: Own-price labour demand elasticities for GEM-E3 sectors, Germany
(base year)
GEM-E3 Sector −ε LL
Agriculture (1) -0.130
Solid fuels (2) 0.083
Liquid fuels (3) -0.085
Natural gas (4) -0.066
Electricity (5) 0.022
Ferrous and non-ferrous metals (6) -0.440
Chemical industry (7) -0.393
Other energy-intensive ind. (8) -0.351
Electrical goods (9) -0.094
Transport equipment (10) -0.156
Other equipment goods (11) -0.121
Consumer goods (12) -0.193
Building and construction (13) -0.116
Telecommunication services (14) -0.027
Transports (15) 0.070
Credit and insurance (16) -0.085
Other market services (17) -0.148
Non-market services (18) -0.040
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6 Summary and final remarks
This work addresses a question that has been on the top of the political agenda for the
last ten years: the employment double dividend (EDD) hypothesis. This hypothesis
claims that an ecological tax reform leads to both a reduction in the unemployment
rate and to lower pollution. Since the beginning of the nineties, energy/CO2 taxes
have been unilaterally introduced in several EU countries – frequently embedded
within an ecological tax reform that is designed to reduce unemployment. Whether or
not an ecological tax reform boosts employment is, however, disputed in the
theoretical and empirical economic literature.
The theoretical research on the EDD hypothesis has widely developed during recent
years and has reached a point where more empirical applications and quantitative
evaluations are required. Hence the central interest of this thesis is to assess the
employment effects of ecological tax reforms in a recursively dynamic computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model framework. The ecological tax reforms considered
refer to a shift from labour taxes (strictly speaking: social security contributions) to
CO2 emission taxes which are imposed on all energy consumers (firms and
households).
Chapter 2 generally introduces to the functioning of energy taxes and recalls the
common economic arguments in favour of energy taxes and tradable permits for use
in national and international climate policies. It shows that both environmental
instruments minimise overall abatement costs and provide innovative incentives.
Some recent studies find that environmental taxes are superior over tradable permits
in terms of innovation incentives. A discussion of the fiscal motives of energy taxes
leads to a survey on the theoretical literature on ecological tax reforms. Theory
suggests that the EDD hypothesis might be accepted only if specific model
assumptions hold. In the case of a perfectly competitive labour market with an
upward sloping labour supply curve, employment rises only if the ecological tax
reform boosts the real consumer wage. This requires that, from a public finance point
of view, labour is taxed with a too high rate compared to energy in the initial
equilibrium (reflecting a sub-optimal tax system) so that tax shifting effects from
labour to other sources of private income can outweigh the negative tax burden effect
(caused by the energy tax) on labour income. A further interesting finding of the
literature survey is that labour market distortions which are caused by wage setting
behaviour may enlarge the opportunity for an EDD. If both the degree of real wage
rigidity (i.e. the inflexibility of the real wage with respect to changes in employment)
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and the size of real wage resistance (i.e. the extent to which the incidence of a cut in
social security contributions falls on employers in terms of lower labour costs) are
sufficiently large to restrain the real wage, labour demand and employment may
increase.
The EDD literature identifies three ways of tax shifting away from labour income:
tax shifting to other factor income (e.g. to capital owners), tax shifting to the foreign
sector (e.g. to foreign users of domestic intermediate and final goods), and tax
shifting to non-wage income (e.g. to the unemployed).
Accordingly, it depends in CGE models on a number of model assumptions – such as
the production structure, substitution and supply elasticities of factors, the foreign
trade specification, or the specification of labour markets and the unemployment
benefit regime – whether (and to which extent) employment will increase or not in
response to a shift from labour to energy taxes. Since it is nearly impossible to
understand all transmission mechanisms that lead to a particular EDD outcome in
empirical models, the qualitative results of the theoretical models, surveyed in
Chapter 2, serve as an indispensable guideline for the interpretation of numerical
model results.
The employment effects of a shift from labour to energy taxes are evaluated in the
Chapters 3 to 5 of this work. The overall framework used is the CGE model GEM-E3
which was developed by the ZEW, Mannheim, and other European research
institutes on behalf of the European Commission (DG XII). The GEM-E3 EU-14
version covers 14 EU countries (linked via bilateral trade flows) and the rest of the
world. While the production side is highly disaggregated (including 18 sectors), the
consumer side is described by a single representative household. In the standard
version of the model the labour market and all commodity markets are perfectly
competitive. Invested physical capital is immobile across countries and sectors; the
capital stock is quasi fixed. Capital income is partially owned by the representative
household. The model includes a number of pre-existing tax distortions.
The EDD outcome in the standard GEM-E3 model version
For testing the sensitivity of model results to substitution patterns in production in
Chapter 3 and to different labour market specifications in Chapter 5 I use the GEM-
E3 single-country version for Germany. The ecological tax reform scenario applied
(Scenario D_TAX20) assumes that Germany realises a CO2 emissions reduction of
-20% over a period of ten years (with –10% after the first five years) by means of a
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unilateral (endogenous) tax on households’ and firms’ CO2 emissions. Revenue
neutrality is secured by a fixed ratio of public deficit to gross domestic product;
excess tax revenues are used to reduce the employers’ and employees’ social security
contribution rates.
Since terms-of-trade effects are more important for large countries, like the European
Union which has some power on world markets, the effects of different foreign trade
specifications on the EDD outcome  are analysed within the GEM-E3 EU-14 model
framework (Chapter 4). The ecological tax reform scenario applied (Scenario
EU_TAX10) assumes an EU-wide reduction target of households’ and firms’ CO2
emissions of –10%; this target is close to the EU’s commitment under the Kyoto
Protocol.
Table 45 summarises the simulation results of the scenarios if these are applied to the
standard versions of the GEM-E3 EU-14 model and the single-country model for
Germany, respectively.
Table 48: Summary of simulation results, GEM-E3 standard version
EU-14 Germany
CO2 emissions -10.00 -20.00 -10.00 -8.78
Employment 0.59 1.27 0.58 0.51
Economic welfare 0.03 -0.06 0.23 0.34
Gross domestic product 0.11 0.00 -0.04 -0.07
Real consumer wage 1.36 2.61 - 0.99
Real capital income -0.96 -2.29 - -0.68
Terms of trade 0.55 1.32 1.03 -
Germany
Scenario D_TAX20 Scenario EU_TAX10
GEM-E3 single-country version GEM-E3 EU-14
Table 45 illustrates that the EDD hypothesis is accepted for both scenarios. In
Scenario D_TAX20, German employment rises by 0.59% if CO2 emissions are
reduced by –10% (within 5 years) and by 1.27% if CO2 emissions decrease by –20%
(within ten years). Real capital income and the real producer wage fall, while the real
net wage and terms of trade rise. For the –10% reduction target, economic welfare
rises by 0.03%, i.e. the welfare loss caused by lower leisure is overcompensated by
the welfare gain from higher consumption levels. Welfare decreases (by -0.06%),
however, in Scenario D_TAX20 for the –20% reduction target.
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In Scenario EU_TAX10, the EU-wide employment level increases by 0.58% and EU-
wide GDP falls by –0.04% for the –10% reduction target. The increase in EU-wide
employment is associated with a rise in the real consumer wage and a fall in real
capital income in nearly all EU countries. The EU-wide terms of trade rise (by
1.03%) implying income redistribution between the EU-14 and the rest of the world.
Moreover, the individual country figures for Germany show that employment goes up
by 0.51% under the co-ordinated policy, while GDP falls by –0.07%.
Generally, in both scenarios positive employment effects can be explained by tax
shifting effects from labour to the foreign sector – i.e. to foreign consumers of
exported (intermediate and final) goods – and by tax shifting effects towards capital
income. Since in the standard model version the labour market is perfectly
competitive, labour supply depends positively on the real consumer wage and
negatively on the real non-labour income. Thus both a loss in capital income (which
partly accrues to the representative household) and a higher real consumer wage
stimulate labour supply. On the other hand, labour demand increases due to
substitution processes in response to the changed ratio of labour to fossil fuel prices.
Obviously, in the GEM-E3 model, substitution effects towards labour input dominate
negative output effects caused by the increase in the energy tax burden.
In Chapters 3 to 5 the single-country and multi-country standard version of GEM-E3
is changed with respect to the specification of several functional forms and the
parameterisation of key elasticity values. The main interest is to test the sensitivity of
model results to the employment effects of a shift from labour to energy taxes.
The EDD and substitution patterns
Chapter 3 investigates the influence of substitution patterns in production on the
EDD outcome in the GEM-E3 single-country version for Germany. Since
econometric estimates of substitution elasticities in German production and service
sectors are rarely available, I started with estimating substitution elasticities between
capital, labour, material, electricity, and fossil fuels using a translog cost function.
Empirical basis is a pooled time-series cross-section data sample for 49 German
producing and service sectors over the period 1978-90. Four sector aggregates are
constructed including the energy supply sectors, the energy-intensive manufacturing
sectors, the nonenergy-intensive manufacturing sectors, and the service sectors. First,
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I estimate the non-nested translog cost function, second, I estimate a three-level
nested translog cost function that fits into the nesting structure of the GEM-E3
model. Even if estimates of the non-nested translog cost function have no direct
connection with the GEM-E3 model, they still are interesting in the context of the
general double dividend debate and fill a gap of empirically substantiated, sectorally
disaggregated substitution elasticities in German production and service sectors.
Since the estimation of the non-nested translog cost function yields significantly
positive own-price elasticities for some sector aggregates and energy inputs, I impose
local concavity restrictions on the parameters. A comparison of results, however,
indicates that differences between the unrestricted and the local concavity restricted
model are of minor importance. The constant-output own-price elasticity is (in
absolute terms) highest for capital demand, whereas electricity and fossil fuel
demand seem to be less price elastic (except for the energy supply sectors aggregate).
Positive Morishima elasticities of substitution below unity are obtained for the
majority of sectors and input pairs. This indicates an overall dominance of weak
substitutability relationships. In particular the results support the hypothesis that
capital and energy are substitutes. An interesting result of the one-stage estimation is
that it is only for nonenergy-intensive manufacturing and the service sectors
aggregate that labour seems to be a better substitute for electricity than capital or
material; in most other cases, labour is more difficult to substitute for energy than
capital or material. Besides, the estimation of sectoral economy-of-scale elasticities
yields the result that it is only for 17 of 49 sectors (mainly energy-intensive
manufacturing sectors) that the hypothesis of constant returns to scale cannot be
rejected at a 5% level of significance, indicating that the majority of sectors are
described by decreasing returns to scale (mainly nonenergy-intensive manufacturing
sectors) or increasing returns to scale (mainly energy supply and service sectors).
Testing for homotheticity and homogeneity shows that the aggregates are
characterised by non-homothetic and non-homogeneous production functions.
In the next step, substitution elasticities are estimated for the nested production
function used in the GEM-E3 model for Germany. A comparison with the values
previously used in the model indicates considerable numerical differences for several
sectors. Testing for weak homothetic separability restrictions proves, however, that
inputs can be aggregated only in exceptional cases. Thus the econometric estimates
of the multi-stage estimation are surrounded by some uncertainty, and further
sensitivity tests are required. Since the econometric tests do not support any
alternative nesting structure, I maintain the one previously used in the GEM-E3
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model with capital and a labour-energy-material aggregate at the first nesting level,
with electricity and a labour-fuel-material aggregate at the second nesting level, with
labour, a fossil fuel aggregate, and a material aggregate at the third nesting level, and,
finally, with three fossil fuels inputs and 14 nonenergy material products at the fourth
nesting level.
I provide sensitivity analyses which are based on the single-country version of the
GEM-E3 model for Germany and the Scenario D_TAX20. The model computes a
double dividend in terms of lower CO2 emissions and higher employment for all
substitution elasticity constellations considered: the previously used values and the
new econometric estimates, while the latter are also halved and doubled. A –20%
CO2 emissions reduction goal is, however, associated with a decrease in economic
welfare in most cases; welfare rises only (by 0.03%) in the case of doubled
substitution elasticity values. Positive employment effects increase with a declining
degree of substitutability between the inputs and input aggregates at all four nesting
levels. For halved elasticity values, employment rises by 2.31%, for doubled values
by 0.73%. This result might be explained with help of the given nesting structure of
the GEM-E3 producer model: The more substitution possibilities are restricted at the
first nesting level, the lower is the rise in capital demand and the higher is the fall in
capital income (indicating tax shifting effects towards capital) in response to an
increase in the unit costs of the labour-energy-material aggregate. All in all, the
numerical simulations with the single-country version of the GEM-E3 model indicate
that the macroeconomic impacts of an ecological tax reform in Germany are – in
terms of the sign – relatively insensitive with respect to a change of substitution
elasticities in production; the model computes an EDD for a wide range of values.
The EDD and foreign trade
In Chapter 4 I study the influence of different foreign trade specifications on the
macroeconomic effects of ecological tax reforms. Since the majority of analytical
models rely on the small-country assumption which implies that exogenous world
market prices completely determine the domestic price level, the impact of terms-of-
trade effects has been widely neglected in the theoretical double dividend literature.
Nevertheless, terms-of-trade effects may arise in the case of a large country like EU-
14 that exerts market power on world markets. Hence in order to investigate terms-
of-trade effects, I apply the GEM-E3 EU-14 model version and the Scenario
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EU_TAX10 that assumes an EU-wide ecological tax reform. The focus, however, is
not only on terms-of-trade effects but also on the effects of varying foreign closure
specifications on the EDD outcome.
Even if GEM-E3 EU-14 is a multi-country model, a closure rule is necessary because
the behaviour of the rest of the world is exogenous in large parts. The survey on the
theoretical literature reveals that the closure rule incorporated in the GEM-E3 EU-14
model is advantageous in empirical applications as it avoids complete specialisation
in production, allows for modelling of intra-industrial trade flows, and includes non-
traded and traded goods. In particular intra-EU trade activities, which account for
around 60% of the whole EU trade, are modelled realistically as they depend on an
endogenous EU-price system. In the standard version, the EU-14 is modelled as a
small country that cannot influence world market prices. The small-country
assumption of exogenous and fixed world market prices, however, is relaxed by the
Armington assumption of product heterogeneity for import demands of the EU
countries and the rest of the world. According to this approach the EU-wide price
level is not completely determined by world market prices, and the rest of the world’s
import demand is finite price elastic.
Based on the literature survey, I suggest three changes in the foreign trade
specification and test them with respect to the employment effects of an EU-wide
ecological tax reform.
The first change replaces the assumption of fixed world market prices by a finite
price elastic foreign export supply function of the rest of the world. Relaxing the
assumption of fixed prices facing EU imports considerably affects the EU terms of
trade and the EDD outcome. The simulation results suggest that the EU-14 as a
whole gains from more flexible export prices. Sensitivity analyses with respect to the
export price elasticity indicate that a lower own-price elasticity of foreign export
supply leads to a stronger rise in EU-wide economic welfare and employment. For a
foreign export price elasticity of 0.5 for all sectors, employment increases by 0.82%
in EU-14, whereas for an elasticity of 2 the increase is only 0.64% – which is still
higher than the increase of 0.58% in the standard version with an infinite elasticity.
With a declining degree of own-price elasticity of foreign export supply the world
market prices increase in response to the EU-wide ecological tax reform – except for
energy products for which world market prices drop dramatically. Particularly foreign
suppliers of carbon-intensive fossil fuels suffer big income losses (both EU import
demand for fossil fuels and world market prices are reduced by the EU-wide CO2
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tax). If world market prices are flexible, the EU-wide terms of trade are affected not
only by the policy induced impact on European export prices, but additionally by the
effects on foreign import prices. Simulation results show that the terms of trade in
EU-14 rise more compared to the standard case, where world market prices are fixed.
In the case of a finite price elastic foreign export supply function, positive
employment effects are also stronger since cost-effective substitution possibilities to
foreign imports are restricted; this reinforces the switch to labour. The stronger rise in
labour demand leads to higher real wage rates and to higher labour supply.
The second modification in foreign trade concerns the modelling of import demand
of the rest of the world. In the standard GEM-E3 EU-14 model version, (sectoral)
foreign import demand only depends on the (sectoral) terms of trade, while income
effects in the rest of the world are neglected. In order to approximately account for
income effects, I introduce a new specification that establishes a linkage between
sectoral foreign import demand and sectoral foreign exports. The new specification
only leads to slight impacts on simulation results. Sensitivity analyses with respect to
the empirically estimated degree of linkage show that employment remains nearly
unaffected compared to the standard version: EU-wide employment rises for the
highest degree of linkage considered by 0.02 percentage points, and EU-wide terms
of trade increase by 0.03 percentage points compared to the standard version. As
expected, the new specification causes a further fall in aggregate EU exports since
negative income effects in the rest of the world additionally reduce foreign demand
for EU exports.
Both changes, the introduction of a finite price elastic foreign export supply function
and of income effects into foreign import demand through a proxy variable, have
some shortcomings which can only be overcome by extending the regional scope of
the GEM-E3 EU-14 model towards a global model with an endogenous
representation of the behaviour of agents in RoW. Recent developments of a world
model version (GEM-E3 World) are geared toward this issue.
The third change refers to the empirical specification of Armington elasticities in the
import demand function of both the EU-14 and the rest of the world and, thus, to
import price elasticities. As expected, the EU increasingly benefits from the
ecological tax reform policy in terms of economic welfare and employment with
declining Armington elasticity values in foreign import demand. Lower Armington
elasticities in foreign import demand offer greater possibilities for EU-14 countries to
shift the tax burden abroad. Sensitivity analyses which are based on an EU-wide
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ecological tax reform scenario (Scenario EU_TAX10) indicate that for doubled
upper-level Armington substitution elasticity values employment increases only by
0.56% (recall that employment rises in the standard version by 0.58%), while
employment rises by 0.60% for halved values. Obviously, the GEM-E3 EU-14 model
proves to be rather robust with respect to variations in upper-level Armington
elasticities.
The EDD and labour market institutions
Finally, I examine in Chapter 5 whether the employment effects of an ecological tax
reform in Germany change in the GEM-E3 model framework if labour market forces
are restrained by labour market institutions. Since Germany is characterised by a
degree of union coverage above 90%, I employ a trade union model in order to
describe aggregate wage setting behaviour and involuntary unemployment in
Germany. Although in Germany wage setting mainly takes place at the industry level,
unions’ wage claims are partly co-ordinated between sectors and regions by wage
leadership. Notwithstanding a rather low degree of union density (below 50%) and
the presence of influential employers’ associations, I apply the monopoly union
model which provides a simple representation of wage setting and is a special case of
the more realistic right-to-manage model.
According to the derived wage setting rule, the aggregate wage level depends on the
economy-wide unemployment rate, the unemployment benefit system, and the
aggregate labour demand elasticity of the three sectors for which the wage is set by
the leading industry union. I assume that the Metal Workers’ Union is a wage leader
that sets the wage rate for the employees of the ferrous and non-ferrous ore industry,
the electrical goods industry, and the transport equipment industry. This wage is then
accepted by all other trade unions without modification.
For a first test of the sensitivity of the EDD outcome with respect to the wage setting
rule, I introduce exogenous real wage rigidities into the model. Simulation results
show that the employment effects are quite sensitive to the particular wage fixing
rule. As expected, positive employment effects are the highest if the real net wage is
fixed throughout the whole simulation period, i.e. if the incidence of the cut in social
security contributions is fully borne by employers. In this case, the model computes a
positive employment effect of around 10% for the –20% CO2 emissions reduction
target. Associated with this increase is a sharp decline in real labour costs by more
than –9%. While in the case of a competitive labour market an increase in
employment (by 1.27%) is associated with a rise in the real net wage (by 2.61%),
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additional labour demand (stimulated by technological substitution effects) can now
be saturated by formerly unemployed workers at significantly lower labour costs.
The increase in employment (0.68%) is moderated considerably, or even turns into a
decrease (-2.04%), for two further wage fixing rules considered. These are based on
the assumption that the real net wage increases by half of the amount and the whole
amount respectively of the cut in employees’ social security contributions. Since this
lowers the degree of real wage resistance, labour costs are reduced to a lower extent
or even rise.
The simulation results obtained from the monopoly union model show that labour
market imperfections may enlarge the opportunity for an EDD. In the case of the
single-country version of the GEM-E3 model – which computes positive
employment effects for a perfectly competitive labour market – an ecological tax
reform leads to stronger positive employment effects if the labour market is initially
distorted by trade unions. Simulation results further indicate that employment effects
are higher if real wage resistance exists (i.e. if the ecological tax reform makes the
income position of the unemployed worse compared to that of the workers). This is
the case for nominally fixed unemployment benefits, for which the benefit
replacement ratio is variable: Employment rises by 1.92% if CO2 emissions fall by
-20% (compared to 1.27% in the standard version and to 1.48% in the case of
monopoly unions and a fixed replacement ratio). Actually, a degeneration of the
relative income position of the unemployed reduces the union’s wage pressure and
leads to lower unemployment.
Restricting assumptions and future needs of research
At the end of the summary of research results, I would like to pick out some
restricting assumptions of this work which uncover future needs of research.
First, I theoretically discuss the innovative incentives of energy taxes in Chapter 2,
but these incentives are widely ignored in the CGE framework used. In reality,
energy taxes can provide a long-run signal effect for firms to search for energy-
saving technologies. In the GEM-E3 model, these signal effects are only captured by
price induced substitution processes within a given production technology, while
technical progress is exogenous. Thus future research is needed in the role of
endogenous technical progress and the EDD outcome.
Second, a main driving force in the model are tax shifting effects from labour to
capital income. These are possible since invested capital is internationally immobile
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and cannot be shifted abroad. In particular in the long run, however, this assumption
is critical and may lead to an overrating of positive employment effects.
A further limiting assumption of the analysis refers to the proposed specification of
the non-clearing labour market. Critical points are not only the use of a monopoly
union model instead of a more realistic right-to-manage model, but also the omission
of segmented labour markets and different skill types. The assumption of
intersectoral mobility of labour is unrealistic, too, and tends to overstate the positive
employment impacts of ecological tax reforms (at least in the short run). In addition,
wage leadership is modelled in a rough way which does not account for
internalisation of wage externalities. Further, the neglect of sectoral wage
differentials implies large labour market inefficiencies.
While it is difficult to introduce all these missing features into a CGE model, they
need to be borne in mind when interpreting the results. Moreover, they point to the
necessity to extend the labour market model in future work. Since product market
and labour market imperfections are correlated in reality, the introduction of
imperfect competition on output markets represents an important research task as
well.
Last, but not least, the study neglects equity issues of ecological tax reforms since
only a single representative household is considered. In reality, however, tax shifting
effects from workers towards the earners of private non-wage income, such as capital
owners or recipients of unemployment benefits, change the income distribution. Thus
it might be an interesting point in future model development to introduce different
household types in order to consider distributional effects of ecological tax reforms.
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Appendix IV: Structure of the GEM-E3 model
GEM-E3 is a multi-country computable general equilibrium model that was
developed on behalf of the European Commission, DG XII, in co-operation with
several European research institutes including the ZEW, Mannheim. When I started
with my thesis at the ZEW, I was in the advantageous situation of being able to
utilise a nearly complete version of the model for the EU-14 without being burdened
with laborious basic construction work. Thus, I will just give a short description of
the model version which I use in this work. Concerning the foreign trade
specification in the GEM-E3 EU-14 model, I would like to refer the reader to
Chapter 4 in which I also discuss possible model extensions. For a detailed
presentation of the model structure and the empirical data basis see Capros et al.
(1997) and Schmidt (1999).
A.1 Production sector
As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, the technology of a cost-minimising industry
is characterised by nested CES cost functions. Figure 3 in Section 3.2.3.2 already
provided an overview of the nesting structure.
Using the dual formulation, the cost function t)x,pC(p KLEM ,,  represents the first
stage of the problem of the firm in which a sectoral output good x  is produced with
respect to the input prices for capital, pK, and the LEM (labour-energy-material)
aggregate, pLEM.156 Technical progress, represented by t, is specified by exponential
(exogenous) rates of price diminution. This type of technical change considers, for
example, autonomous energy efficiency improvements (see Hillebrand et al. 1998).
Profit maximisation under constant returns to scale (in the long run) implies marginal
revenues equal to marginal costs, which explains the output price px of domestic
production in terms of a CES unit cost function:
(A-1) ),,( tppp = p KLEMxx .
Applying Shephard’s lemma yields the factor demand function for capital, K , and
the LEM aggregate.
                                                
156 Sectoral indices are omitted in the following equations.
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Capital input as derived from (A-1) represents the desired capital stock, Kdes. In the
GEM-E3 model, however, the sectoral capital stock is quasi fixed over the current
year at a level reached at the end of the previous year, Kfix. Hence the derived demand
function for K  is used to determine an endogenous ex post price of capital, postKp :
(A-2) 



⋅= t
K
xfpp
fix
xpostK , .
postKp  is the endogenous shadow price of capital which clears the market for the
fixed capital stock, Kfix. It is used to calculate capital income: fixpostK Kp ⋅ ,
157
 which
is distributed among households (in form of interest payments from assets,
dissemination of firms profits, entrepreneurs’ salary), firms, and the government.
Given the ex ante price of capital )+(rp=p IanteK δ⋅ , the factor demand function
for K  can be employed to determine the desired stock of capital, Kdes , where Ip
denotes the price of investment goods, r is the rate of return on risk-free government
bonds (in the standard version of the model with a flexible current account r is
exogenous), and δ  is the rate of replacement.
Net investment Inet is given by:
(A-3) )( fixdesnet K-Km=I , where .10 ≤≤ m
Finally, the capital stock for the next period is:
(A-4) fixbr K-+I=K )1( δ
where fixnetbr KII ⋅+= δ  (gross investment).
In the next step, a CES price function for the LEM aggregate is specified:
(A-5) )( t,P,PP=P LFMELLEMLEM
where ELp  is the price of electricity and LFMp  is the price index of the LFM (labour-
fossil fuel-material) aggregate. Applying Shephard’s lemma yields the factor demand
function for electricity and the LFM aggregate.
One level further down of the nesting, the unit cost function for the LFM aggregate is
specified:
                                                
157 It is easy to check that the calculation of postKp  is equivalent to calculating it from the zero
profit condition.
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(A-6) ),( t,pp,pp=p MFLLFMLFM .
Again, the price dependent, cost-minimising composition of the LFM aggregate is
derived from Shephard’s lemma. This yields the input coefficients for labour, L, the
material aggregate, M, and the fossil fuel aggregate, F.
The final level is represented by a CES composition of fuel and material aggregates.
The fuel aggregate consists of three fuel inputs (represented by 321 ,, FFF  in Figure 3
in Section 3.2.3.2): solid fuels (2), liquid fuels (3), and natural gas (4); the material
aggregate contains fourteen nonenergy inputs (corresponding to 141 ,, MM   in
Figure 3, Section 3.2.3.2): agriculture (1), ferrous and non-ferrous metals (6),
chemical industry (7), other energy-intensive industries (8), electrical goods (9),
transport equipment (10), other equipment goods (11), consumer goods (12), building
and construction (13), telecommunication services (14), transports (15), service of
credit and insurance institutions (16), other market services (17), and non-market
services (18).158
(A-7) ),,(
3
~
2
~
1
~ tpp,pp=p
FYFYFYFF
(A-8)   tp pp=p
MYMYMM
),,,(
14
~
1
~ 
where 
FiY
p ~  denote the prices of domestic supply of coal, oil, and gas plus indirect
taxes including environmental taxes and abatement costs (see the definition of 
FiY
p ~
in (A-18)), and 
MiY
p ~  represent the prices of domestic supply of the nonenergy
intermediates plus indirect taxes. The input coefficients are derived by applying
Shephard’s lemma. By multiplying the input coefficient of the aggregates by the
coefficients of their sub-inputs the overall input coefficients with respect to the
domestically produced supply are obtained.
A.2 Consumer demand and labour supply
The behaviour of the representative household is assumed to perform a two-stage
budgeting procedure: an intertemporal allocation of lifetime wealth endowment
between present and future consumption of goods and leisure and an intratemporal
allocation of total consumption of goods to durable and non-durable goods. Figure 5
illustrates the household’s allocation problem:
                                                
158 Numbers in parentheses denote GEM-E3 sectors (cf. Table 17 in Appendix I of Chapter 3).
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Figure 5: The household’s allocation scheme of the GEM-E3 model
The representative household determines an allocation of its resources between
present and future consumption by maximising an intertemporal utility function
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint:159
(A-9) [ ])ln()ln()1(max
,
LJLJ+C-C s+ tLJtC
t
tLJC tt
−∑ − ββ
s.t. )()1( LJp+Cpr=WT tLJtCtt tt ⋅⋅+∑ −
where WT is the present value of wealth. Ct is private consumption (in volume) and
C  its subsistence level, LJt is leisure (in volume) and LJ  its subsistence level, s is
the discount rate and r the nominal interest rate. The price of leisure, 
tLJp , is
calculated according to: nomthdirhsstLJ wttp ⋅−⋅−= )1()1( , where thdir is the marginal
tax rate for labour income, thss is the employees’ contribution rate to social security,
and nomtw  is the nominal gross wage rate.
Under myopic expectations and the assumption of constant and equal growth rates
for both inflation and the nominal wage rate the Fisher relation can be used to reduce
the demand functions for consumption and leisure to the following expressions:160
(A-10) ( )LJp-Cp-LJp+Y
pr
s
+C=C LJCLJdisp
C
C
r
⋅⋅⋅⋅
β
(A-11) ( )LJp-Cp-LJp+Y
pr
s
+LJ=LJ LJCLJdisp
LJ
LJ
r
⋅⋅⋅⋅
β
                                                
159 βC and βLJ are normalized so as to sum up to one.
160 See Schmidt (1999) for a complete representation of the derivation.
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where rr  denotes the real long-term interest rate which is assumed to be constant in
the standard version of the model.161
In order to obtain leisure demand one has to solve (A-11) for LJ. Labour supply LS is
then given by the residual of total time resources minus leisure demand. In the
standard version of the GEM-E3 model with a neo-classical labour market, the wage
rate serves to balance labour demand of firms and leisure demand of households. The
savings of households S are determined by the difference of disposable income and
consumption expenditures: S = Ydisp - pC ⋅ C.
The model distinguishes between two types of consumption expenditure: expenditure
for non-linked, non-durable goods ( eˆ ), which are allocated on the second stage of the
consumer decision problem, and expenditure associated with the use of durable
goods – covering capital user costs and demand for linked non-durable goods.
The GEM-E3 model considers eleven non-durable consumption categories
(corresponding to 111 ,, QQ   in Figure 5): food, beverages, tobacco (1), clothing (2),
housing and water (3), fuels and power (4), housing furniture (5), medical care and
health expenses (7), operation of transport equipment (9), purchased transport (10),
telecommunication services (11), culture (12), and other services (13). Furthermore,
the model includes the following two non-durable commodities (corresponding to 1Z
and 2Z  in Figure 5): heating and cooking appliances (6) and transport equipment
(8).162
Demand for linked non-durable goods and demand for services from durables has to
be reconciled with investment demand for the modification of the stocks of durables
towards their optimal levels. This requires the employment of a restricted
expenditure function with stocks of durables as quasi fixed goods. The expenditure
function for (linked and non-linked) non-durable goods and given stocks of durables
e(p,u,Z) is derived from the Stone-Geary utility function u(Q,Z) underlying the linear
expenditure system (cf. Schmidt 1999:124-130):
(A-12) ∏∏
==
−⋅−=
2
1
11
1
)()(),(
j
i
j
fix
j
i
i
ii ZZQQu γβZQ
                                                
161 The long-term interest rate is endogenous if the constraint of a balanced current account is
imposed (see Section 4.3.4).
162 Numbers in parentheses denote GEM-E3 consumption goods categories.
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(A-13) 
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where 
iQp  and jZp  indicate market prices of consumption good categories which are
derived from supply prices of sectors (including indirect taxes) and the consumption
matrix (by product). 
jZ
p~  represents the user-cost price of durable good j, u is the
utility level, iQ  the minimum required quantity of non-durable consumption good i,
fix
jZ  is the quasi-fixed stock of durable good j, jZ  is the minimum required quantity
of durable good j, and netZ jI  denotes net investment in durable good j.
Expenditure minimising demand for non-durable goods, given utility u and the quasi
fixed stocks of the durables, can be derived by partial differentiation of the
expenditure function (A-13) with respect to prices (Shephard’s lemma):
(A-14) 11,,1ˆ
11
... =i     ,Qp-e
p
+Q=Q iiQ
1=iiQ
i
ii 


⋅∑β .163
A special feature of the GEM-E3 model is the linkage between non-durable and
durable goods: two non-durable goods (fuels and power (4) and operation of
transport equipment (9)) are linked to the stocks of heating and cooking appliances
(6) and transport equipment (8). In these cases, the input of the non-durables is
composed into a linked (complementary) part and a disposable part.
The linked part is defined by fixjji
l
i Z=Q ⋅,α , where ji ,α  is yearly (fixed)
consumption of non-durable good iQ  per unit of purchase price of durable good
fix
jZ .
164
 The disposable part was already specified in (A-14). Consequently, total
demand of non-durable good i is given by the sum of iQ  and liQ . As the
consumption of linked non-durables does not enter the utility function but increases
only the user costs of durables, the expenditure function (A-13) is reduced by
∑ ⋅⋅
ji
fix
jQji Zp i
,
,
α , leading to eˆ .
                                                
163
eˆ  is defined as the expenditure given by e minus the expenditure for linked non-durable goods
(see below).
164 See Conrad and Schröder (1991) for more details.
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The user-cost concept for durables implies a price Zjp~  for the services of the durable
good fixjZ  which includes the user cost of capital plus the associated costs of linked
non-durable goods:
(A-15) ∑
=
⋅
11
1
,
)(~
i
QjiZjZj p++rp=p iαδ .
The desired stocks of durables and the ex post service prices of durables can be
derived by analogy with the restricted cost function approach. With an exogenous ex
ante user-cost price of durables 
jZ
p~  the desired stock desjZ  follows from:
i.e.          ,p
Z
Z ,e
Z j
j
des
j
~
)(ˆ !
−=
∂
⋅∂
(A-16) 


⋅∑ iQ
1=iZ
j
j
des
j Qp-ep+Z=Z i
j
11
ˆ
~
γ
.
Purchases of new durables under partial adjustment restrictions are (cf. (A-3)):
(A-17) )( fixjdesjjZnetZ j Z-Zm=I ⋅ , where 10 ≤≤ jZm .
With this specification one can analyse the impact of environmental policy on the
stock of durable goods (e.g. cars). According to (A-18) (see below), a tax on CO2 (or
NOX) emissions increases, for example, the price of gasoline. The user cost of an
already purchased car ,
jZ
p~ , increases as well, while the long-run optimal stock of
cars, desjZ , and the demand for new cars, netZ jI , decline.
A.4 Demand, supply, and model closure
Since the demand system determines consumption goods by categories and the
system of investment functions determines investment demand by destination, transi-
tion matrices are required to transform demand into deliveries from the industries.
Therefore, the final demand is the result of the transition matrix of the type (branches
×  categories) multiplied by the consumption categories. Similar to the matching of
consumption categories to products, an investment matrix with fixed technical
coefficients is used to calculate investment demand by origin (products) from
investment demand by destination (branches) as evaluated from the investment
behaviour in (A-3), together with investment for replacement and decay, i.e. fixK⋅δ .
The national accounting identity, which expresses that the private gross domestic
production from both the flow of cost approach and the flow of product approach
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should be equal, is satisfied if and only if total saving, involving income distribution
and fiscal policy relationships, equals total investment. Following Walras’ Law, this
market (n+1) is in equilibrium if an equilibrium price vector is found for the other n
markets (supposing that the demand, supply and price functions are specified
according to the needs of an Arrow-Debreu economy). Therefore, the saving-
investment identity (I=S) and the corresponding global shadow price of capital
(mobility of (new) capital between sectors but not across countries is assumed) is
automatically given.
A.5 The environmental module in GEM-E3
The scope of the environmental issue considered is limited to the primary pollutants:
nitrogen oxides (NOX), sulphur dioxide (SO2), volatile organic compounds (VOC),
particulate (PM10), and carbon dioxide (CO2); and the secondary pollutants: ozone
(O3), sulphur (S), and nitrates (N). These emissions are calculated in linear relation to
the use of primary energy inputs, i.e. solid fuels, liquid fuels, and natural gas. The
consideration of transboundary air pollution and the computation of secondary
pollutants yield concentration and/or deposition figures per pollutant and country.
These figures serve as input for the evaluation of damages, which, in turn, are used
for an integrated ex post assessment of a particular environmental policy.
For SO2, NOX, and VOC end-of-pipe abatement cost functions ( )c aab  are explicitly
specified. Policy induced abatement measures (i.e. the degree of abatement a ), but
also emission/energy pricing through taxes, increase the cost price of using pollution-
intensive inputs. This changes price relations and the derived demand for
intermediates and final consumption. To include these aspects, the (sectoral) prices of
pollution-intensive inputs, sFip , , are expressed as follows:
(A-18)  
( )
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )∑ ⋅⋅⋅+⋅−+
⋅⋅+⋅+=
p
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spsp
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,
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where
cs
en : tax on energy,
eci : coefficient for energy content of energy input i (equal across sectors),
χ i s, : share of energy related use of input i  in sector s ,
efp i s, , : emission factor for pollutant p  using input i  in sector s ,
  efp i s, , = 0 for i ≠emission causing energy input,
µ i s, : share of energetic use of demand of input i  in sector s ,
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α i s sX, ⋅ : intermediate demand of input i  for output sx  in sector s .
A similar specification is used for the price of linked non-durable goods in private
consumption. Inserting these prices in (A-7) and the user cost of durables (A-15) and
maximising profits or utility yields both the policy induced changes in (intermediate
or final) demand and the optimal degree of end-of-pipe abatement. The sectoral
expenditure for end-of-pipe abatement is distributed to demand addressed to delivery
sectors through fixed coefficients. These inputs are added to the intermediate demand
of the sectors and are priced just like all other intermediate deliveries.
A.6 Welfare measure
The welfare change used for the evaluation of policy scenarios is represented by
Hicks’ measure of equivalent income variation (EV). The EV is based on the
intertemporal utility maximisation problem and is derived from (A-9) – (A-11). In a
single period t the EV is defined as:
(A-19) )()( 000100 tLJCtLJCt u,p,p FE-u,p,pFE=EV tttt
where FE is the expenditure function corresponding to (A-9) – (A-11); 1tu  and 0tu
indicate the utility levels observed in the policy and the reference scenario. EV gives
the change in expenditure at base case prices 0Cp and 
0
LJp that would be equivalent to
the policy implied change in utility. In order to derive the expenditure function from
the utility function, the demand functions (A-10) and (A-11) are inserted into the
utility function (A-9) which is solved for the level of utility, ut:
(A-20) ( )LJp-Cp-FE
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where FEt is total expenditure, i.e. LJp+Y=FE tLJtdisp,t t ⋅ .
Solving (A-20) for FEt yields the expenditure function used in (A-19) to determine
EV:
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The utility level ut is calculated from the tth element of the sum of utilities in (A-9).
To aggregate the stream of welfare gains (or losses) of the entire time horizon, a
present value operator is applied. The overall welfare effect of the policy is then:
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where ηt0  is a function of some reference run data.165
If 0<totEV , welfare is lower after the policy measure than in the reference case. The
consumer would be willing to pay the maximum amount totEV  at the fixed budget
level FE0  to avoid the decline of utility. Similarly, if EV>0, the consumer would be
willing to pay up to totEV  to see the policy implemented.
                                                
165 See Schmidt (1999) for a complete representation of the derivation.
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